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Biological beings are the result of an evolutionary and developmental process of adaptation
to the environment they perceive and where they act. Animals and plants have successfully
adapted to a large variety of environments, which supports the ideal of inspiring artificial agents
after biology and ethology. This idea has been already suggested by previous studies and is
extended throughout this thesis. However, the role of perception in the process of adaptation
and its integration in an agent capable of acting for survival is not clear.
Robotic architectures in AI proposed throughout the last decade have broadly addressed the
problems of behaviour selection, namely deciding "what to do next", and of learning as the two
main adaptive processes. Behaviour selection has been commonly related to theories of moti¬
vation, and learning has been bound to theories of reinforcement. However, the formulation of
a general theory including both processes as particular cases of the same phenomenon is still
an incomplete task. This thesis focuses again on behaviour selection and learning; however it
proposes to integrate both processes by stressing the ecological relationship between the agent
and its environment. If the selection of behaviour is an expression of the agent's motivations,
the feedback of the environment due to behaviour execution can be viewed as part of the same
process, since it also influences the agent's internal motivations and the learning processes via
reinforcement. I relate this to an argument supporting the existence of a common neural sub¬
strate to compute motivation and reward, and therefore relating the elicitation of a behaviour to
the perception of reward resulting from its execution.
As in previous studies, behaviour selection is viewed as a competition among parallel path¬
ways to gain control over the agent's actuators. Unlike for the previous cases, the computation
of every motivation in this thesis is not anymore the result of an additive or multiplicative
formula combining inner and outer stimuli. Instead, the ecological principle is proposed to
constrain the combination of stimuli in a novel fashion that leads to adaptive behavioural pat¬
terns. This method aims at overcoming the intrinsic limitations of any formula, the use of
which results in behavioural responses restricted to a set of specific patterns, and therefore to
the set of ethological cases they can justify. External stimuli and internal physiology in the
model introduced in this thesis are not combined a priori. Instead, these are viewed from the
perspective of the agent as modulatory elements biasing the selection of one behaviour over
another guided by the reward provided by the environment, being the selection performed by
an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm aiming at the maximum cumulative reward.
In this context, the agent's drives are the expression of the deficit or excess of internal
resources and the reference of the agent to define its relationship with the environment. The
schema to learn object affordances is integrated in an actor-critic reinforcement learning al¬
gorithm, which is the core of a motivation and reinforcement framework driving behaviour
selection and learning. Its working principle is based on the capacity of perceiving changes
in the environment via internal hormonal responses and of modifying the agent's behavioural
patterns accordingly. To this end, the concept of reward is defined in the framework of the
agent's internal physiology and is related to the condition of physiological stability introduced
by Ashby, and supported by Dawkins and Meyer as a requirement for survival. In this light, the
definition of the reward used for learning is defined in the physiological state, where the effect
of interacting with the environment can be quantified in an ethologically consistent manner.
The above ideas on motivation, behaviour selection, learning and perception have been
made explicit in an architecture integrated in an simulated robotic platform. To demonstrate
the reach of their validity, extensive simulation has been performed to address the affordance
learning paradigm and the adaptation offered by the framework of the actor-critic. To this
end, three different metrics have been proposed to measure the effect of external and internal
perception on the learning and behaviour selection processes: the performance in terms of
flexibility of adaptation, the physiological stability and the cycles of behaviour execution at
every situation. In addition to this, the thesis has begun to frame the integration of behaviours
of an appetitive and consummatory nature in a single schema. Finally, it also contributes to the
arguments disambiguating the role of dopamine as a neurotransmitter in the Basal Ganglia.
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Chapter 1
Learning Affordances and Behavioural
Patterns with an Actor-Critic
Artificial Intelligence does not anymore view robots as pieces of hardware executing a plan,
but as creatures existing in an environment they perceive and wherein they act. Instead of
plans and reasoning mechanisms, robots decide their course of action based upon their internal
representations and perception of their environment. The advantage of this second approach
is that the robot does not need to be programmed; the robot can by itself design its own plan
to perform a task. However, the fact that these robots do not require a completely specified
program does not mean they are easy to design. If you ever tried to program a robot to perform
a task, you already know the complexity of this endeavour. We are all capable of predicting
the effect of some simple interactions with the environment, but predicting the consequences
of every single action is not possible. Hence, lots of fine tuning may be necessary before
the robot performs as intended. In response to this, several authors have addressed different
aspects of this problem. These have provided very useful insights into the role of affective
phenomena for behaviour selection (Avila-Garcfa and Canamero, 2004), an ethological model
of motivation based on internal physiology (Spier and McFarland, 1996), a description of the
procedures used by some animals to select behaviours (Gumey et al., 1998) and some opinions
on the elements that would suffice to build animated creatures (Blumberg, 1997). However,
these have also highlighted two main deficiencies. Firstly, that perception is disregarded as an
adaptive mechanism; secondly, that for most ethological models, once behavioural responses
are set they are difficult to change. My intention in this context is to review perception as
an adaptive mechanism and to integrate this into an adaptive agent architecture. To attain
this goal, I have searched for inspiration in previous studies on adaptation based on ethology,
neuroscience and robotics.
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1.1 The Problem
Therefore, the problem is to find the appropriate manner to introduce perception into the dy¬
namics of interaction with the environment. To this end I have searched for inspiration in
neuroscience and ecology. The last fifteen years have consolidated biology as a source of in¬
spiration to build robotic models. An example of this is the model of action selection proposed
by Redgrave, Prescott and Gurney (Gurney et al., 1998), based on the assumption that the main
role of a vertebrate's basal ganglia is to arbitrate among the animal's behaviours in a centralised
manner (Redgrave et al., 1999).
From a neuroscience perspective, I agree that the basal ganglia play a significant role in
action selection. However, this model does not explain the process of adaptation to the envi¬
ronment, since the meaning of every object is engineered and hard-coded before the selection
of behaviours initiates. Therefore, the execution of behaviours will ultimately be unique and
completely determined by these definitions. This may suffice in a static environment for some
applications. However, interacting in a dynamic environment will —where the value of an ob¬
ject may vary throughout time— require learning of these values. As a response to this, I argue
that it is necessary to modify the designer's view with respect to the role of the environment.
The environment has already been demonstrated to provide proprioceptive and kinaesthetic
feedback when executing a behaviour. However, solving the problem of perceiving in a dy¬
namic environment necessitates a change of perspective with regard to the environment. The
value of an object is used to bias the execution of one behaviour over another. Hence, there is
an implicit behavioural meaning, which I suggest to relate to the notion of affordance. Accord¬
ing to this, the environment should not be viewed anymore as a set of sensory signals, but as a
set of potentialities for action, which may vary over time. This novel view of the environment
introduces a direct relationship between objects in the environment and their potentialities for
action, which is equivalent to a basic semantic definition of the surrounding environment with
regard to the agent. However, it also introduces the problem of learning them. Redgrave's
model uses situatedness for action selection. I argue that this can be further extended in the
concepts of motivation and internal physiology developed by Spier, McFarland and Canamero
(Spier and McFarland, 1996; Canamero, 1997) and the role of reward introduced by Rolls
(2003).
Therefore, the learning of affordances can be formalised by relating the effect of executing
a behaviour to the agent's internal physiology. For example, if an object is edible, eating it
should have a compensatory effect on the level of hunger of the agent. If this effect occurs
repeatedly, it can be assumed that the object is always edible. Furthermore, if the effect of
that particular object varies, the internal representation of this semantic will also vary, sug¬
gesting appropriate changes in the agent's behavioural patterns. Along the same lines, Spier
and McFarland's motivational model (Spier and McFarland, 1996), introduced the possibility
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of combining stimuli with internal physiology to suggest the selection of one behaviour over
another. The intensity of each behaviour is calculated on the basis of its related motivation,
which multiplies the intensity of a stimulus by its related internal physiological values. This
model is mostly inspired by ethology and is a referent with regard to later models of motiva¬
tion. However, this model fails at explaining behavioural phenomena, since the combination of
stimuli is restricted a priori. I suggest that reward, as an assessment of an interaction with the
environment, can be the solution to this problem. I adhere to Schultz' hypothesis that the basal
ganglia are a learning device (Schultz et al., 1993). This argues that the basal ganglia are a de¬
vice learning to relate stimuli to responses on the basis of an assessment signal (reward), which
I argue is also reinforcing or weakening the tendencies towards one behavioural response or
another. This is therefore suggestive of a procedure for learning to select behaviours, which I
propose to implement in a model.
1.2 The Thesis
This thesis focuses on two mechanisms for an agent to dynamically adapt to an environment:
learning the ajfordances1 of the elements of the environment surrounding the agent and learn¬
ing to sequence the executions of behaviours to survive. Although these topics have been
already addressed, this thesis proposes a novel approach inspired after the ecological principle.
The agent and the environment are integrated in a single dynamics; therefore, changes of the
environment reflect in changes of in the agent. Based on this, any living being and its environ¬
ment are viewed as parts of a single entity, governed by a common dynamics. Therefore, from
an artificial perspective, changes of the environment should reflect in changes in the relation¬
ship between the agent and the environment. I have considered perception, behaviour selection
and learning as three of the necessary processes coupling the agent and its environment.
Firstly, as sources of inspiration for perception, this work has focused on the notion of
ajfordance formulated by Gibson (1966). In a way, perception in robotics has been often treated
as a set of sequential processes, e.g., the recognition of individual features often precedes the
recognition of other more elaborated features (composed from the individual features), which
are processed to govern the agent's behaviours. In contrast, the implementation introduced in
this thesis views perception from a functional viewpoint. The agent perceives a flow of sensory
patterns while interacting with its environment, and learns to assign a predictive value to some
patterns depending on previous experience. If the perception of a certain situation preceded
the successful execution of a certain behaviour, the future perception of a similar pattern will
be used as a predictor of the potentiality of performing that same behaviour. This relational
concept between the perception of certain elements of the environment and the potentiality of
' Affordance is a relational concept meaning the function offered by the objects in the environment surrounding
the agent. This is further explained in chapter 4.
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performing an action is the affordance. Learning affordances is viewed as the process relating
perception to the agent's physiology. From a different perspective, this also means that this
learning process defines the semantics of the objects in the environment with regard to that
particular agent as a natural result of their intrinsic common dynamics. In other words, learning
affordances implies grounding the agent in the environment (Harnad, 1990).
Nevertheless, adaptation often requires more than learning the potentialities for action of¬
fered by an environment. Knowing the affordances of the objects in the surrounding environ¬
ment only allows the agent to react to them. However, the next action to perform is under-
determined when the goal is survival in a competitive or dynamic environment or when the
object nearby offers more than one course of action. In order to address this problem, I have
taken advantage of further biological inspiration by integrating the affordance learning system
into an adaptive system based on the actor-critic algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1981). This
element of design learns behavioural patterns. It has been selected because it conciliates the
traditional ethological view on action selection brought up by Avila-Garcfa and Canamero
(2002); Canamero (1997); Blumberg (1997); Tyrrell (1993) with the neuroscience and ma¬
chine learning perspective, which views learning and behaviour selection as concurrent pro¬
cesses (Konidaris, 2003; Humphries, 2002; Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Humphrys, 1997). I
argue that both views can be conciliated if the choice of behaviours is driven by the maximi¬
sation of future reward. This has been addressed by the model described in chapter 5, aiming
at demonstrating that an agent driven by reward can learn behavioural patterns coherent with
ethological observation. Furthermore, by assuming this principle, it is also possible to view
behaviour selection and learning as concurrent processes in the hierarchy of adaptation (see
the beginning of 2). Behaviour selection provides a certain level of adaptiveness, which can
only be improved if processes ranking higher in the hierarchy, such as learning, come into
play. However, this view is incomplete if these processes are considered to be independent.
Both these processes, behaviour selection and learning, are related to the same dynamics of
which perception is also part. Hence, I argue that both must be considered concurrently. The
agent's internal motivations are the expression of internal resources and of its perception of the
environment, hence motivations are the reference for choosing a behaviour to relate to the en¬
vironment. These considerations are the framework of this thesis, which focuses on the study
of learning affordances and behavioural patterns in a situated ecological agent.
Contributions
The use of an ecological approach has provided some answers to problems posed in the tra¬
ditional behaviour selection architectures. Former studies in robotics are mostly based on se¬
lection architectures where the intensity of the motivations or drives biasing the execution of
one behaviour or another is calculated via additive and/or multiplicative formulae. Examples of
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this are Avila-Garcia and Canamero (2002); McFarland and Spier (1997); Spier and McFarland
(1996). These exhibit two main limitations; they do not explain some behavioural situations
(McFarland, 1993), furthermore they do not generally consider new behavioural patterns can
be modified to deal with changing situations. The model proposed in this thesis has overcome
these limitations by using the ecological principle to constrain this relationship. Therefore,
variations in the availability and distribution of resources in the environment will be perceived
by the agent, which will respond by appropriately modifying its behavioural patterns. I have
formulated our behaviour selection architecture by extending the hypothesis of an actor-critic
reinforcement learning algorithm to drive the learning of stimulus-response relationships in
Pavlovian and in instrumental contingencies. This hypothesis is based on neurological evi¬
dence for Pavlovian contingencies only (Schultz et al., 1993), although it has also been sug¬
gested for the instrumental case (Houk et al., 1995). This learning architecture assumes that
learning and behaviour can be integrated if decisions are made by comparing the predictions
of future return for the execution of every behaviour. If the prediction does not match the real
reward obtained after the execution of the behaviour, this is corrected for future interactions.
The policies for selecting behaviours are appropriately modified, and the potential of executing
that behaviour when those patterns are perceived are also adapted. The results of testing the ex¬
tended version of the actor-critic hypothesis have a dual effect. Firstly, they integrate behaviour
selection and learning in a single ecological framework; secondly, this helps to disambiguate
the role of dopamine (DA) as a neuro-transmitter in the basal ganglia (Redgrave et al., 1999)
supporting its role as an assessment signal for Pavlovian and instrumental learning. This is
further explained in the next chapter.
This thesis is not explicitly addressing planning (Chapman, 1987) or the modulation of
behavioural responses due to affective phenomena (Fellous, 2004). However, I understand that
these also play a role in adaptation. This thesis mainly focuses on the role and reach that
ecological learning has in the context of an agent embodying affordances and an actor-critic
algorithm to adapt to its environment.
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are:
• An ecological adaptive agent that integrates perception and behaviour selection in a sin¬
gle framework. Perception is structured in the form of affordances and behaviour selec¬
tion on the structure and principles of the actor-critic. The perception and the behaviour
selection architectures improve the agent adaptation by interacting with the environment
(via correlating the fluctuations of the agent's internal physiology to the perception of the
agent's itself, i.e., according to the ecological principle). These architectures are based
on integrating interaction and internal physiology in the same dynamics.
• The ecological principle constrains the manner in which to interact with the environment.
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This principle I have also used to inspire the way in which stimuli are combined. Based
on the actor-critic, the agent overcomes the limitations when stimuli are combined using
additive or multiplicative formulae. Instead, it provides a more complex account of the
influence of external affordances and internal drives and of the ways in which these com¬
bine to interact with one another to provide behavioural patterns leading to an internal
physiological stability.
In terms ofperception, this thesis has provided a concrete methodology to cluster sensory
signals and to build a neural representation the object's affordances with respect to the
agent's internal physiology. The learning is based on the causality between physiological
fluctuations and the execution of behaviours when certain sensory patterns are perceived.
It has been experimentally demonstrated that these principles and the model introduced
suffice to build a perception space for the agent to successfully interact with a variety of
scenarios in which it adapts in a dynamic manner.
With regard to behaviour selection, an architecture based on an actor-critic as a phe-
nomenological model of the basal ganglia has been introduced. This architecture has
experimentally demonstrated its ability to combine external and internal stimuli to give
rise to behavioural patterns which satisfy the need for internal physiological stability
postulated for the agent's survival.
- It proposes to measure the effect of behaviour execution in terms of reward and
relates this to homeostasis and to the internal physiological stability. Related to
this, the relationship between the effect due to the execution of a behaviour and
its related reward has been hypothesised. Reward is the metric used to assess the
performance of the actor-critic and therefore the appropriateness of the behavioural
patterns for the given scenario. A formula that relates the effect of executing a
behaviour to a certain amount of reward has been proposed based on ethological
data. If the effect of the behaviour diminishes an internal deficit, a reward results
from the formula. Conversely, a punishment is obtained. This implicitly relates the
maximisation of reward to obtaining internal physiological stability.
- It introduces experimental evidence supporting the idea that the "common cur¬
rency" used for comparing among several behavioural possibilities is the expec¬
tation of future reward.
From a neurological perspective, it also helps to disambiguate the role of dopamine (DA)
in the basal ganglia by supporting its hypothesis as the signal of error in the prediction
of reward. Furthermore, it suggests that Pavlovian and instrumental learning could use
the same assessment criterion and therefore share part of the same neural substrate.
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• The thesis also demonstrates that the internal physiological dynamics plays a funda¬
mental role in grounding knowledge from the environment and in relating the different
processes encompassed in the adaptation process. Furthermore, the last experiments also
demonstrate that the parameters of the internal physiology modulate the learning in or¬
der to divert most attention to those elements of the environment that palliate the deficits
which grow faster. Therefore, the dynamics of the environment and of the internal phys¬
iology are inter-related.
• Finally, this whole set of principles has been explicitly integrated in a model that has
demonstrated the ability to adapt the agent to the environment in an ecological manner.
Furthermore, this has demonstrated that the integration between perception, behaviour
selection and the environment can be merged in a common dynamics governed by the
principle of ecological adaptation. This argument extends further in the discussion of
this thesis, suggesting future ways of application in robotics.
1.3 The Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis addresses the problem of adaptation from an ecological perspective, and is divided
into the following chapter:
Chapter 2 introduces a literature review, highlighting the need to encompass the different
elements of the internal dynamics of the agent with the level of availability of resources
and complexity of the scenario, and the advantage of doing so in an ecological manner.
Chapter 3 introduces an overview of the model and of the points to be addressed in an artificial
model.
Chapter 4 introduces the homeostatic architecture and the module for learning object affor-
dances from the objects in the scenario.
Chapter 5 presents the architecture for learning behavioural patterns, and the different ele¬
ments of reinforcement learning used in order to learn the appropriate policies to reach
physiological stability.
Chapter 6 studies the effect of internal modulation on the learning of behavioural patterns for
a set of behaviours.
Chapter 7 is the Discussion.
Chapter 8 is the Conclusion.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This thesis addresses the process of learning affordances and its integration in the adaptive
process. This is inspired and framed by the ecological principle. In this light, I have studied
perception, behaviour selection and learning as three of the necessary processes coupling the
agent and its environment in a dynamic manner.
The environment is viewed as a set of potentialities of action (affordances), which will have
to be intelligently selected and executed to survive. In order to frame this, the chapter intro¬
duces the ecological framework where the agent will have to make decisions (by appropriately
combining external and internal stimuli). This precedes a description of the behaviour selection
strategies required to learn to maintain the agent 'alive'.
I have assumed that the agent is situated in its environment and that as for biological beings
this is necessary for survival. Therefore, the perception of potential courses of action and the
appropriate sequencing of behaviours will have to lead towards the compensation of internal
needs. In this process, the perception of affordances is viewed as the process of acquisition of
basic knowledge from the environment, which situates or grounds the agent to its environment.
In a complementary fashion, the actor-critic provides the necessary ability of sequencing the
execution of behaviours to maximise reward. Depending on how reward is defined, the actor-
critic biases the agent towards reactive or internally motivated behavioural patterns.
Therefore, the behavioural patterns that ensure the agent's survival will have to draw on
Ashby's criterion of physiological stability (Ashby, 1965). Furthermore, we suggest basing
our model on the actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm, which has been hypothesised
by Houk et al. (1995) to govern high level behaviour selection and instrumental learning in
high vertebrates, such as rats and macaques.
Adaptation in the natural world occurs both at a genetic and developmental level. How¬
ever, this thesis solely focuses on developmental learning in terms of reward as an adaptation
mechanism. This chapter introduces background information regarding this. Furthermore, it
has been considered appropriate to also review in this chapter social learning and learning by
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imitation for reference purposes and for completing our view on biologically inspired learning
processes (Demiris and Hayes, 2002; Maistros and Hayes, 2001; Billard and Mataric, 2001;
Mataric, 2000).
This chapter introduces a view of perception, behaviour selection and learning as a con¬
tinuum of adaptive processes in the context of ecological psychology, from social facilitation
to taxis reactions. It highlights that the notion of interaction with the environment and the
manner in which this happens is fundamental to condition behaviour selection and the task to
be performed. Finally, it argues in favour of a framework based on the actor-critic reinforce¬
ment learning algorithm as a device to improve the agent's adaptation to the environment. The
chapter is organised as follows:
• Section 2.1 introduces a taxonomy of adaptive processes, classifying them in terms of
their time-scale.
• Section 2.2 introduces two fundamental processes for adaptation: learning and behaviour
selection. These are characterised in terms of persistence (see section 2.2.2) and the man¬
ner in which stimuli are combined (see section 2.2.1).
• Section 2.3 introduces the necessary elements to abstract an artificial physiology as a
framework in which to embed any adaptive system that has to provide adaption. Fur¬
thermore, it also presents the concept of motivation, which biases the agent to make
decisions. This is used throughout the experimental chapters.
• This is followed by an introduction to reinforcement learning and of its relationship to
behaviour selection and the definition of reward (see section 2.4).
• Section 2.5 introduces the principles ofneuroscience and ethology that have inspired our
model and that will condition the fashion in which the actor-critic combines external and
internal stimuli and therefore the reach of its adaptiveness.
• Section 2.6 explains Gibson's ecological perception (Gibson, 1966) and the reasons to
use this as a principle for artificial adaptive agents. This is further extended in sections
2.7 and 2.8, which introduce the neurological background involved in affordance learn¬
ing and some theoretical considerations on grounding knowledge from the environment,
respectively.
• Section 2.9 introduces the complete framework that will lead to building the model in¬
troduced in the next chapter and a summary presents the set of hypotheses to be tested in
the experimental chapters.
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2.1 Taxonomy of Adaptive Processes
Adaptation is about modifying behavioural patterns in response to changes in the environment
to survive. Therefore, it seems reasonable to classify adaptive processes according to the time-
scale of the changes they encompass (Maes, 1997). Namely:
• Behaviour Selection. This consists of a change of activity typically due to a change in the
environment (e.g., a predator is perceived in an agent's vicinity) or to a fluctuation of the
agent's internal physiology. The response to each contingency is usually unique. Some of
these responses are the result of genetically encoded information and of developmental
learning. Nevertheless, behaviour selection specifically refers to a change in activity
from a behaviour to another, where each individual behavioural pattern remains fixed.
• Developmental Learning. This refers to changes within the patterns of behaviour and/or
perception.1 These changes occur throughout the life of the agent via interaction with
its environment. This sort of developmental learning has been sub-divided into three
different types:
- Associative Learning. This consists of establishing relationships between stimuli
and their elicited responses. An example of this is Stimulus-Response learning,
formally introduced by Pavlov (1927).
- Reinforcement Learning. This consists of relating stimuli to actions leading to
reward. The learning of relationships requires more than one interaction of the
same sort and can be unlearnt along the same lines. From a behavioural viewpoint,
the term had already been used by Pavlov, though probably the most popular model
is due to Sutton and Barto (1981). Thus since this learning method requires several
interactions, it exhibits a longer time-scale than other learning schemata.
- Social Learning. This comprises every adaptive sub-process, ranging from be¬
haviour selection to the modification of behavioural patterns via interaction with
other individuals. This includes social facilitation (Heyes and Galef, 1996), learn¬
ing by imitation (Demiris and Hayes, 2002) and also overlaps with reinforcement
learning for the cases in which the assessment (reward) is indirectly provided by
demonstrators.
• Genetic Adaptation. This comprises changes in stmcture and behaviour of the individual
transferred from generation to generation. These changes extend over several generations
to have effect (Damoulas, 2004; Wright, 1932, 1931; Fisher, 1930; Darwin, 1866).
1 If a particular pattern of perception means the potentiality of performing one behaviour or another.
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The categories of adaptive processes described above take place concurrently in nature.
However, in a strict sense only behaviour selection and developmental learning facilitate an
animal's adaptation in a dynamic and interactive fashion within its life time. Similarly, we
would like to model this process in an efficient manner to be applied to robotic platforms.
To this end, this thesis focuses on developmental, associative and reinforcement learning as
adaptive processes; deliberately disregarding genetic adaptation. Despite this process being
intrinsically related to the ecological relationship between the agent and its environment, our
interest only focuses on the adaptive processes at a lifetime scale for a single individual, and
social learning involving several individuals is disregarded.
2.2 Behaviour Selection
Behaviour selection is the change of current activity in response to internal or external stimuli.
Several authors have addressed this issue from different disciplines: ethology (Blumberg, 1997;
Spier and McFarland, 1996; Rosenblatt and Payton, 1989; Baerends, 1976; Dawkins, 1976;
Tinbergen, 1953), artificial intelligence (Gershenson Garcia, 2000; Gonzalez et al., 2000; Maes,
1991), psycho-neuroscience (Bryson, 2004; McClure et al., 2003; Bryson, 2000; Redgrave
et al., 1999), machine learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Humphrys, 1997; Sutton and Barto,
1981) and robotics (Avila-Garcia and Canamero, 2002; Tyrrell, 1993).
The different overviews highlight the fact that selecting suitable behaviours is a complex
task involving several related processes. Even for the simple case of a reactive behaviour,
making a decision will require sufficient information from the environment. Furthermore if the
decision is deliberative, appropriate methods for the combination of stimuli must be provided
in order to satisfy some criteria of goodness with regard to the goals of the agent. Moreover,
there are related aspects of the creature and its environment that control the execution of the
behaviour, either before (anticipatory), during or after it. For example, how long should the
execution of a behaviour be maintained? When should the agent change its activity? Do
behavioural patterns have to exhibit intentionality and to be motivation driven? (Blumberg,
1994).
Among others, these issues have been formally listed in a complementary manner by Blum¬
berg (1997), Maes (1997) and Tyrrell (1993). They are introduced in the next sub-section,
except those perception related, introduced in section 2.6. Finally, section 2.9 addresses the
missing links and the methodology followed throughout the thesis.
2.2.1 Combination of Stimuli
How can an agent combine its internal wishes with the possibilities for action provided by
its close environment? This issue has been commonly referred to as combining external and
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internal stimuli to satisfy internal goals (McFarland, 1993). Even though the problem has been
widely addressed in several fields, models based on ethological observation focus most of our
attention. These provide an analysis that correlates the agent's internal physiological dynamics
with behavioural observations, which makes them most valuable to us. The validity of an
artificial model can be assessed in an analogous manner and furthermore be compared with an
ethological counterpart.
Building an artificial model requires the formulation of abstract representations mirroring
the animals' internal physiology (Canamero, 1997; Spier and McFarland, 1996). Related to
this, the notion of motivation is fundamental (Damasio, 2000; Izard, 1993; Toates and Jensen,
1990). This is defined as a combination of internal and external stimuli expressing an urge
for compensation. Internal stimuli were firstly abstracted by Hull in his concept of drive (Hull,
1943), expressing the urge to act whenever the level of an internal resource falls below a certain
threshold, e.g., when feeling hungry, sated, weary, invigorated, thirsty. This information is then
processed to select one behaviour over another. However, the decision making is a complex
task, since there are as many right decisions as criteria defining correctness. To constrain
this, ethological coherence has been traditionally applied, namely comparison with animal
behaviour. As a result, several classical procedures for the combining of stimuli have been
formulated. These are listed next.
• Hull (1943) formally introduced the concept of drive. Behaviour selection in his model
consists of a competition among the agent's associated systems (behaviours). Hull pro¬
posed that the strength of a drive (therefore the relevance of the drive) responded to a
multiplicative formula, namely: drive = habit x stimulus. The strength of a drive re¬
sults from the learnt habit and the stimulus strength, which depends on external and
indeterminate stimuli, as expressed by stimulus — f(internal, external,other stimuli).
According to Hull, each action system has an associated drive, and the selection is the
process of priming systems whose related drives exhibit the highest values.
At the level of implementation, these principles of selection are insufficient, as they
do not formally specify how to relate drives to behaviours, nor do they specify formal
procedures for the combination of stimuli nor how to choose among several activities.
• Tinbergen (1953) introduced a hierarchical node-based architecture, for which the rel¬
evance of a behaviour is determined via competition between active nodes. These are
nodes whose innate releasing mechanisms are activated by certain external stimuli. When
these are active, activation levels can flow to the inferior level in the hierarchy until reach¬
ing the motor command level. A single action per level is released. The combination of
stimuli is multiplicative at each level of the hierarchy.
• The model of Lorenz (1971) only addresses how to generate the strength of a drive. The
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drive disinhibits the behaviour, and is modelled as a water reservoir. Internal stimuli are
abstracted as water streams flowing into the reservoir, regulated by a set of parameters (k
constants). External stimuli flow into the same reservoir (Sp). Hence, the influence and
combination of stimuli in defining the strength of the drive are additive. The strength
of the drive results from the addition of these stimuli minus the inhibition provoked by
higher (cognitive) centres, modelled as a negative flow.
• The model of Baerends (1976) is hierarchical; lower nodes are controlled by other higher
nodes in the hierarchy. The combination of stimuli is mostly left unspecified, although
can be assumed as largely additive.
• Maes (1991) proposed a distributed, non-hierarchical model of action selection based
on activation nodes, which represent the relevance for each action. Furthermore, Maes'
model encodes all possible relationships among these nodes, whether the nodes are con-
summatory or appetitive. In doing this, their conflicts, goal-achieving relationships for
some goals and goal-counteracting effects between nodes and goals, have been consid¬
ered in the design. External stimuli and internal stimuli are evaluated in two steps at
each node. The resulting combination of stimuli is largely additive, although their
combined effect depends on the nodes activated at the previous step.
• Rosenblatt and Payton (1989) proposed a hierarchical, feed-forward network model in
a similar manner to Baerends'. However, unlike his, the new architecture foresees the
combination ofpreferences. A single node is active at each level and receives connections
from the relevant external and internal stimuli. Since each node consists of a neural
network, the combination of stimuli may respond to any sort of function (not necessarily
additive or multiplicative) that the network may implement. Activation propagates down
to the level of actions, where the node with the highest activation inhibits the others and
disinhibits its related action.
• The turning point of these architectures have been Tyrrell's approach (Tyrrell, 1993) and
Spier's architecture (Spier and McFarland, 1996). Spier's drk model introduces the pos¬
sibility of having an internal physiology to close the perception-action loop. This archi¬
tecture combines stimuli in a multiplicative manner (drive x environment'srelatedcue x
cueregardingeverytool). Therefore, the execution of a behaviour in this model follows a
multiplicative rule.
These architectures are based on the assumption that the combination of stimuli responds
to an additive or multiplicative formula except Rosenblatt and Payton. Using formulae imposes
serious restrictions, since these formulae cannot explain some behavioural responses (Tyrrell,
1993), pp. 172. Furthermore, I argue that a more ambitious explanation of behaviour selection
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cannot only be based in the study of the combination of stimuli. Behaviour selection always
occurs in a context. I therefore propose that any framework for behaviour selection consider
the principle ofecology (Pfeifer, 1994). The agent (natural or artificial) is part of a niche, hence
an explanation of the way stimuli combine should naturally arise if the relationship between
the agent and its environment is well understood and faithfully modelled. Related to this is a
recent formulation in neurophysiology and robotics, which suggests that the selection of be¬
haviour works on the basis of the comparison of future expected reward for each behaviour
(Rolls, 2003). Therefore, if the combination of stimuli relates the inner motivation to the inten¬
sity of each behaviour, reward does in turn relate the outer experiences to the inner motivations.
Although using reinforcement learning is not novel in AI, there is not a single example of an
ecological framework that integrates reinforcement learning so far. Nevertheless, I have con¬
sidered it appropriate to mention two examples of frameworks that use reinforcement learning.
These do not have an internal physiology, therefore, they do not ground their interactions within
their environment. However, they still pursue the same goal of adapting to the environment.
• The model of Blumberg (1997) introduces a hierarchical structure, where behaviours are
organised in groups within which a single behaviour is chosen via lateral inhibition. Win¬
ners at each group compete then at the next level of the hierarchy until there is a winner
at the lowest level. This gains control of the agent's actuators and is therefore executed.
Blumberg's assumptions with regard to the combination of stimuli are based on McFar-
land's thesis: "behavioural activation is determined by natural selection" (McFarland,
1993). The consequences for a synthetic approach lead towards empirical tuning meth¬
ods: "the modern (synthetic) approach is to regard this question as an entirely empirical
matter, not subject to any particular discipline" (Blumberg, 1997). This is explicitly for¬
mulated in a temporal difference framework (Sutton and Barto, 1998), where three sorts
of combination of stimuli are modelled: multiplicative, additive and a combination of
these.
• Another model of interest from the viewpoint of robotics was proposed in Gershenson
(2001); Gonzalez Perez et al. (2000). Their method for the combination of stimuli is
calculate according to the following equation:
Af = Of * (oc+ * Oj) + Of, (2.1)
j
where Af is the certainty value with which will be created the solution element C, in the
proprio/extero/drive congruent level of the blackboard (analogous to the motivation to
select a behaviour), a is the weight or importance attributable to the internal state, Of is
the internal signal, Of is the signal created in the drive level, 0Sj are the external signals
associated to the internal state Of and Fafj are the coupling strengths of the elemental
behaviours. This model mostly focuses on behaviour selection only.
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• Likewise, Redgrave et al. (1999) presents a model of action selection inspired in phys¬
iological measurements of the basal ganglia, which calculates salience directly on the
strength of the stimulus. The stimuli are directly related to the potentiality of execu¬
tion of a behaviour. This is a model of behaviour selection inspired in physiological
observations of the basal ganglia. This model does not perform learning.
Therefore, despite the use of reinforcement learning, these frameworks do not use rein¬
forcement learning for instrumental learning in a strict sense, since decision making still occurs
as a result of an additive or multiplicative combination of stimuli.
The framework I introduce can encompass any combination of stimuli that a feed-forward
neural network reaches to calculate. This implies a wide range of possibilities to combine stim¬
uli, only constraint by the physics of interaction of the agent with its surrounding environment.
It is expected that patterns of combination of stimuli (closer to the multiplicative or to the ad¬
ditive rule) will arise at an experimental level depending on the environment while the agent
leams to use its resources in a beneficial fashion.
In addition to the manner in which stimuli are combined, persistence has also been consid¬
ered as a good feature to assess a behaviour selection system. This is described next.
2.2.2 Persistence
Relevant from an adaptive perspective is the notion of persistence-, "to persist in a state, en¬
terprise or undertaking in spite of counter influences, opposition or discouragement" (Webster
Dictionary Online). In roboticist terms, this refers to extending the execution of a behaviour
while reasonable; usually until the intended effect is obtained.
Persistence has been qualified as a requirement for intelligent behaviour selection (Tyrrell,
1993). However, the underlying mechanisms of persistence have not still been revealed. Some
contemporary models (Blumberg, 1997), influenced by Tyrrell (1993) and by classical etho-
logical models (Baerends, 1976; Lorenz, 1971), have introduced persistence in their design
considerations, in an attempt to test its effect at an experimental level. In a complementary
fashion, the model of Gurney et al. (1998) introduced persistence in a bottom-up fashion by
linking the duration of the execution of a behaviour to the role of non-phasic dopamine (DA)
among neurons in the vertebrate's' basal ganglia (non-phasic DA indirectly modulates the dif¬
ficulty of initiating and maintaining the execution of a behaviour). Finally, the model proposed
by Avila-Garcia and Canamero (2002) implements persistence from an ethological perspec¬
tive in an artificial robot. Extensive experimentation with this model has demonstrated the
relevance of including persistence in any robotic behaviour.
Based on this, persistence has been considered as an element to assess the quality of a
model. This, together with the procedure to combine stimuli, are the two main issues intro-
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duced in this section. As documented, these have been addressed in previous models in an an¬
alytical manner. However, unlike these, this thesis intends a synthetic approach. It introduces a
hypothesis regarding the process of grounding knowledge from the environment (namely learn¬
ing affordances) and utilises constraints derived from the adaptation methods used in nature for
selecting behaviours. The hypothesis says that these principles constrain the fashion in which
persistence and the combination of stimuli occur. Furthermore, that the interaction between
the agent's surrounding environment and the agent's internal physiology determines the details
along which this occurs.
The process of grounding knowledge from the environment consists of defining the seman¬
tics of the objects in its surrounding environment for a particular agent. Therefore, this can
only be defined by the agent itself by relating the effect of a particular behaviour and sensory
pattern with its internal physiology. Implicitly, the dynamics of interaction with the environ¬
ment are directly linked to the dynamics of the agent's internal needs. Because of this reason,
it has been considered appropriate to devote the next section to describe the agent's internal
physiology and its dynamics.
2.3 Homeostasis and Internal Physiology
Homeostasis is directly related to motivation. Homeostasis was first studied by Claude Bernard
during the 19th century (Bernard, 1878). However, the first formal definition is attributed to
W. B. Cannon: "The condition of a system when it is able to maintain its essential variables
within limits acceptable to its own structure in the face of unexpected disturbances" (Cannon,
1929). This notion is directly related to the process of dynamic self-regulation in Maturana's
and Varela's ontology (Maturana and Varela, 1980).
Homeostasis was used by Hull (1943) to frame the concepts of drive and of homeostatic
variable to describe internal bodily processes for the management and regulation of internal
resources. Drives express the status of deficit or excess of the homeostatic variables, which
can be compensated either via internal self-regulation or via external interaction (McFarland,
1990). The capacity of compensation in either way is related to the stability of the system
(Ashby, 1965), hence survival depends on maintaining essential physiological variables within
their range of viability. Ashby's notion of viability has inspired the notion of empirical viability
indicators (Avila-Garcia and Canamero, 2002).
Although homeostasis has been traditionally classified as a purely internal process (Can¬
non, 1929), I argue that both processes of internal self-regulation and external compensation
can be viewed as part of the same regulatory mechanism. In fact, the agent is endowed with
a set of courses of action related to the agent's environment, each of which requires a certain
set of elements in the environment in order to have some effect on the internal variables, hence
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to close the regulatory cycle. For example, the presence of something edible is necessary to
execute the behaviour eat. The behaviour execution has then a compensatory effect on the level
of hunger of the agent.
There have been several architectures having implemented homeostasis (Avila-Garcia and
Canamero, 2002; Canamero, 1997). In particular, Canamero's architecture is the first im¬
plementation of the aforementioned regulatory cycle. This initiates by the homeostatic vari¬
ables (e.g., nutrition, stamina) expressing an urge for compensation via a set of internal drives
(hunger, tiredness). Compensation occurs via behaviour execution (external compensation),
which requires interaction with some elements in the agent's surrounding environment in or¬
der to be successful. In particular, the behaviour executed has to exert a beneficial effect on
the agent's internal drives expressing an urge for compensation (for example, if the external
stimulus is hunger, the right behaviour to execute is eating, since this diminishes the internal
drive and increases the level of nutrition). In these terms, an agent adapted to its environment
will be able to appropriately select behaviours to maintain its physiological needs within the
boundary of survival. However, the adaptiveness of an agent can only be demonstrated if the
environment or the requirements of the agents vary with respect to one another. Its adaptive¬
ness will then depend on its capacity to modify its behavioural patterns until this compensation
is sufficient to regain the stability of its physiological needs satisfied for the given scenario.
The procedure to this end is however not straightforward, since there are as many possibilities
of change as criteria of correctness. Nevertheless, some criteria can be derived from Ashby's
notion ofviability (Ashby, 1965), which I have implicitly assumed as a necessary criterion that
the agent has to respect to survive. Therefore, this can be used as an assessment criterion for
adaptive processes based on whether they succeed in bringing the agent onto its physiological
stability or not.
Each of the architectures mentioned in the previous section addresses behaviour selection
as the main adaptive process, disregarding the contribution of perception as an adaptive process.
However, I argue that, from an ecological viewpoint, perception should be considered as part
of the homeostatic cycle as an adaptive process. Accordingly, the architecture I propose in this
thesis considers perception as a dynamic process, where objects are viewed from the agent's
perspective in a functional manner (I often refer to this as to "affordance based perception"). I
argue that the agent can learn affordances by monitoring the internal physiological dynamics
for every behavioural response of the agent. This also suggests that learning affordances is a
fashion to ground knowledge from the environment (Hamad, 1990), since the meaning of any
object with regard to every agent is different, depending on the own set of goals and on the
assessment criterion. Related to this is the notion of semiotic triangle (Suonuuti, 1997), which
identifies three related issues in perception: the sensation of the object itself, the meaning and
the sign used to represent it. In these terms, solving the grounding problem would mean to
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define these three notions as well as their interrelation. This argument will be further continued
in section 2.6.
Ecology is a principle stressing the mutuality of the interactions between an animal and its
niche (Gibson, 1966). Reorienting this for a synthetic approach is a complex task, which we
propose to facilitate through a convenient description of an agent as a set of inter-related units:
its goals, its needs, its morphology, its behaviour repertoire and its perception. Although
this section solely focuses on perception, these concepts interrelate and more importantly,
justify the framework and the assessment criterion used in the learning process, which is intro¬
duced in section 2.4.
2.4 Learning to Select Behaviours
This agent views the environment from a functional perspective, learning the affordances (func¬
tionalities) offered by every object. However, the problem of selecting among different courses
of action is easily encountered when an object offers more than one affordance to the agent.
Therefore, selecting behaviours and learning to do so in an adaptive manner is a necessary
ability for an adaptive agent. This section reviews previous viewpoints while introduces the
ecological perspective with which I have formulated my approach.
The notion of viability introduced in the previous section asserts that adaptation depends on
the ability to maintain the internal physiology stable when there are changes in the environment
or in the agent's physiology. A procedure to this end consists of modifying the behavioural
patterns, which directly relates to the topic of learning to select behaviours. There is a variety of
methods used to this end in robotics. This section reviews them before describing the procedure
used in the model introduced by this thesis. Two learning methods have been broadly addressed
in robotics: learning by imitation and learning by reinforcement. These are described next.
Learning by imitation consists of transferring procedures to execute actions from demon¬
strators to learners, either directly by observation or via social facilitation. For the former
case the information is passively demonstrated, for the latter this is actively performed. The
procedure may vary depending on the knowledge to be acquired, however, as an example for
the case of motor commands, it can be decomposed to the set of sub-processes introduced be¬
low. It requires the learner to decode visual information from the movement of the limbs of the
demonstrator and furthermore, to correctly associate the demonstrator's limbs with its own ones
in order to infer the motor commands that the demonstrator was using. This sort of learning has
been observed to be part of the developmental abilities of higher primates (Heyes and Galef,
1996). In support of this, recent neurophysiological measurements suggest that the repertoire
of motor commands is encoded in the motor cortex of some primates and that several types
of neurons co-interact, mainly the ones encoding the motor command itself (motor-neurons),
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and those capable of matching the observation of the execution of a motor command to its own
repertoire of commands—mirror neurons—(Rizzolatti et al., 2000). This method, joint with
inspiration from ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966), has reached the level of implementa¬
tion in robotics for the case of motor commands (Metta and Fitzpatrick, 2002; Demiris and
Hayes, 2002; Maistros and Hayes, 2001; Billard and Mataric, 2001). Other sensory modal¬
ities have also been addressed in infant psychology (Kessen et al., 1969) throughout the last
decades, although not until recently have they reached domains of artificial intelligence and
robotics (Westermann and Miranda, 2002; Kohler et al., 2002). Mirror neurons have been
located in higher vertebrates, such as macaques or humans only. These are hypothesised to
match perceptual information with an appropriate set of motor commands2. However, learning
by imitation has also some limitations, since two or more individuals endowed with complex
hardware are required. Learning by imitation is supported by medical studies on language and
motor learning disorders. Furthermore, understanding this would save tedious programming
hours for roboticists.
However, this thesis focuses on individual learning principles, based on the mutual relation¬
ship between the agent and its environment, namely on the responses that the agent receives
by interacting with the environment. This relates to a whole family of learning algorithms,
usually referred to as Learning by Reinforcement. For every particular application in reinforce¬
ment learning, independently from the framework, the goal is reached via sequencing a set
of courses of action in a manner that reward is maximised throughout time. Similarly, in the
model described in this thesis, the goal is the minimal deficit and physiological stability, which
are reached via learning to sequence actions in an appropriate manner. These assumptions
have been selected for two main reasons. Firstly, they partly fit some biological data; Schultz's
experiments (Schultz, 1998) support the hypothesis that reward —or its absence— may play
a role in strengthening or weakening the neural representations of instrumental relationships
between stimuli and actions, and between actions and their effects. Secondly, because this is is
a natural extension of an affordance based framework to sequence courses of action.
A Brief Review of Reinforcement Learning in Robotics My interest is finding a plausible
explanation to the problem of adaptation within the boundaries set by the reinforcement learn¬
ing framework. From this perspective, robotics is a broad field of application of the aforemen¬
tioned techniques. One of the first —most renamed— examples of this cooperation was Lin
(1993), who proposed the use of reinforcement learning as a possible pathway for overcoming
limitations of reactive architectures in terms of planning and adaptive action selection.
Towards this direction, several authors have used different formulations of reinforcement
learning algorithms to address learning in the robotic context. In Navigation, Toussaint (2003)
2The term motor is used in a broad sense, meaning any action related to the sensory modality responsible for its
activation, e.g., to see a chair and to sit.
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has recently provided a nice approach to adaptive solutions for creating models of the world to
be used for navigation on the basis of reward functions. Another interesting solution combining
reinforcement learning and heuristics has been proposed by Konidaris (2003). A more abstract
approach was followed by Blumberg (1997), who proposed the use of temporal difference —a
particular reinforcement learning update rule— within a hierarchical architecture for guiding
the patterns of behaviour of a believable artificial creature. An example of emotional archi¬
tecture to bias behaviour selection based on reinforcement learning was proposed by Gadanho
(1998). From a more theoretical perspective, Humphrys (1997) proposed a possible solution to
extend reinforcement learning to be able to scale up to high dimensional spaces with the use of
W-learning, a sort of hierarchical set of small reinforcement learning algorithms.
Although in theory reinforcement learning could be applied to any sort of Markovian do¬
main, most of the aforementioned applications are limited to discrete domains. A thorough
review of these methods is Sutton and Barto's book (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Further applica¬
tion to continuous domains has been mostly approached during recent years from a theoretical
perspective (Doya, 1999). These studies are progressively reaching one of the most challeng¬
ing fields in AI, that of humanoid robotics. Beyond being a pure application, it is serving as a
benchmark of development of interdisciplinary solutions for two of the most critical domains
of reinforcement learning: continuous and high dimensional spaces (Peters, 2003).
The set of applications of reinforcement learning is currently very large, however, it is still
possible to provide a standard formulation for a generic framework for reinforcement learning.
This is shown in figure 2.1.
action
at
Figure 2.1: Framework of a Generic Reinforcement Learning Problem, a, is the action at time t,
s, is the state at time t, s,+ i is the state at time t+1.
The elements of the algorithm are: a set of Markovian states s, describing the state of the
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agent, the action a, (to be chosen among the agent's repertoire), to move from one state to
another and the reward r, function, which quantifies the effect of the execution of each action
on the environment and the environment itself. The definition of reward is fundamental and
specific to each problem, since this is the definition of good- and badness that will reflect on
the desirability of one behaviour over another. From a biological perspective, reward has been
often referred to as sense of valence (Ackley and Littman, 1991), and has been hypothesised to
be a mechanism to increase the individual's chance of survival (Damoulas, 2004). The second
element related to the reward is the definition of state. It must be considered that reward
is delivered when following a transition among states, therefore the states must sufficiently
characterise the environment to make these transitions meaningful. Otherwise, some states
may not be distinguishable, which would make related decisions uncertain. This could lead to
a dramatic decrease in performance (Crook and Hayes (2003) — two states look alike though
they are in different locations in the state space). The difficulty of addressing this is beyond
the reach of this thesis. To overcome this, environments have been engineered to be easily
distinguishable among similar states.
These elements introduce the framework to view learning as an extension to the simple
change of activity, where reward may be used to modify responses to stimuli and to adapt to
changes in the environment. To be able to do this, I am implicitly assuming that reward is
related to effect and that every action has an effect relating to the animal's physiology. For
example, eating increases the level of glucose in blood, jogging (if exercised enough) increases
stamina. Therefore, I view reward as a measure of the effect from the perspective of the agent.
This depends on the internal, physiological and affective state and on the surrounding environ¬
ment. Loosely speaking, reward could be viewed as the feeling experienced by the agent due
to the physiological effect. The definition of reward is further explained in the chapters 4 and 5.
This argument is further grounded on principles of neuroscience introduced in the next section.
2.5 Neuroscience Background
A possible explanation to the interest raised by reinforcement learning is not due to the robotic
applications, but to the physiological measurements performed by Wolfram Schultz of the Ven¬
tral Tegmental Area (VTA) and in the Substantia Nigra Pars Compacta (SNC) (Suri and Schultz,
1998; Schultz et al., 1997). These suggest that neural activity in the output nuclei of the basal
ganglia signal the error in the prediction of reward given a certain stimulus (Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Schultz, 1998). Hence, the hypothesis is that one of the roles of the basal ganglia is the learn¬
ing of stimulus-response relationships. The experiments to test this consisted of presenting a
stimulus followed by a reward to a macaque monkey. Dopamine (DA) from the SNC and VTA
signals the novelty of this reward for the first trials of the experiment and decreases at later
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trials. The hypothesis is that after some trials, the system learns to predict the rewarding event
given the stimulus. A computational model including these effects was introduced by Dayan
and Montague (Schultz et al., 1997) and is further described in section 2.5.2.
This hypothesis for the role of the basal ganglia solely includes learning and is unrelated
to action selection. Nevertheless, there is a second hypothesis arguing the possibility of the
basal ganglia being a centralised action selector (Redgrave et al., 1999). This is based on the
anatomical evidence that the cortex has a large projection to cells in the input nuclei of the basal
ganglia (the striatum). Furthermore, the output nuclei, the SNr and the Globus Pallidus Internal
Segment GP„ project back to the thalamus and to the cortex. These closed-loop connections
suggest that cells in the striatum receive much information about the situation that the animal
is experiencing. This also hints that the projections between the striatum and the GP;/SNr are
parallel pathways, each devoted to a behaviour, which is disinhibited by the activity of the cells
in the striatum.
These two hypotheses have been so far irreconcilable. However, the learning hypothesis of
Schultz can be easily extended to action selection if Pavlovian learning is viewed as a partic¬
ular case of instmmental learning, where the delivery of reward is mediated by the absence of
action. This approach has been followed by several authors in machine learning and robotics
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), however, only recently has it received some attention by neurosci-
entists (McClure et al., 2003). This suggests that there is a simpler solution to the problem of
action-selection than that proposed by neuro-scientifical hypothesis. This will be tested in the
experimental chapters.
The following sections introduce both models of the basal ganglia (Redgrave's and Dayan's
—inspired by Schultz's ideas) in order to frame and introduce an extended version of the actor-
critic, which is introduced thereafter.
2.5.1 Redgrave's Model for Action Selection
A biologically inspired model for action selection has been proposed by Redgrave et al. (1999)
and (Gurney et al., 1998). This hypothesises that the main role of the basal ganglia is to be a
centralised action selector. Despite conflicting with the model of Schultz et al. (1997), it has
demonstrated its performance in a robotic architecture (Gurney et al., 2001b,a). The model is
shown in figure 2.2 at a functional level.
The structure of the basal ganglia is considered as an input/output system, which receives
afferent projections from the cortex to the striatum and whose output nuclei, the globus pallidus
and the substantia nigra, project to the cortex and to the thalamus (the connections have been
omitted from figure 2.2 to facilitate its understanding).
The action selection process in Redgrave's model is divided into two different sub-processes:
selection and control. The model also distinguishes between D1 and D2 dopamine receptors
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Figure 2.2: Redgrave's Model of Action Selection. STN=Sub-Thalamic Nucleus, GP<,=Globus
Pallidus External Segment, SNr=Substantia Nigra Pars Reticulata, GP,=Globus Pallidus Internal
Segment, BG=Basal Ganglia.
(D1 receptors affect an excitatory response, D2 inhibitory) in the striatum.
The striatum is composed of several neural centres each of which encodes the salience of a
single action, based on a set of signals from the cortex and the thalamus. Via lateral inhibition,
these centres compete with one another for activation, resulting in a reduced number of active
centres. It should be noted that the physiological evidence for such lateral interactions is still
weak, although this is not strictly necessary to perform action selection. The neural centres
in the striatum project via inhibitory connections to the output nuclei, which are released only
when the striatal neural centres are active, i.e., acting in a disinhibitory manner. This sub-
process involves the so-called direct pathway in the basal ganglia (Prescott, 2001). Redgrave
et al. also introduce a secondary pathway, whose hypothesised role is to refine the selections
suggested by the primary pathway. The secondary pathway involves the Globus Pallidus Ex¬
ternal Segment (GPe) and the cells in the striatum with D2 receptors. They suggest that this
pathway automatically scales excitatory outputs. The GPe sends out control signals that project
to the Sub-Thalamic Nucleus (STN). Negative feedback to the STN scales the outputs of the
active channels. A second hypothesis concerns the synergistic action of dopamine in both the
control and selection pathways. The hypothesised role of dopamine (DA) in this mechanism
is to regulate the ease of selection. Hence, an increase of DA should provoke promiscuous
selection, and its absence a high level of inhibition (consistently with final stages of Parkinsons
disease).
If any of the neural centres in the striatum are active, this introduces the possibility of them
being further inhibited, from the Sub-Thalamic Nucleus (STN) to GPe and from this to the
output nuclei in the SNr. Hence, this would facilitate or complicate selection, acting as an
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activation threshold of the output nuclei.
This model is mostly engineering based. It includes the notions of clean switching between
behaviours and persistency, which are desirable for selection in the basal ganglia. Nevertheless,
their hypothesised dependence on DA remains uncertain.
The model of Redgrave was embedded into a Khepera robot for testing purposes. This
calculates salience the sum of relevant variables: perceptual, motivational, positive feedback
and efferent copy. The first two are, respectively: affordances present in the agent's surrounding
environment and the internal state of the agent (its drives). The positive feedback has been
proposed as the ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops which may act to provide a positive feedback
pathway (derived from the efferent copy) that can maintain an appropriate level of salience of a
behaviour (hence forcing persistence). Each behaviour may be able to generate a "busy" signal
that contributes to its own saliency.
In conclusion, this model introduces the hypothesis that the Basal Ganglia working as a
behaviour selector and considers the level of non-phasic dopamine (DA) as a threshold con¬
trolling the selection of the behaviours. However, it considers neither learning nor the role of
phasic dopamine in its model.
2.5.2 Dayan and Montague's Model for Learning
Unlike the previous model, the hypothesis of (Schultz et al., 1993) was made explicit via Dayan
and Montague's model. Their most relevant contribution has been to show that Schultz's hy¬
pothesis of the Temporal Difference (TD) algorithm as a possible explanation of the learning
phenomenon was consistent. Both the hypothesis and the measurements have solely addressed
learning, although as it will be argued next, this naturally relates to action selection.
Schultz's measurements in monkeys suggest that phasic dopamine signals effective rein¬
forcement that mediates Pavlovian learning in the vertebrate's brain. Schultz's experiments
measured DA activity from cells in the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) and/or in the Substantia
Nigra Pars Compacta (SNc). The procedure consisted of exposing the monkey to a stimulus,
followed by a reward some seconds later. The measurements of the DA cells show a significant
increment of their spiking frequency the first few times the reward is given. This decreases
gradually after repeated trials until reaching its stationary level.
Schultz's explanation of this decreasing phenomenon is bound to the hypothesis that some
part of the basal ganglia is implementing a TD learning algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1981). In
this light, the basal ganglia is viewed as an Input/Output device. The input nucleus to the system
is the striatum, and the output nuclei are the Globus Pallidus Internal and External segment
(GPj and GPe) and the Substantia Nigra Pars Reticulata (SNr). These are represented in figure
2.3 along with the Thalamus. Anatomically, it has been observed that cells in the striatum
receive strong projections from the thalamus and the cortex, and that dopamine projections
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Figure 2.3: Basal Ganglia Functional Representation. The abbreviations are: THAL for Thala¬
mus, VTA for Ventral Tegmental Area, STN for Subthalamic Nucleus, SNr for Substantia Nigra
pars reticulata, SNC for Substantia Nigra pars compacta. GP, for Globus Pallidus Internal Seg¬
ment, GPe for Globus Pallidus External Segment, DA for Dopamine. The different colours of the
arrows and boxes have been only used for clarification purposes.
from the SNc and VTA to the striatum are hypothesised to behave as an effective reinforcer,
i.e., signalling the error in the prediction of reward following that stimulus.
The Temporal Difference (TD) algorithm was proposed by Sutton and Barto in the early
80's (Sutton and Barto, 1981) as an instrumental learning algorithm, and was further formalised
by Dayan and Montague as a model of the Basal Ganglia (Schultz et al., 1997).
TD assumes that learning is aimed at maximising future rewards, hence at maximising the
following function:
V(st) = E[r(st) +Yr(s/+]) + y2r(5f+2) + ...] (2.2)
V(st) in equation 2.5.2 is the state-value function in the reinforcement learning context, and
equals the addition of the rewards due to transitions between states, from time t until the goal
(stability) is reached, y is the discount rate (ranges between 0 and 1). In this model, the TD
algorithm also assumes that the current state, defined by the cortical and thalamic projections,
only depends on the previous state (Markovian property). It uses the quantity
8(5,-1) = r(s,-]) +yV,(s,) - V,(s,-i) (2.3)
as the effective reinforcement at time t; where 8(5,-1) is the effective reinforcement for state
5,_i, r(st-i) the reward at time t — 1 and V,(s,) the effective reinforcement at time t for state
5,. Therefore the update rule relates r(5,_i), the reward due to the behaviour executed at a
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time t — 1 to its predictions of cumulative reward before and after that behaviour has been
executed, F^-i) and V(s,). The corrections occur for individual transitions; however, the goal
of the learning process is global; physiological stability. In the long run, when the appropriate
transitions to the goal have been learnt, the return will be predicted correctly and the value of
8 will be 0. Furthermore, a similar update rule affects the critic itself after every transition,
the value of the V function (the critic) for the previous state s,_i is updated according to this
equation
AV/(5/_1) = a x 8(s;_i), (2.4)
whereby a is the learning rate. Concluding, the hypothesis relating both the algorithm and the
observation suggests that cells in the patch of the striatum embody the V (state value) function,
and that the dopamine projection signals the 8, the error in the prediction of reward. This
would explain the silence of the dopamine neurons after several: the prediction of reward is
then correct, therefore 8 is 0.
This model introduces the role of learning, i.e., of learning to associate stimuli to rewarding
events. However, this has been, at an experimental level only measured in Pavlovian contin¬
gencies. In this respect, I suggest that there is sufficient evidence to extend this model to
instrumental learning and to extend the hypothesis of DA as a predictor for learning general
behavioural patterns. This is the role of the actor-critic (Sutton and Barto, 1981) introduced in
the next section.
2.5.3 Justification of an Actor-Critic
The last two sections have described two models of the basal ganglia. These have been built
based on the hypotheses that the main role of the basal ganglia is either learning to relate
stimuli to rewards or action selection. However, I argue that it is quite likely that both roles
(among others) are been concurrently performed in the basal ganglia, and that both functions
interact with one another. In the path towards a more general model, I suggest to integrate both
hypotheses in a single model that learns to select behaviours: the actor-critic model.
The actor-critic is a reinforcement learning algorithm embedding both learning and be¬
haviour selection in two modules of the same architecture. The actor selects behaviours and
modifies its policy on the basis of the signal delivered by the critic, which corrects the predic¬
tions of future return for that behaviour. Therefore, this algorithm would already encompass
both Schultz's and Redgrave's hypotheses. This is not thoroughly supported experimentally,
but has already been suggested as a future working hypothesis (Houk et al., 1995). Both hy¬
potheses are described next, together with their relationship to the actor-critic.
With regard to behaviour selection, Redgrave et al. (1999) suggested that several neural
pathways projecting from the thalamus and the cortex onto striatal cells provide information to
select among the output pathways projecting onto the basal ganglia's output nuclei (to disinhibit
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a single behaviour). The striatum is therefore processing every piece of incoming information
and calculating the intensity of every outgoing pathway. Behaviour selection is then conceived
as a competition between several output pathways. This competition is possible if I assume
the notion of reward according to Rolls (2003). Rolls argues that the selection among different
courses of action is driven by the maximisation of future reward. If this is correct, it would
be sensible that Redgrave's outgoing pathways were measured in terms of future reward. The
behaviour predicted to return the highest reward would be selected to be executed. Therefore,
I am hypothesising a direct correspondence between Redgrave's common currency and Rolls'
reward. Based on this, I assume that the actor (within the actor-critic) is assuming the role of
selecting a behaviour over another.
The experiments performed by Schultz et al. (1993); Schultz (1998) with regard to learn¬
ing suggest that the dopamine projection from the SNC and VTA to striatal cells signals the
error of the prediction of reward when learning to relate a stimulus to a response in a Pavlo-
vian contingency. I argue that this same reward is acting as an internal assessment to correct
the predictions of future reward and for biasing the selection of one behaviour over another.
Therefore, by using the actor-critic, I am extending Schultz' hypothesis to instrumental contin¬
gencies as well. Contingencies for which the delivery of reward is mediated by the execution
of a behaviour. In this light, I argue that reward is modifying the neural structures predicting
reward for every behaviour.
I intend to use this framework to study the manner in which reward-based mechanisms
contribute to adaptation and to answer related questions: how to combine stimuli and how
to integrate appetitive and consummatory behaviours. I argue that the answers to these
questions may emerge if behaviour selection and learning are considered as two concurrent
processes integrated in a single ecological framework as the actor-critic. In addition to this, I
am also concerned about the way agents learn to perceive their environment as a function of
their goals and motivations and how they learn to make decisions based on this information. In
a way, these open questions require an understanding of the topics to be addressed in this thesis.
Firstly, the understanding of the dynamics of the animals' internal physiology. Secondly how
to learn to perceive the environment, how to ground knowledge from the environment based
on the feedback provided. Finally, the processes underlying the process of behaviour selec¬
tion. Concluding, the aforementioned hypotheses suggest that the actor-critic is the biological
mechanism integrating integrate both sensory and motor information to select among future
courses of action. It is therefore interesting to build an artificial model that would concurrently
consider ecological perception, behaviour selection and learning in a natural manner. This con¬
currency must be considered since adaptation cannot occur in the absence of a single dynamics
coordinating resource management, behaviour selection, learning and adaptive perception.
Lastly, I also pursue the extraction ofbiologically plausible conclusions about learning in
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perception and in behaviour selection. The remainder of this review addresses a description
of the necessary elements to build an ecological perception system, and to integrate this in the
actor-critic. The final section introduces the developmental approach followed throughout this
thesis.
2.6 Ecological Perception: Gibson's Affordances
The previous sections have presented the principles relating learning and behaviour as inter¬
active processes in an ecological context. In a complementary fashion, this section situates
the notions of ecological perception and of affordance and explains the way in which these
intervene for adaptation.
As mentioned in section 2.4, transitions for the actor-critic, as for any other reinforcement
learning algorithm, occur between two states in a Markovian space. Therefore, part of the
problem when defining the framework of the actor-critic is defining the states themselves. As a
general rule, as for any other reinforcement learning algorithm, the states will have to provide
sufficient information to appropriately make a decision. In this case, since the selection of
behaviour occurs in an environment inspired after biology, it is most sensible that the state
includes information from the agent's outer environment and from its own physiology. The
part that depends on the agent's physiology is described in section 2.3. In a complementary
fashion, this section focuses on describing a novel way to view the environment: a functional
view based on object affordances. The state of the actor-critic is based on this. To commence
the description of this ecological view, I have considered appropriate to review some historical
concepts on traditional psychology. The following paragraphs are only intended to explain the
chain of events leading to the concept of affordance from a historical perspective. However,
the reader may decide to skip reading until the end of this section without losing the current
line of thought.
Gibson's ecological perception theory originated as a counter-position to dualism, which
was based on the assumption of a physical dimension, separated from a phenomenological
dimension of nature. Along these lines, Gestalt theorists maintained that objects in their phe¬
nomenological dimension tell us what to do with them; according to Koffka, they have demand
character, a concept further shaped by Lewis as Aufforderungscharacter and translated as in¬
vitation character by Brown (1929) and as valence by Adams (1931). In philosophical terms,
the concept of valence is related to the phenomenological dimension of an object and it is dis¬
joint from its physical dimension. Furthermore, its value is bestowed by a need of the observer.
Thus, only when she or he needed to eat, did the food have its demand character.
The term affordance in the Gibsonian ontology derives from the aforementioned concepts.
However, unlike these, the formulation of the affordance is based on the principle of ecology
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and denies the existence of a phenomenological dimension. Citing Gibson: "The object offers
what it does, because it is what it is. Duality does not exist, the physical object (the only one),
possesses meaning and value to begin with". Furthermore, this value is independent of the
motivational state of the agent (the level of hunger, the level of tiredness, etc. of an animal).
Gibson's ecological perception opposed contemporary cognitivist views. Cognitivists ar¬
gued that perception is a process integrating object features, which are perceived separately.
Instead, Gibson asserted that affordances are specified in the structure of the ambient light,
hence by the sensory signals perceived by an animal. Therefore, the perception of the object
can be viewed (and simplified) in terms of direct perception, i.e., the meaning of the object is
directly perceived in terms of the behaviours and actions offered. This is individual knowledge,
valid only in the context of an individual observer.
Reformulating this in synthetic terms, to learn affordances consists of establishing the value
of sensory information with regard to the agent's internal goals. This is equivalent to grounding
the meaning of sensory cues with regard to the agent's internal goals (Steels, 1994) —or as I
prefer to say, with regard to the agent's internal physiology. I suggest that this learning capacity
offers the possibility of building agents capable of adapting to a variety of environments. This
is the major principle guiding the design of the architecture introduced in the next chapters.
2.6.1 Perception of Function
Gibson's affordances relate a set of sensory cues to the potentiality of performing a behaviour.
For example, an affordance of a chair or of a table is to support. This is a fashion to define
objects.
Gibson (1966) postulated ecological perception on the grounds that an animal and its en¬
vironment are part of a single entity. Therefore, animals (and plants) have arisen via mutual
interaction with their environment. This suggests that every animal is probably bound to live
in its own niche of creation. For example, dolphins are to some parts of the sea as humans
are to some regions of the earth. In general, animals are prepared to manipulate a restricted
environment in an intelligent manner and are sensitive to aspects of the environment useful to
them. For example, the view of a prey for a fox is fundamental, but the view of a bottle of
whisky might not be. Hence, perception seems to be functionally biased according to species,
according to their internal needs. Gibson's theory of affordances agrees with this principle.
Two of Gibson's most relevant forerunners are von Uexkiill (1921) and Thorndike (1911).
Von Uexkiill transferred the viewpoint to study nature from the observer to the animal: "And
due to the fact everything natural for us disappears: the whole nature, the earth, the sky, the
stars, all and everyone and each of the things that surround us, and everything which remains
is only the effect of elements from the world having some influence in the structure of the
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animal,"3
In this respect, his Funktionskreis4 defines a functional relationship between the agent and
the environment: "Each stimulus coming from the same attribute5 will next be transformed
into excitations of different nerves that meet together again in the centre, in a property-net
meaning an action primitive."6 Furthermore: "For the case of large animals, each property-net
corresponds to a nervous effect-net, from which some paths lead out to groups ofmuscles that
constitute an action primitive."1 Therefore, the Funktionskreis is a loop that relates sensation
and action. The object in its double feature set, as property- and effect-support, possesses its
own structure binding together this double property (von Uexkiill, 1921).
Similarly, Thorndike (1911) argued that stimuli are structured into families, in which any
situation was associated with a hierarchical set of responses. The response taken at any point
in time was at the top of the currently applicable habit family, and is modified through the laws
of exercise and effect (so there is promotion of responses that are successful and weakening of
responses that fail).
Although not clearly detached from dualism, both Thorndike and Von Uexkiill could be
classified as non-cognitivists who argue in favour of a functional view of the animal-environment
relationship as part of the same whole. Although there is no bibliographical evidence (to the
best of the author's knowledge) that Gibson knew Von Uexktill's work, the concept of affor-
dance is a natural continuation of the perception postulated by Von Uexkiill as Funktionskreis.
Furthermore, both found behavioural support in Thorndike's hypothesis of action priming and
selection.
2.6.2 Affordances
Gibson's ecological perception introduces the view of the agent and the environment as part of
a single entity, whose perception is not based on identification, but on differentiation. Hence,
learning to differentiate is learning to perceive. Details of objects will reveal themselves after
further interaction. Furthermore, the significance of an object with respect to an agent arises
from this interaction and can be considered invariant with respect to that particular agent.
Gibson further extended this definition through the concept of affordance. The agent was
modelled based on feedback and on sensory signals from the environment and its memories as
3Damit veschwindet alles, was fur uns als selbstvertandlich gilt: die ganze Natur, die Erde, der Himmel, die
Sterne, ja alle Gegenstande, die uns umgeben. Es bleiben nur noch jene Einwirkungen als Weltfaktoren iibrig, die
dem Bauplan entsprechend auf Tier einen Einfluss ausiiben, von Uexkiill (1921)
translated by D.L. Mackinnon as function-circle (Von Uexkull, 1926).
5It remains however unclear whether he refers to features, thus Merkmal in German means 'attribute' but also
counts 'feature' as a possible translation.
6Alle von einem Merkmal stammenden Reize werden zunachst in Erregungen verschiedener Nerven verwandelt,
die sich im Zentrum in einem nervosen Merknetz zusammenfinden und dadurch die Einheit des Merkmals schaffen.
7Jedem nervosen Merknetz entspricht bei hoheren Tieren ein ebenfalls nervoses Wirknetz, von dem die Bahnen
ausgehen, welche bestimmte Muskelgruppen zu einer einheitlichen Handlung zusammenfassen.
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centres, each of which resonates to different sensory cues. Hence, the invariance of perception
depends on the way these centres are developed to allow the invariants in the input to be differ¬
entiated at a neural level. The registering of invariants is something that all nervous systems are
geared to do, even those in the simplest animals. When the sensory signals related to certain
objects are perceived (shape, size, colour, texture, composition, motion, animation and position
relative to other objects), the observer can detect their affordances. Their affordances depends
on these. These are then classified into categories and subcategories according to their degree
of similarity.
Gibson's affordances can be viewed as a concrete case of von UexkiiU's Funktionskreis.
In this respect, it can be argued that Rizzolatti's research (Rizzolatti et al., 2000) brings them
together by explaining their underlying neural support. Some nuclei in the brain are active when
certain actions or parts of objects are perceived (hence, resonate to the stored information). This
allows agents to perform actions by self-observation and by mirroring other individuals. This
implies that perception and action are closely coupled and that direct perception of objects and
action priming are related by the affordance.
The concept of affordance is used in the literature in a very abstract manner. I have therefore
considered it appropriate to conclude this introduction on ecological psychology by introducing
a set of citations to frame my own definition, which is introduced at the end of section 2.6.3.
• According to Gibson (1986), from a general point of view the basic affordances are
perceivable and are usually perceivable directly, without an excessive amount of learn¬
ing. The basic properties of the environment that make an affordance are specified in
the structure of ambient light, and hence affordance itself is specified in ambient light.
Moreover, an invariant that is commensurate with the body of the observer himself is
more easily picked up than one non commensurate with his/her body
• Affordances are properties taken with reference to the observer. They are neither physical
nor phenomenal. Only physical objects exist.
• The notion of invariants that are related at one extreme to the motives and needs of an
observer and at the other extreme to the substances and surfaces of a world provides
a new approach to psychology.
In conclusion, the agent does not make sense without the environment, whose perception
and abilities have been developed to match its need to survive in that particular environment.
Hence, if we wish to build agents adaptable to different environments, they must be able to
learn affordances in order to perform actions to satisfy their internal needs.
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2.6.3 Uses of the Term Affordance
The concept of affordance has only found certain acceptance in neuroscience and psychology.
However, a series of definitions can be met in the literature. This section lists a series of defi¬
nitions and models using affordances I have considered most salient. Finally, it also introduces
my own definition of affordances, which I will use next to build the model.
• In robotics and AI, its main field of application has been imitation, where an affordance
has been defined as the perceived or actual properties of how something may be used
by the agent (Nehaniv and Dautenhahn, 1998). Affordances are a bridge relating the
agent's environment to its behaviours. Furthermore, Nehaniv proposes them as the unit
of perception which could be used to facilitate imitative processes between agents of
different morphology.
• In psychology Cooper and Glasspool (2002) explicitly built a model using affordances
as attentional mechanisms that filter the amount of information which can be perceived
from the environment. Their definition is however not entirely Gibsonian, since this
is based on symbolic features perceived from objects, defined and engineered by the
designer.
• In neuropsychology Fagg and Arbib (1998) postulated a model for the extraction of
Gibsonian affordances. This is in the context of navigation and manipulation tasks. Ac¬
cording to them, the term affordance is used to mean the link between the visual cues to
parameters relevant for motor interaction.
• In Human-Computer-Interaction (HCI) St. Amant (1999) emphasises the situated nature
of human behaviour. HCI designers view affordances as the perceived properties of a
software artifact that indicates how it can be used (Baecker et ah, 1995). St. Amant also
defined them as: "a mechanism that allows orfacilitates the execution ofsome operator.
More specifically, an affordance preserves the conditions necessary for the successful
completion of the operator by reducing the execution cost ofother appropriate operators
or by increasing the execution cost of inappropriate operators."
I argue that the difficulty to define the concept of affordance lies on its intuitive charac¬
ter. However, I argue that St. Amant (1999) introduced the most comprehensive definition of
affordance, including four separate dimensions for the concept: first, Gibsonian affordances
(relationships or properties of relationships), second our perception of several properties, the
surfaces, distances, areas, textures, relationships between parts (on this fact relies the design
of ecological HCI), third the mental interpretation derived from perception, fourth the act of
performing an action itself.
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Along with Gibson's view, I argue that affordance has to be viewed as a relational con¬
cept, established between an agent and its environment, since their meaning is restricted to
that framework. I define affordance as the potentiality offered by a set of sensory cues to a
certain agent ofperforming a behaviour. Therefore, affordances can only be defined from the
perspective of the agent, and are grounded on the dynamics relating the agent's physiology to
the environment.
The next section introduces the neuroscience data hypothesised to embody affordances.
These data have been often referred to in models of learning by imitation (Demiris and Hayes,
2002), based on the mirror neuron hypothesis, also introduced in the next chapter. I have
deliberately chosen the FARS model as the most complete model encoding animal affordances,
since this is consistent with the parts of the brain also hypothesised to embody affordances.
2.7 Ecological Principles in Neuroscience
The structure of an animal is a result of the interaction with its environment. Hence, the tasks
an animal may be able to perform are closely related to its environment. Furthermore, an
animal can be viewed as an active entity performing some function related to the balance in its
environment (thus its reason of existence); when the balance is impaired, the species adapts or
extinguishes.
Hence, the internal resources of the animal are related to the maintenance of its internal
energy and of the balance of its internal structure within the boundaries that enable life, so that
individuals can transmit their genes to the individuals of the next generations for continuing
their balancing function with respect to their ecosystem (Ashby, 1965).
Some recent neuroscience studies have addressed the principles underlying ecological per¬
ception and their possible relation to the inverse mechanisms for action generation (Oztop and
Arbib, 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 2000; Guazzelli et al., 1998). The use of these principles for a
robotic synthetic approach is nonetheless insufficient, since these principles do not integrate the
environment and the agent's internal physiology in a dynamic defined by themselves. To this
end, there have also been several elements relating to action selection, which will be introduced
in the next section.
2.7.1 The FARS Model
The FARS (Fagg-Arbib-Rizzolatti-Sakata) model (Fagg and Arbib, 1998) introduces an im¬
plementation of the principles underlying perception and the generation of action responses.
It is based on experimental studies in macaque electrophysiology. This model uses the term
affordance to refer to a set of motor commands relating to a set of sensory cues.
The schema of the FARS model is introduced in figure 2.4, and mostly involves areas AIP
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and F5 in the macaque brain. AIP (Anterior Intraparietal Sulcus) is located in the parietal
cortex. It receives projections from the visual cortex and is hypothesised to extract the relevant
set of cues to restrict the set of grasping actions encoded by the F5 area. Neurophysiological
recordings in this area suggest that some neurons encode the set of motor commands executed
by the monkey when grasping an object. Most importantly, some of these cells show the same
activation pattern when the related motor sequence is observed by a demonstrator. Rizzolatti
hypothesised that this suggests that these cells are acting as a bridge between perception and
action, enabling the macaque to learn by imitation.
Figure 2.4: Fagg-Arbib-Rizzolatti-Sakata Model. Abbreviations stand for: AIP (Anterior Intrapari¬
etal Area), VIP (Ventral Intraparietal Area), IT (Infero-Temporal Area), PIP (Posterior Intraparietal
Area). The remaining anatomical medical notation for different parts of the brain.
The FARS model is not directly concerned with behaviour selection or reinforcement learn¬
ing. However, it includes an intrinsic component of interaction with the environment. Unlike
this, I contend that the execution of behaviour triggers a feedback signal from the environment,
which relates the three processes of interest for this thesis: affordance learning, behaviour
selection and learning.
The FARS model has been used as a model for learning by imitation Rizzolatti et al. (2000);
Guazzelli et al. (1998); Oztop and Arbib (2002). The process starts by areas V2 and V3 (pre-
motor cortex) by providing visual input to the AIP (Anterior Intraparietal Area). This is used
to make a coarse selection of the possible affordances of the object. Area F5 refines this
selection by applying constraints depending on the task according to the signals from area F6,
on the working memory (from area 46) and on the stimuli (from area F2). This relationship
between F5 and AIP fits with the hypothesis of the AIP acting as an active memory of the one
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selected affordance and updating this memory to correspond to the sort of grasp executed. In a
complementary fashion, area F5 is held responsible for selecting a single grasp after integrating
the task's constraints with the set of grasps afforded by the object nearby. The FARS model
(Fagg and Arbib, 1998) provides a reasonable explanation of the way in which F5 may accept
signals from areas F6 (pre-SMA supplementary motor area), 46 (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex)
and F2 (dorsal premotor cortex) to respond to task constraints, working memory and instruction








Figure 2.5: Interaction between AIP (Anterior Intraparietal Area) and F5 area neuron cell popu¬
lations (FARS Model).
Related to this are also Gibson's arguments on perception. According to Gibson, the per¬
ception of object's affordances works on the basis of relating cues to behaviours, e.g., for
the case of grasping: To be graspable, an object must have opposite surfaces separated by a
distance less than the span of the hand (Gibson, 1986). This hypothesis, for the case of the
grasping affordance, has been hypothesised in terms of Arbib's theory of virtual fingers and of
opposition space. According to this, a grasp is defined via two "opposition axes", the oppo¬
sition axis in the hand joining the virtual finger regions to be opposed to each other, and the
opposition axis in the object.
This has been implemented in Fagg and Arbib (1998) by their theory of virtual fingers
and opposition space. In these terms, a grasp can be defined via two "opposition axes", the
opposition axis in the hand joining the virtual finger regions to be opposed to each other,
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and the opposition axis in the object. If combining Gibson's and Arbib's perspectives, visual
perception seems to provide the necessary cues to the AIP, LIP (Lateral intra-parietal area),
VIP (ventral intra-parietal area), areas 7a and 7b, and area SII (second somatosensory area).
Each of these areas has a menu of the possible motor primitives for the animal (monkey) for
every action: saccadic eye movements (LIP), ocular fixation (7a), reaching (7b), and grasping
(AIP). Everyone of these areas are within the brain's IPL (Inferior Parietal Lobule), receiving
projections from the occipito-temporal areas and from the visual field periphery of V3 and V2.
For the case of grasping, an appropriate opposition axis in the object can be determined after
an affordance is selected, and hence the appropriate grasping behaviour can be selected and
executed via mutual interaction between the F5 and AIP area, cf. figure 2.5.
In this light, I suggest that one can view the FARS' model from a more general perspective.
An animal has to perform a task to satisfy each internal need by interacting with those elements
in its niche offering the right affordances, e.g., a source of water when thirsty. Furthermore,
this occurs in a chain of processes, starting when perceiving the environment and ending by
the selection of behaviours/actions. On the one hand, sensory cortices perceive and represent
sensory information, which is transferred to the basal ganglia in order to select a behaviour
(Redgrave et ah, 1999). According to the reward obtained via interaction with the environment
behavioural patterns may be modified.
The FARS model is a very interesting model from a neurological perspective, since it as¬
sembles together the necessary processes and related parts of the brain for the grasping affor¬
dance. However, some further abstraction is required if this is to be applied to a mobile robot,
since other actions than grasping will be necessary. From this perspective, I propose to ab¬
stract from this model in order to learn object affordances other than grasping. In this context,
I have considered the process of learning to perceive object affordances. The process can be
described as follows:
1. The perception of an object.
2. The relationship between the perceived cues and the possible functions of the object is
estimated.
3. A behaviour or action is selected according to the repertoire attached to the object.
4. The behaviour is executed.
5. The environment returns some feedback during and after the execution of a behaviour.
6. The agent leams that the perceived cue may indicate the potentiality of executing that
behaviour.
I propose to apply this method to learn object affordances in a mobile robotics' framework to
improve adaptation. This is further explained in the next section.
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2.8 Adaptive Perception: Learning Affordances
Gibson's classification of affordances extends to any possible action, either related to a physical
movement or to a mental or abstract execution of behaviour. Furthermore, mobile robots may
have to perform other actions than grasping when performing their tasks. For example, the
affordance for walking is possible whenever there is a surface affording a strong enough support
to sustain our weight, a picture affords to be watched, a chair affords to sit. Thus, I propose to
extend the same principles introduced in the last section to other actions.
Affordance learning is intimately related to the knowledge grounding problem, i.e., learn¬
ing that the perception of certain sensory patterns and fluctuations of the internal physiology are
related to the execution of a certain behaviour. In other words, learning the potentiality of exe¬
cuting a particular behaviour when certain stimuli are perceived is knowing that this may fulfil
some internal goals. Based on this, I argue that learning affordances is a different formulation
of the same knowledge grounding problem, for which there is an extensive literature (Steels,
1994; Harnad, 1990). However, this has so far not been related to learning and adaptation in
robotics.
The models reviewed in the first sections use external stimuli in their procedures to select
actions. However, they restrict the use of external stimuli to their combination with internal
drives to select behaviours, disregarding the possibility of self-learning their potentiality. This
is exactly the extension I am proposing in order to improve a robot's adaptation to its environ¬
ment. I argue that this ability is fundamental if the environment experiences a change affecting
the agent's internal needs. The procedure I have designed to this end is inspired after the prin¬
ciples of the FARS model at a phenomenological level, and based on the assumption that this
can be learnt by interaction with the environment only. The framework and the method I have
used to model this are introduced in the next section.
2.9 Physiology, Ecology and Behaviour
Probably the most famous example of an artificial ecological agent is Pfeifer's Fungus Eater
(Pfeifer, 1994). This is mainly based on the consideration that every creature is the result
of a process of continuous interaction with the environment. Its emerging behaviour is a dy¬
namic process, a balance between the mutual effects of the agent and the environment. This
is the framework within which I propose to address the integration of affordance learning and
behavioural patterns.
The set ofgoals ofan animal defines the focus of interest in the environment and therefore,
its drives for action. Complementarily, the environment constrains the manner in which the
interaction takes place via physical laws. The results of these constraints are the behaviours
of every species. For example, in the case of the simple bacterial organism Dictyostelium
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discoideum, behaviours have adapted to respond to light gradients (phototaxis), temperature
gradients (thermotaxis), pH differences (acidotaxis), and wind current (rheotaxis) in a response
to the environment addressed to satisfy its nutritional and reproductive needs (Maree et al.,
1999). The essential goal is to find the right conditions to reproduce; being the difference
between the ideal and sensed conditions the leading force to this end. This is an example of
behavioural adaptation resulting from the animal-environment mutuality.
In this light, the role ofperception consists ofproviding the right information to arbitrate
among the behaviour repertoire in order to satisfy the agent's goals. I can simplify this pro¬
cess of design by allowing the process of interaction with the environment to restrict these
relationships in an analogous fashion to natural organisms. Furthermore, as suggested in the
previous paragraph, the agent's perception does not need to be global, it can be restricted to the
relevant elements for the fulfilment of the task. In a practical manner, this can be determined
by the agent's internal goals/needs. For example, in the case of the aforementioned bacteria
(.Dictyostelium discoideum), its perception to perform phototaxis is limited to light intensity
(the only salient element in the environment). Therefore, a framework consisting of a set of
goals together with the interactions and the structure of the niche would be sufficient to frame
a biologically resemblant agent. Evolution and adaptation will provide the boundaries for the
system to exist and to survive. I propose to approach the design of the agent and its environment
in an analogous fashion for the agent to be capable of adapting to its scenario; a framework to
leam the affordances of an agent in its scenario.
This level of knowledge from the environment is necessary if the agent has to evolve in
an environment. However, some mechanism to govern the interaction is also necessary. Oth¬
erwise, only a reactive behaviour would be possible. To this end, I argue that this perception
framework needs to be embedded in a larger context to govern the interaction with the environ¬
ment, a framework combining these external stimuli with the internal wills of the agent to bias
the agent's behaviours in an adaptive manner: the actor-critic.
In an analogous manner to animals, these principles suggest using the structure of an animat
to integrate these principles of interaction with the environment. To this end, I have based an
artificial assessment system on the notion of stability proposed by Ashby (1965). The effect of
a behaviour reflects on the body of the agent through the compensation of its needs. Hence, an
interaction is considered to be successful if it contributes to compensate a need. Conversely, if
it does not compensate a need it is considered as failed. The affordance learning criterion has
to also match the sensory patterns of that behaviour when its execution is successful, and to
unrelate them otherwise.
As a whole, behaviour selection in robotics was formally posed by Tyrrell (1993) and has
been further addressed by Humphrys (1997), Spier and McFarland (1996), Avila-Garcfa and
Canamero (2002) from an ethological viewpoint. However, a neuro-ethological perspective has
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only been introduced by Redgrave et al. (1999) and Guazzelli et al. (1998), whose complete
model for action learning consists of a combination of DRAMA (Billard and Hayes, 1998),
the MSN and the FARS model (Oztop and Arbib, 2002; Fagg and Arbib, 1998). Our view on
behaviour selection draws on learning applied to behaviour selection in an alternative fashion
to that proposed by Redgrave, and applied to perception in a Gibsonian manner.
Summary
The overall goal of this thesis is to build an agent capable of learning object affordances and
of integrating these in an actor-critic reinforcement learning architecture. To achieve this aim,
perception and behaviour selection are presented in this thesis as two dynamic processes of
interaction with the environment. This animat consists of a set of processes: perceiving the
right information from the environment, combining this with the expression of internal needs
and executing the appropriate behaviour to satisfy the internal needs. Furthermore, this is
assessed by a criterion inspired after Ashby's notion of viability (Ashby, 1965) and after the
ecological principle. This relates the internal physiology to the environment and provides a
guideline to implement the model described in previous sections. Next we review a set of
contributions in order to justify the set of situations where this framework will be tested.
On the one hand, classical ethological models are based on the assumption that the selec¬
tion of one behaviour over another works by comparison of different drives, these being an
expression of internal and external stimuli. Each of them has an associated set of responses,
which are activated whenever its associated drive exhibits the highest level. On the other, en¬
gineering criteria were the inspiration of robotic models, e.g. Maes (1991). However, Tyrrell's
thesis pointed out the limitation of the aforementioned principles and put forward a novel in¬
spiration for their future design. Tyrrell analysed several models, both inspired in ethology
and robotics, concluding that Maes's architecture performed worse than classical ethological
ones. Ever since, there have been several attempts to address the topic with mixed inspiration:
Gadanho (2002), Blumberg (1997), Canamero (1997). Some of these models were focusing
on animation or basic emotions, however their most important contribution has been the iden¬
tification of the relevant cognitive issues for behaviour selection. Two of these still require
further study: the methods to combine external and internal stimuli and the understanding of
methods to combine appetitive and consummatory behaviours. I argue that finding a solution
to these problems requires novel principles of design inspired in neuroscience and ethology.
Furthermore, to address these topics it is necessary to have an appropriate framework, namely
a picture where the effect of behaviour selection and dynamic perception can be quantified.
Therefore, this thesis is about ecological adaptation inspired in principles of neuroscience
and ethology. The topics addressed are:
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The first topic addressed is the learning of object ajfordances. Their relationship to be¬
haviour selection is dual: firstly, affordances (the agent's unit of ecological perception) and
decision making are intrinsically related via the feedback from the environment, also related
to reward. Reward is based on the effect provoked by the execution of a behaviour on the
bodily physiology. Secondly, learning affordances also means to ground the knowledge from
the environment with regard to the agent's internal goals. This is necessary to make efficient
decisions and to be able to adapt if the affordances of the surrounding objects change.
The second topic addressed in the thesis is the combination of external stimuli (affor¬
dances) with the internal drives for learning to select behaviours. This goal is dual: on the
one hand, to demonstrate that the learning of affordances has been correctly assessed, on the
other to assess the aforementioned combination of stimuli to bias a heterogeneous behaviour
repertoire.
physiological and behavioural, being inter-dependent. It is from this perspective that
The principles used for learning are inspired in biology and ecology, and affect both per¬
ception and behaviour selection. The novelty introduced, beyond the architecture presented in
the next sections, is that this process is now self-regulated. Perception and behavioural pat¬
terns will vary if there are changes in the physiology or in the environment inviting to do so.
For example, if the food becomes scarce, the behaviour eating may have to be selected more
often to compensate this scarcity.
In this model, behavioural patterns are governed by the actor-critic, which has been hy¬
pothesised to be assessed by reward in biological systems. This, together with the Temporal
Difference (TD) algorithm, address learning in an incremental manner, not needing an a-priori
model of the environment, coherently with the ecological, developmental adaptation to the
environment.
A series of hypotheses have been formulated to build this learning model:
• Affordance learning is driven and modulated by reward.
• The common currency for behaviour selection is reward.
• Behaviour selection is performed via comparison of motivations related to behaviours,
since these are related to the predicted reward obtained via their execution.
• Learning to make decisions consists of two sub-processes:
- Calculating the motivations related to each behaviour, predicting the expected re¬
ward (due to its execution) on the basis of external and internal stimuli.
- Having an appropriate criterion to decide for one behaviour over another on the
basis of a set of activation values.
The testing of these hypotheses is conducted under the following assumptions:
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• The architecture for learning and behaviour selection responds to ecological principles.
• External stimuli can be modelled as affordances, i.e., reward-driven (functional) relation¬
ships between cues in the environment and the behaviours within the agent's repertoire.
The expected results should demonstrate that:
• Affordances can be integrated into behaviour selection.
• An actor-critic and TD provide a framework for naturally integrating perception and
behaviour selection in a biologically resemblant manner.
• The principle for learning affordances is based on strengthening the relationships be¬
tween cues in the environment and the motivation related to each behaviour. This rela¬
tionship is the affordance of that cue with respect to that behaviour.
• The assessment criterion is based on correcting the predictions of reward for every cue
with regard to each behaviour, via interaction with the environment.
• Learning to perceive from the environment and to select behaviours are part of the same
problem.
• Appetitive behaviours are competing for execution in equal conditions to consummatory
behaviours.
Finally, I have also argued for a single interaction dynamics, integrating physiology, the
learning of functionalities and of policies. The laws of interaction with the environment will
bias adaptation towards looser or stricter policies to select behaviours on demand of the envi¬
ronmental conditions in a way that will try to cover the need of internal, physiological stability,
mandatory for the survival of the agent.
Chapter 3
A Model of Ecological Learning for
Perception and Behaviour Selection
This thesis focuses on ecological learning as a process underlying perception and biologically
inspired behaviour selection. The set of hypotheses and assumptions pertaining to them are
addressed and disseminated throughout the different chapters composing this thesis. Nonethe¬
less, it has been considered appropriate to collect them in this chapter as an introduction to
these. Beyond introducing a loose view of model to be used in the experiments, this chapter
also aims at providing an overview of the ensemble of assumptions and reasonings that relate
each element of the model and that ground their interactions. The first section addresses eco¬
logical perception and the related elements of the model. This is followed by a section focusing
on the parts of the model involved in behaviour selection and learning and the principles un¬
derlying their functioning. Finally, a conclusion relates elements of both previous sections and
introduces the next chapters.
3.1 Grounding Affordances in the Physiology
Ecological Perception, Learning in terms of Artificial Physiology The animat approach
(Meyer, 1997, 1995) views animats as creatures capable of "actively seeking the information
they require and of selecting those behaviours that allow them to profit from their interac¬
tions with the environment." (Meyer, 1997). Different robotic architectures (Avila-Garcfa and
Canamero, 2002; Gadanho, 2002; Velasquez, 1998; Canamero, 1997; Spier and McFarland,
1996; Blumberg, 1994) focus upon building behaviour selection architectures to make deci¬
sions according to the agent's internal state. In most architectures, although the agents can set
their own goals, the relationship between the objects in the environment (or their perception)
and the internal goals is usually hard-wired. However, Wilson suggested that "At each point (in
building the animat) we will be careful to include full connection with a sensory environment,
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together with maximum use of perception, categorisation, and adaptation" (Wilson, 1991).
This is consonant with the direct extraction of information from the sensory flow proposed by
Gibson (1966). In this respect, one of Gibson's main contribution to the understanding of per¬
ception is the concept of affordance. Affordance is the unit of perception in functional terms
defined as the causal relationship between a set of cues and the potentiality for action that their
perception offers to a particular agent. This is further explained in chapter 4.
According to this, it can be interpreted that this is equivalent to learning to perceive the
world in an active manner. Additionally, that learning object ajfordances is one of the pos¬
sible ways towards "the maximisation of the use of perception" suggested by Wilson (1991).
Furthermore, a natural consequence of this ability is the conclusion that an agent capable of
learning affordances would also be able to adapt to scenarios where functional relationships
between objects and behaviours can be established.
However, this view is still incomplete if it remains ungrounded in the agent's internal physi¬
ological dynamics. In fact, in order to establish functional relationships between the perception
of a cue and the elicitation of a behaviour defining an affordance, the effect of the execution
of a behaviour on the agent's internal physiology has to be measurable. This is the principle
proposed to learn the affordances of a scenario with regard to the physiology of a certain agent
(affordances equally depend on the scenario as they do on the agent).
In this light, an affordance can be seen as the causal relationship between the agent's sen¬
sory flow at the moment of the interaction and the internal effect of the execution of its related
behaviour. This is further addressed in chapter 4. The next section introduces the elements
of design of a motivation-driven architecture as the context within which to test the aforemen¬
tioned hypothesis.
Modelling Artificial Physiology and Affordance Learning The model which we present
to learn affordances consists of three main elements: an Internal Physiology module, a Self-
Organising Feature Map (SOFM) and a Learning Module.
The agent's internal physiology, in analogy to the motivation-driven architecture proposed
by Canamero (1997), consists of two main elements. Firstly a set of homeostatic variables,
abstractions of the agent's internal resources. Secondly, a set of drives (cf. centre-left figure
3.1), which signal the level of deficit or excess of their related variables. For example, nutrition,
stamina and boredom could be the homeostatic variables, and hunger, tiredness and restlessness
their related drives.
The Self-Organising Feature Map consists of a Grow When Required (GWR) network,
—cf. top-left in figure 3.1— (Marsland et al., 2002), which groups together similar sensory
patterns as nodes of a topological network. The metric of similarity is the Euclidean distance
between sensory patterns. The choice of the GWR network over other Self-Organising Fea-
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Figure 3.1: Complete Model Schema: Physiology (homeostatic variables and drives modules),
SOFM (affordances, external stimuli module). Both contribute to the motivational state and to
determine the intensity of the behaviours, in competition for the agent's actuators. The learning
process is not explicitly indicated, but affects the connections relating the motivational state to
the behaviours.
ture Maps (e.g., Kohonen networks (Kohonen, 1982)) is motivated by the ability of the GWR
network to grow as much as required by the complexity of the sensory space (according to a
pre-set level of accuracy). If the environment is static, each node in the network will represent
a set of similar sensory patterns when its final structure has been reached. Similarly, if the en¬
vironment is dynamic, the network will try to dynamically follow up its changes. If a sensory
pattern is not encountered anymore, its related node will fade away and eventually disappear.
Conversely, if a new sensory pattern arises, the network will create a new node to represent the
novel element in the agent's sensory space.
The Learning Module consists of a set of synapses relating each of the nodes in the SOFM
to every behaviour of the agent's repertoire. The strength value of each synapse (between 0
and 1) indicates the strength of the affordance for a given sensory pattern. The strength of
the synaptic weights is established via Hebbian reinforcement (Hebb, 1949). This strengthens
or weakens the weights of the synapses on the basis of the internal effect provoked by the
execution of a behaviour. Behaviour execution alters the internal physiological dynamics (e.g.,
it increases the level of glucose in blood). This effect is signalled via a hormonal release. If
it is beneficial, it strengthens the functional synapse that connects the behaviour just executed
to the node which was active at the moment of execution (not the topological synapses of the
GWR). This operation is repeated until the weights of these synapses are stable. These weights
define the behaviour-affordance of that object, e.g., its edibility, or maybe how restful it is.
To summarise, this section briefly introduces a set of modules to endow an agent with the
ability to learn affordances for a given set of objects in the scenario. Importantly, the learning
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process is based on the principle ofecology, which relates the agent's interaction with elements
in its scenario to the effect these may have in its internal physiology. It is argued that this is the
fundamental element that allows the agent to be able to define affordances, therefore to adapt
its perception to a given scenario. This argument is explained further in chapter 4.
3.2 Actor-Critic Module
Reward-Based Developmental Learning: Adapting Behavioural Patterns In addition to
the ecological framework for perception, it has been previously argued that integration between
different adaptive processes is a crucial issue for developing adaptive elements and systems
exhibiting a higher biological resemblance and adaptive power. Towards this aim, the second
issue addressed throughout the thesis is the study of reward-based developmental processes
that would allow the agent to modify its behavioural patterns according to the dynamics in its
scenario.
Furthermore, it is argued that adaptive learning implies modifying behavioural patterns in a
manner regulated by the internal physiology, which is commanded by the reward obtained via
external interaction. Behavioural and neuroscience studies support this hypothesis (Houk et al.,
1995; Schultz et al., 1993) and suggest the actor-critic as a possible solution used by vertebrates
to modify their behavioural patterns. This framework, together with the Temporal Difference
(TD) update procedure (Sutton and Barto, 1998), addresses learning in an incremental manner,
thus not requiring an a-priori model of the environment; this is consistent with the philosophy
of ecological, developmental adaptation to the environment.
On the basis of these principles, a series of hypotheses have been formulated. These have
been initially introduced at the end of the literature review; however, it has been considered
appropriate to re-formulate them and to list them in this first experimental chapter. These will
be addressed in the subsequent chapters:
• Affordance learning is driven and modulated by reward.
• The "common currency" (Redgrave et al., 1999) for behaviour selection is also reward.
• Behaviour selection is performed via comparison of the activation of the different moti¬
vations. Each motivation represents the state of activation of a related behaviour, calcu¬
lated on the basis of the reward the agent expects to obtain via its execution.
• Learning to make decisions consists of two sub-processes:
- Learning a set of activation functions (motivations), one for each behaviour, that
predict expected reward (when the behaviour is executed) on the basis of external
and internal stimuli.
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- Having an appropriate criterion to decide for one behaviour over another on the
basis of a set of activation values.
The testing of these hypotheses is conducted via modelling a model on the basis of the
aforementioned principles under the following assumptions:
• The architecture for learning and behaviour selection responds to ecological principles.
• External stimuli can be modelled as affordances, i.e., reward-driven (functional) rela¬
tionships between cues in the environment and the behaviours within the repertoire of
the agent.
The concrete hypotheses we intend to test are:
• Affordances can be integrated in an ecological framework for behaviour selection.
• An actor-critic and TD learning provide a framework for naturally integrating the afore¬
mentioned principles of perception and action selection in a natural manner.
• The principle used for learning affordances is based on strengthening weighted relation¬
ships between cues in the environment and the activation of each behaviour within the
repertoire of the agent. Each weight is the affordance of that cue with respect to that
behaviour (see earlier comment on this).
• The assessment criterion is based on corrections of the predictions of reward for each
cue with regard to each behaviour, via interaction with the environment.
• Learning to perceive the environment and to select behaviours are part of the same prob¬
lem.
Finally, the need to encompass the dynamics of each element in the system has also been
argued. Physiology, learning of functionalities and of policies are part of a single regulatory
process orchestrated by the interaction with the environment, which will bias adaptation to¬
wards looser or stricter policies to select behaviours on demand of the environmental circum¬
stances, and bounded by the need of internal, physiological stability, mandatory for the survival
of the agent.
Model for Learning and Behaviour Selection The model for learning and behaviour se¬
lection has been developed as an extension of the ethological-based architectures proposed
by (Avila-Garcfa and Canamero, 2002; McFarland and Spier, 1997). However, unlike previ¬
ous architectures solely devoted to behaviour selection, this one incorporates the possibility of
modifying patterns of selection by exploiting the aforementioned principle of ecology. In fact,
the effect of interacting with the environment on the internal physiological dynamics can also
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LEARNING AND BEHAVIOUR SELECTION ARCHITECTURE
SENSORY PERCEPTION
CRITIC
Figure 3.2: Initial Agent Model. It consists of an internal physiology, comprising the homeostatic
variables and internal drives, a module to learn affordances, a motivational state, a behaviour
repertoire, the agent's actuators and the environment.
be viewed in the context of reward. The elements of the architecture introduced next address
the process of learning to select behaviours to maximise the prediction of reward.
The elements for learning to select behaviours are two: the actor and the critic, in addition
to the modules introduced in section 3.1. As the names indicate, the actor and the critic are two
different (though interacting) elements. The input to both elements is the state (motivational
state), which consists of the currently perceived external stimuli and the state of the drives.
As a novelty for this architecture, and unlike for others, there is no pre-defined formula to
calculate the motivational state for every internal state. Instead, the actor-critic RL algorithm
is integrated to learn to calculate these motivational states on the basis of the reward obtained
by interacting with the environment.
The actor (cf. centre figure 3.2) decides the behaviour to execute next in such a manner
that reward is maximised. This principle of learning is applied to combine external and internal
stimuli to appropriately select behaviours. The selection is a competition for dis-inhibiting the
behaviour which is presumably the most rewarding.
The critic (cf. centre-bottom figure 3.2) assesses decisions and calculates the error in
the prediction of reward (effective reinforcement) once the decision has been made. At that
moment the prediction of reward can be compared with the real reward obtained in order to
correct the prediction.
This architecture for learning has a dual goal. To show that learning to perceive and to
select behaviours are a sub-set of a more general reward-based learning system, in the overall
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context of adaptation. Furthermore, it also aims at using an actor-critic in a simulated envi¬
ronment providing elements to disambiguate different theories on the main role of the basal
ganglia by suggesting that both learning and behaviour selection can partly share the same
neural substrate.
Summary
This chapter has introduced the different interacting modules in the model (cf. figure 3.2) and
an overview of their inter-dependence and interaction. The parts of the model are:
• a module of internal resources, the level of which is signalled by the homeostatic vari¬
ables. These variables express their deficit or excess via a set of related drives. This is
introduced in the next chapter; section 4.1.
• the module of affordances, which provides the agent with information about the possi¬
bility of executing certain actions with the elements situated in its close scenario. This is
also introduced in the next chapter; section 4.2.
• the module for behaviour selection and learning, composed of the actor critic. This is
described in chapter 5.
• the behaviour repertoire of the agent.
Each aspect of the model and an extended explanation of their principles are introduced in
detail in the following chapters.
Chapter 4
Ecological Perception
Biology has become increasingly popular throughout the last decade as a source of inspiration
on adaptation-related ideas for mobile robotics (Avila-Garcia and Canamero, 2002; Gadanho,
2002; Velasquez, 1998; Canamero, 1997; Spier and McFarland, 1996; Blumberg, 1994; Brait-
enberg, 1984). I argue that this line of research is justified by the fact that the best example of an
adaptive system is an animal in its niche. This view as inspiration for engineering purposes has
been however admonished (Hallam, 1998), since a direct application of biological principles
does not guarantee an acceptable solution from an engineering perspective. Natural adaptation
occurs if there are competitors for the same resources or if changes in the environment oblige;
these can be viewed as the natural optimisation criteria. Unlike these, optimisation in engi¬
neering is driven by criteria imposed by a designer, which depending on the application do not
need to maintain any resemblance to biology. Nevertheless, if the goals pursued by the natural
and the artificial beings are alike, it seems appropriate to learn from the examples delivered by
nature and from the principles of interaction that lead to themselves as autonomous individuals.
This is the intention throughout this thesis.
The relationship between the individual and its environment is summarised by the eco¬
logical principle (Pfeifer, 1994) which considers an agent and its environment as two entities
integrated in a single dynamics governing their mutual interaction. Interaction can be viewed
from the perspective of an agent as a loop, initiated by the perception of the environment, fol¬
lowed by some internal interaction with its physiological values which lead to a behavioural
response to modify the environment and the agent's own internal physiology. Therefore, from
an ecological perspective it seems reasonable to focus on the three processes that seem to ini¬
tially drive adaptation: perception, interaction with the environment and internal physiological
dynamics, since adaptiveness is an emergent phenomenon of the dynamics established by these
processes. In this context, this chapter addresses the study of the first of these processes: the
underlying mechanisms of ecological perception. To assemble agents capable of dynamically
adapting to a variety of environments firstly depends on this.
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Perception in the animal realm is designed as a means for survival. It is a process endowing
animals with the appropriate information on their environment to intelligently manage their in¬
ternal resources (McFarland, 1993). Most animals perform sequences of actions to satisfy their
needs by interacting with the appropriate elements in their environment. However, animals do
not interact with everything; they filter much of the sensory information while still remaining
capable of navigating, evolving and adapting to their environment. This raises questions related
to the ingraining of perception in this process. How do animals perceive their world? How do
they combine perception with their internal wills to drive themselves to satisfy their internal
needs? How do they increase their knowledge of the environment? This chapter intends to sug¬
gest answers to these questions and to do so within the constraints imposed by the ecological
principle.
It is important to stress that this is a study on developmental learning in the context of
adaptation. Traditionally, adaptive processes have been classified as developmental and ge¬
netic (Fisher, 1930). The former modify the perception of the animal by interacting with its
environment in the course of the life of the individual (McFarland, 1993). The latter prune
the individuals unfit to deal with their environment and extend over generations. However,
this classic separation seems to fade in the light of newer hypotheses arguing the influence of
behaviour on the genome (Ackley and Littman, 1991); therefore suggesting a relationship be¬
tween both processes as complementary mechanisms for adaptation. However, this is beyond
the scope of this research. For practical reasons, this thesis solely focuses on developmental
learning.
For this study on ecological perception, I have considered observation of perception and
interaction processes in the animal world. However, this does not suffice to explain how ani¬
mals learn to perceive their environment. Beyond perception and behaviour selection, learning
also requires assessment (Sutton and Barto, 1998); hence being able to distinguish the ben¬
eficial from the harmful. Only those animals encouraging actions whose effect is beneficial
and discouraging those whose effect is harmful survive. This internal assessment criterion has
been commonly referred to as the sense of valence (Ackley and Littman, 1991). It works at
a physiological level, providing an overall assessment about the changes in the physiologi¬
cal state due to the execution of a behaviour. For example, consuming good food when it is
hungry reflects on a feeling of satisfaction because it increases the level of glucose in blood,
whereas putting a hand on fire provokes a feeling of discomfort, related to the pain and harm
resulting from this action1. The sense of valence increased the likelihood of survival of some
'Why are animals endowed with this sense? The most likely reason is that those lacking this appreciation do not
survive in hazardous environments. Hence, they were pruned from the genetic tree (Darwin, 1866). In this respect,
it is useful to view the interaction between the animal and its environment in terms of a systems interaction, whose
level of organisation is granular and hierarchical, i.e., an autopoietic matrix (Maturana and Varela, 1980). In this
context, the sense of valence can be interpreted as a basic element of cognition, a principle necessary to allow the
autopoietic entity (the living being) to be, and to be in position of contributing to perpetuate the species.
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species; however, the underlying physiological phenomena that gave origin to this are still un¬
certain. However, the need for homeostasis (Cannon, 1929), re-formulated as Ashby's notion
of viability (Ashby, 1965) does provide a practical guideline for assessing the effect of the
behavioural responses on the agent. Only animals whose physiological needs are kept within
certain boundaries (within the viability zone) survive. In engineering terms, this principle has
been the inspiration for Avila-Garcfa and Canamero (2002) who defined a set of viability in¬
dicators to assess the performance of different behaviour selection architectures. However, I
argue that this is furthermore the assessment principle guiding the learning processes, which I
propose to apply to ecological perception. The reward of the artificial agent in this thesis will
have an embedded assessment system dictating that actions whose physiological effect leads
towards a physiological state of less deficit are rewarding. Those with the converse effect are
considered as punishing.
Furthermore, it is also important to introduce the idea that this learning process has rel¬
evant implications from a conceptual perspective. Among the most mentioned processes in
developmental psychology is the process of knowledge grounding (Noble, 1998; Vogt, 2001).
I argue that the ecological principle can be used to establish a semantics of the objects in the
environment. If the meaning of an object is its functional definition, learning the physiological
effect of a behaviour related to some sensory cues is learning a possible semantics of these sets
of cues at an individual level.
In this light, this chapter addresses the study of the underpinnings of the learning processes
that enable an agent to interact with objects for a given set of environments. The level of
description of these processes lies at the level of functional systems. In loose terms, I intend
to endow an agent with the capability of knowing what to do with the things it has around
given the aforementioned constraints. This is addressed by assigning significance to the cues
perceived with respect to each behaviour and to each goal of the agent, hence, by endowing the
agent with the capability of learning its own affordances2. This is reviewed in chapter 2.
The next section introduces the principles that enable us to model an agent's internal phys¬
iology, which is necessary to allow the agent to drive its actions and to model the effects of
a behaviour. This is followed by a section on clustering methods, which introduces different
algorithms that can be used to identify and group similar cues in the environment. The learning
mechanisms are then described, followed by a section introducing some experiments carried
out to test the learning algorithms. A summary of the results of these experiments precedes the
discussion and the conclusion.
2This term was defined by Gibson (1966) as the "functionality ojfered hy a cue or set of cues in the environment
to a particular agent". We suggest that learning the affordances ofan object is equivalent to grounding the knowl¬
edge of the functionality of objects with respect to the agent's internal goals if the assessment criterion respects the
aforementioned assumption.
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4.1 Artificial Physiology
This section introduces the elements composing the agent's internal physiology. These provide
the necessary context to understand the integration of the feedback from the environment into
the agent's internal dynamics and therefore the role that perception plays in the adaptation
process.
Homeostasis (Cannon, 1929) is the self-regulation of the body's internal milieu3 (Bernard,
1878). From a synthetic perspective, Canamero (1997) proposed to model internal resources
as a set of Homeostatic Variables, abstractions of internal resources, which may express their
status of deficit or excess via drives (Hull, 1943) or motivations. These need to be satisfied
either by internal compensation or by external action (behaviour execution).
For the latter case, the environment provides the necessary feedback for this satisfaction or
compensation and restricts via physical laws the manner in which interaction is possible.
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Figure 4.1: Affordance Learning and Behaviour Selection Model. It consists of a set of homeo¬
static variables, a set of drives and motivations, a behaviour repertoire, a hormonal set and an
affordance learning module.
The overall goal for any living organism is survival, which directly relates to Ashby's
definition of physiological balance (Ashby, 1965). The physiological deficits of an agent bias
the execution of behaviours, the completion of which depends on meeting and recognising the
3Agent's internal physiology.
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appropriate resources. Given these processes, I propose to analogously view an artificial agent
as a set of interacting elements as shown in figure 4.1: a set of homeostatic variables (top left
of figure 4.1), a set of drives (underneath the homeostatic variables in figure 4.1), a hormone
satisfaction and frustration (on the right hand side of the drives in figure 4.1) and a behaviour
repertoire (Bl, B2 and B3 in figure 4.1) and an affordance learning module (based on a GWR
network and a set of synapses relating perception to every behaviour) - bottom right in figure
4.1 -. The structure of every module and the dynamics of the overall agent are introduced next:
The controlled homeostatic variables (top-left corner in fig. 4.1) are abstractions represent¬
ing the agent's internal resources, e.g., stamina, nutrition, restlessness. Their values must be
kept within the viability zone (Ashby, 1965) for the agent to remain alive; if their values over¬
flow/underflow the upper/lower boundaries of the variable, the robot 'dies'. Each homeostatic
variable can have a status of 'normality', excess or deficit. Their behaviour is governed by the
equation
14 = -C, + £>,8(/-r;). (4.1)
j
In equation 4.1, the homeostatic variable V,- decays over time with T,- = — 1 /C, if there is
no feedback from the environment, a,-* is the amount of effect relating behaviour k to variable
i. The summation over j indicates the contributions from the environment to the compensation
of variable i. These contributions are made each time a behaviour is executed (time tj). In the
general case, every homeostatic variable can be compensated by more than one behaviour (and
so I would also have to sum over all behaviours k). Nevertheless, it has been initially considered
to reduce the complexity of the system by relating the agent's internal physiological variables
to the behaviours one to one. Therefore, for this case every behaviour compensates a single
homeostatic variable. For example, if some food is ingested, the value of its related variable
(nutrition) is increased by a% (see table 4.1 for a set of typical values). 8(t) is the Dirac-delta
function.
The second element of the physiological model introduced in this thesis are the drives (top-
left corner in figure 4.1). If the role of the homeostatic variables is to represent the agent's
internal resources, the drives express the deficits of these resources, quantified as a function
of the differential between the optimal value and the instantaneous value for every related
homeostatic variable. Equation 4.2 is the generic equation for a drive:
Di(t) = Y,ap(VoPi - V/(0) +I><^. (4.2)
j k
D[ is drive i and the V, and V* are the values of the related homeostatic variables. Vop. is
the optimal value of the j'h homeostatic variable, aj, and are the coefficients relating the
variable and its derivative, respectively, to the drive. The initial simplification for the modelling
of the drives has been to restrict the number of homeostatic variables that influence every
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drive, furthermore that the drives are implicitly independent of the derivative of the homeostatic
variables. Therefore, the summation for the first expression will solely contain a single term,
and all values for bki will be zero. Therefore, when a homeostatic variable diverges from
its optimal point, an appropriate mechanism of compensation is triggered. In this case, the
mechanism of compensation is the selection and execution of a behaviour.
The arbitration mechanism for behaviour selection follows a winner-take-all policy, using
the drive that exhibits the highest urgency (the one with the highest level) to choose the be¬
haviour to execute next. In the first experiment set, it has been organised in such a manner that
a single behaviour can satisfy every drive. The amount of compensation potentially provided
by behaviour k to variable i at the time tj is expressed via the term a,*5(? — tf) in equation 4.1.
Every behaviour execution will only succeed (a,*4 will be larger than 0) if the object nearby
affords that behaviour to be executed. For example, hunger (controlling nutrition) needs an
edible object, fatigue (controlling stamina) a resting object, curiosity (controlling restlessness)
any object to interact with. At every time step, each drive is assigned an intensity proportional
to the magnitude of the error of its controlled variable, as shown by equation 4.2.
The behaviours (cf. centre-left in figure 4.1) are in this case grasp, shelter, rest; unless it is
specified otherwise. Behaviours are coarse grained and include a subset of actions. For exam¬
ple, for the behaviour to have a compensatory effect (increment or decrement on the internal
homeostatic variables), its execution must happen in an agent-object framework exhibiting that
affordance, e.g., if the agent is a human and the object a door handle, the behaviour to open the
door may be executed. The increments to each variable as a result of the successful execution
(some drive is diminished as a result of this execution) of a behaviour are introduced in table
4.1. Any successful interaction affects the agent's internal deficits5, and the way in which this
is done is shown in figure 4.2 (Spier and McFarland, 1996), where d(t — 1) and d(t) are two
vectors representing the values of the drives (every dimension relates to a drive) before and af¬
ter the execution of the behaviour. The vector linking them is the effect vector, the components
of which are a,* for every dimension k.
The model also includes two hormones, satisfaction and frustration, which are internally
triggered when there is a sudden variation of the internal homeostatic variables and exhibit an
exponential decay after this moment. Their role is to strengthen or weaken the neural structure
that learns object affordances, as described in section 4.3.
The rest of the architecture introduced in figure 4.1 is the sensory pattern clustering module
(labelled as GWR module) on the right hand side of the figure. Its role in the perception
process together with the elements relating perception to the agent's internal physiology will
4The OLjk have been fixed a priori of every trial to the values introduced in table 4.1.
5For the case represented in figure 4.1, there are only two deficits, one on each axis, and a viability zone defined
by some boundaries that the agent has to maintain itself within to survive. The execution of a behaviour can have
two different effects, either it does not modify the agent's internal state (failed execution) or it diminishes the level
of one or more deficits (successful execution).
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var^behaviouri. Grasp Shelter Touch
nutrition 0.3 0.0 0.0
stamina 0.0 0.2 0.0
restlessness 0.0 0.0 0.1
Table 4.1: Effects of each behaviour on the homeostatic variables (a,*)
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Figure 4.2: Depiction of Reward in Physiological Terms in a 2-D physiological space. d(t — 1)
and d(t) stand for the physiological state before and after the execution of a behaviour. The
vector effect stands for the amount of physiological compensation due to its execution. Optimal
zone is the area where the deficits are minimal. Viability zone stands for the area of tolerable
deficits. This is closed by the lethal boundary.
4.2 Ecological Perception
It was previously stated that the goal of this study is to model the mechanisms for an agent to
learn to perceive the environment in an ecological manner. To this end, the previous section
has introduced the set of elements that explain the dynamics of the agent's internal physiology.
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In a complementary fashion, this section introduces the assessment system and the procedure
to group together sensory patterns from the environment as an intermediate step for learning
affordances.
4.2.1 Feedback from the Environment
The model introduced (cf. figure 4.1) aims at learning affordances by relating the perception of
sensory cues (invariants in the agent's sensory flow) to fluctuations of the internal physiological
dynamics. The affordances are modelled as synaptic relationships between the representation
of clustered sensory cues and every behaviour within the agent's repertoire. The learning pro¬
cess then consists of strengthening those synapses whose related behaviour execution leads
towards a higher physiological stability and to weaken those evoking the converse effect. This
is indirectly driven by the hormonal response; satisfaction reinforces synapses, frustration has
the converse effect. Therefore, learning is based on the interaction between the agent's physi¬
ological dynamics and the environment. This is further explained in section 4.3.
This is analogous to biological behaviour, since the interaction with the environment pro¬
vokes a proprioceptive (response in the environment that can be perceived by the agent's sen¬
sory apparatus) and a hormonal response detectable at different time-scales (Kravitz, 1988). By
learning from this hormonal feedback, the agent will be able to anticipate the outcome of an
interaction; and will therefore be able to decide whether it is worth carrying out that interaction
with that object or if it is preferable to search for an alternative. Initial experiments with a sim¬
ulated Khepera robot demonstrated that this results in a better adaptation to the environment in
terms of life span (Cos-Aguilera et al., 2003).
The model introduced to learn object affordances comprises several parts: a clustering
module to extract patterns of the sensory flow, an architecture for behaviour selection to choose
the behaviour to execute next and a learning module. The principles underlying the behaviour
of Self-Organising Feature Maps as clustering devices are introduced next.
4.2.2 Growing Networks
Animal perception systems can distinguish stimuli with a level of precision determined by
the tasks they execute for survival (Pfeifer, 1994). Furthermore, animals lack of a sense of
aesthetics and are indifferent about the features of the stimulus as long as they offer the right
functionality. For example, horses do not seem to care about the shape or size of the apples, as
long as they are edible.
Therefore, stimuli can be classified according to their physical properties and to their rela¬
tionship to the agent. In other words, perception seems to classify objects according to their
physical similarity and to their functionality. Furthermore, this occurs as an adaptive process,
since animals respond to novelty by integrating new combinations of sensory patterns in their
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neural representation, the affordances of which will have to be inferred. Thus, an adaptive
artificial implementation of this will have to be extendable.
Two Self-Organising Feature Maps (SOFM) exhibit the required properties: Growing Neu¬
ral Gas (GNG) network (Fritzke, 1994) and Grow When Required (GWR) network (Marsland
et al., 2002). Both networks relate their connectivity to the geometrical similarity of the sensory
signals used to train them, measured by a given metric. Furthermore, unlike Kohonen networks
(Kohonen, 1982), for these cases the number of nodes grows proportionally to the complexity
of the sensory space and does not need to be fixed a-priori. New nodes are inserted when the
mismatch between the sensory pattern and its closest node rises over a certain threshold.
These neural algorithms dynamically adapt to the level of entropy of the sensory signals and
they do so in an incremental manner— commonly used synapses are strengthened, conversely
for those seldom triggered, which tend to fade and to disappear in the long run. The main
difference between both is that the GNG network adds a node periodically, while the GWR
network does so only when the topological representation is considered to be not accurate
enough.


























Figure 4.3: 2-Dimensional Principal Components of a generic Topological Map (SOFM). The
GWR network clusters the sample space represented by the red dots. The network is repre¬
sented by the green nodes, connected by the blue synapses.
The SOFM adapts the topology of its nodal representation to the patterns of the sensory
signals. The representation therefore organises in sets of nodes, which can be identified and
numbered, grouping sets of objects exhibiting similar perception in a single representational
unit —cf. figure 4.3 green dots. Furthermore, Gibson's ecological approach argues that animal
perception works in a functional manner by using the regularities of the optical flow to elucidate
the potential for action in that situation (its affordances). Thus I hope that the SOFM will
organise to capture these regularities. The schema introduced in figure 4.1 shows an overview
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of the first implementation of this ecological view.
The next sections address the growing of two different types of SOFMs, a GNG network
and a GWR network. The former is trained with object features, which the agent perceives
from the objects in its surroundings, the latter are trained with raw sensory signals. These two
different approaches reflect two complementary views on how perception is built. On the one
hand, it has been suggested that sets of neurons in the vertebrates' neural substrate (VI to V5
areas) are sensitive to objects' features (size, shape, orientation) (Tao et al., 2004). On the
other, Gibson argued that raw sensory signals are directly related to the agent's behaviours.
Based on these two perspectives, the two aforementioned experimental approaches have been
proposed.
4.2.3 Feature Based Perception
The first set of experiments, introduced in section 4.4.1, addresses the use of object features,
e.g., size and shape, to build a topological map. A Growing Neural Gas Network was used to
this goal (Fritzke, 1994).
Shape 1/3 1/4 1/6 1/8 1/N
Figure 4.4: Features Definition for Common Objects: shape and size are the features consid¬
ered.
For the first two sets of experiments, the GNG network has two pre-processed signals as
inputs; the size and shape of the object closest to the agent. The size of the object is the
radius of the object's base and the shape is computed as the number of sides of the object's
polygonal base, cf. figure 4.4. The GNG (Growing Neural Gas) network is initialised with two
nodes only; located at positions (D(, and co/ of the sensory space, chosen at random. At each
presentation of a sensory signal ^ to the network, the algorithm behaves as follows:
• Locate the two nodes i and j closest to the samples by calculating the Euclidean distance
from the sample q to each node co,
Ae,-=|| go,- —y2 Vie{l.JV}, (4.3)
where N is the number of nodes.
4.2. Ecological Perception 61
• The winner (i.e., closest) node i and the nodes immediately adjacent in the topology are
shifted towards the location of the sample by an amount proportional to the mismatch
between them. The winner node is shifted by
A, = eb(^ - toi) (4.4)
and the nodes immediately adjacent by
A* = e*($ —<D*), V*€{1..L}, (4.5)
where L is the number of adjacent nodes.
• The age of the synapse between nodes i and j is re-set to zero. If it does not exist, it is
newly created.
• Synapses the age of which is larger than aare deleted together with nodes with no
synapses.
• Every A, samples a new node is inserted equidistantly between the two units, q and f, with
the largest accumulated error. If there is a synapse between these two nodes, it is deleted
and two new ones connecting them to the newly inserted node are created. Furthermore,
the error of units q and f is decreased by a factor of a and the new node is initialised with
the average error of nodes q and f.
• All error variables are decreased multiplying by parameter d.
These steps are repeated ad infinitum or until a criterion of convergence is reached. In this
study, a final number of nodes has been pre-set. Four examples of GNG network are shown in
figure 4.8, corresponding to the worlds represented in figure 4.7. The GNG network adapts its
topology by shifting and adding nodes and synapses to the locations where input signals are
most frequent. If there is an area of the sensory space where the samples rarely appear, nodes
or synapses located within it will age and be deleted in the long run. This is the algorithm used
to cluster sets of object features.
In a complementary fashion, the second possibility consisted of directly clustering raw
sensory signals. This procedure is performed in section 4.4.3 in four different scenarios. This
issue is further extended in the next subsection.
4.2.4 Raw Sensory Data Perception
The first set of experiments clustered combinations of pre-processed features, which could be
obtained by using feature detectors (Kohonen et al., 1997). It is argued that this intermediate
step facilitates the clustering, since processed features are easier to classify; however, though
62 Chapter 4. Ecological Perception
correct from the perspective of learning affordances, ecology argues in favour of a principle
of economy, which can be better supported if meaningful knowledge is directly extracted from
the sensory flow. For example, while an object is approached, the sensory flow contains much
information, from which only a few cues may be significant to perform that behaviour. From
this perspective, I introduce the following set of experiments (see section 4.4.3), where percep¬
tion is based on raw object images. The sensory inputs in this case are snapshots taken always
at a fixed distance from the object. We now describe how I have used Marsland's Grow When
Required (GWR) network. The vector associated with each node is a 64 x 64 image of 8-bit
pixels.
• Analogously to a GNG network, the first and the second closest nodes to the sample,
nodes i and j, respectively, are selected —the metric is the Euclidean distance6.
• A synapse between i and j is grown (if not yet existing).
• The activity of the best matching unit is calculated according to
m = exp^'~^2, i <E {l.JV}. (4.6)
where ^ is a sample from the sensory input and CO, the vector of node i. This is the
quadratic power of the original activity metric proposed by Marsland. In this way, sam¬
ples which are close will be considered to be even closer, and those which were separated
will be considered to be further apart. If the activity is lower than the threshold aj and
the habituation threshold is lower than hj, a new node k is inserted between the best
matching node i and the sample The new node k is connected by two new synapses to
nodes i and j and the synapse between i and j is deleted. Its weight vector is the average
of i and X-
• If no new node is added (the activity of the winning node a,- is smaller than aj and/or
the firing threshold fi,- is larger than hj), the winner node i and the nodes immediately
adjacent in the topology are shifted towards the location of the sample by an amount (eb
and £*) proportional to the mismatch between them. The winner node is shifted by
A,- = £bxhbxfc-co,) (4.7)
where co, is the vector of node i. The nodes immediately adjacent are shifted by
A* = e* x hk x (£ - go*), V k € {1 ..L}, (4.8)
being L the number of adjacent nodes, £ a sample from the sensory space, hb and /z* two
normalisation constants and co* the vector of node k.
This is defined as LfQ(xi —yi)2-
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• The age of all nodes connecting to the winner node are incremented by 1.
• Reduce the habituation according to
hi(t) = h0 - — (1 - exp(-<Xit/ii)) (4.9)
Ot;
where a, is a normalisation constant and x, the decay constant. Likewise, the counters
of its neighbours k respond to
MO =ho~ — (1 - exp(-akt/lk)) Vk € {1..L}. (4.10)
Ot/t
where a;, is a normalisation constant and x^ the decay constant.
• If there are nodes with no synapses or synapses the age of which is larger than agemax,
these are deleted.
The parameters of the network are as follows. Firstly, activity threshold aj, secondly the
habituation threshold hj. The hj is a value signalling the boundary in time allowed for a single
node to place itself in its best fitting location. Beyond this boundary, it is not allowed for the
node to move any further to represent the data more closely; hence a new node is needed. The
third parameter is the maximal age of synapse agemax. Synapses connected to frequently used
nodes are re-set to 0, conversely, a natural ageing is experienced that beyond a threshold leads
to the deletion of the synapse and of the nodes (nodes with no synapses are also deleted). The
final parameters are the shifting coefficients £b and £*; which specify the dragging speed of
the nodes towards the new sample. Despite working on a statistical basis, the GWR offers the
advantage of controlling novelty and habituation via the parameters presented in this paragraph.
So far the methods for fitting the agent's sensory space have been described as an intro¬
ductory step to learn object affordances. The next section introduces the learning method for
establishing functional relationships from sets of cues represented by a node in the SOFM to
behaviours.
4.3 Learning Method
The problem posed consists of learning to relate the perceived regularities to the potentiality
of performing a behaviour. To this end, I propose to grow functional synapses, represented
by the letter Xij (cf. figure 4.5), which differ from the topological synapses (cOjt) inherent to
the topology of the SOFM. The functional synapses Xij indicate the potentiality of performing
behaviour j when node i is active. Therefore, if the agent is able to establish these weights, it
will be able to predict the outcome of performing certain behaviours when its related node is
perceived. The process is illustrated in figure 4.5 and is described next:


















Figure 4.5: Affordance Learning Framework. iij stands for the synaptic weight relating be¬
haviour i to the node j of the SOFM.
• At the detection of an object, the closest node (Euclidean distance) is identified.
• If the interaction succeeds there will be a reduction of one or more of the deficits that will
trigger the hormone satisfaction. Conversely, the hormone frustration will be triggered.
The release of one or another hormone conditions the growing or fading, respectively,
of the functional weight (likelihood) that relates the node active at that moment to the
executed behaviour according to
where Xij is the weight between node i and behaviour j, where bj is the intensity for
behaviour j (cf. right hand side in figure 4.5). It is 1.0 if j is the behaviour just executed
and 0.0 otherwise. Therefore, only the weights relating the active cue i to behaviour j are
updated by a value a. This is positive if the hormone satisfaction has been released and
negative otherwise.
• The learning results in a set of weights relating each cue in the environment (represented
with a node in the network space), to each of the behaviours. These are the affordance
values of the object represented by the nodes for that particular agent.
In a step-by-step fashion, the learning process is as follows:
1. Growing the SOFM. The network is trained with a series of sensory patterns7 to which
it shall adapt its structure. The adaptation algorithm compares the pattern (red dots in
figure 4.5) to the node space of the network (green dots in figure 4.5): if the Euclidean
distance between the closest node and the current sensory pattern is considered to be too
7A pattern is a sample of the input sensory signals.
Xij <- Xij ; afi, (4.11)
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far away, a new node is inserted equidistantly and new synapse (blue lines in figure 4.5)
is added. Conversely, the closest node and the nodes in its neighbourhood are dragged
towards the input pattern to better represent it. Nodes seldom close to the input pattern
are deleted. A fully detailed description of the growing algorithms is provided in the
previous section and in Fritzke (1994); Marsland et al. (2002) for the GNG and GWR
networks, respectively.
2. Identifying the Nodes. Once the network has been grown and has a stable structure,
the nodes of the network are numbered. For the GNG network case, the nodes have
been assembled in clusters (each set of inter-connected nodes is considered a cluster),
identified by a centre (the mean of the position of each node in the cluster) in the input
space, and a measure of its dispersion (the distance between the centre and the furthest
node). For the GWR, single nodes are treated and numbered individually. Numbering is
necessary to be able to relate the sensory cues to each of them during the growing of the
functional synapses relating to the behaviours.
3. Use of the Network. Once the network has reached a stable topology, it can be used for
object identification by identifying the closest node to the sensory input.
This learning process has been engineered in analogy to biology, being that the baby agent
starts to recognise discrete objects and to attach some functional value to their perception. This
argument is further extended in section 2.6.
This learning procedure is Hebbian (Hebb, 1949). However, it is guided by a reinforcement
signal, see expression 4.11. Several interaction episodes happen repeatedly throughout the
duration of the simulation and modify the values of the functional synapses relating the nodes
in the SOFM to the agent's behaviours. The final values are associated to the probabilities of
succeeding when executing a behaviour and have been normalised between -1.0 and 1.0 at the
end of the learning process. These measure the matching between the node (the regularity in the
environment) and the behaviour potentials in an analogous fashion to a normalised probability
value between -1.0 and 1.0.
This learning mechanism has been extensively studied in a series of environments, varying
the perception from features to raw sensory data, and from the GNG to the GWR networks.
These experiments are introduced in the next section.
4.4 Experiments
The set of experiments introduced next has been performed with a simulated Khepera robot
with a Webots™ simulator 4.0. The overall goal of the robot in these environments is to
survive by learning to interact with the objects in its surroundings. To this end, the robot is
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Figure 4.6: Worlds 1 and 2 (left and right, respectively). World 1 contains a series of polyhe¬
dral objects with triangular and square shapes, and world 2 a series of polyhedral objects with
octagonal and square shapes. The number of objects in each scenario is the same (12 objects
each).
Figure 4.7: Worlds 3 and 4 (left and right, respectively). World 3 contains a set of octagonal and
hexagonal shapes and world 4 a set of triangular and square shapes. The number of objects in
each scenario is the same (12 objects each).
programmed to continuously wander and interact. At every encounter with an object, the robot
has the opportunity to execute a behaviour, which may compensate an internal need depending
on the affordances offered by the object. Once an interaction with an object has occurred, the
object is abandoned to search for a new one.
4.4.1 Feature Based Perception Experiments
The goal of the first experiment set is to demonstrate that the artificial agent can learn to relate
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Figure 4.8: Clusters for Worlds 1, 2, 3 and 4 (top left to bottom right, respectively). These are
environments containing the shapes specified in figure 4.7.
teractions. This would be analogous, loosely speaking, to learning to select appropriate objects
(or the equivalent set of regularities) to successfully perform an interaction8. The environments
shown in figure 4.7 which generated the clusters represented in figure 4.8 have been used for
simulation.
The experimental method is described next:
1. The GNG Network is built in order to match different patterns of features until its struc¬
ture becomes stable. The parameters used to grow the network are: aT = 0.5, £/, = 0.5,
£„ = 0.006, space dimension=2, amax = 50, X = 100 and D=0.995. A thorough descrip¬
tion of the algorithm and of the aforementioned parameters can be found in section 4.2.3.
Gaussian noise has been added to the input signal. The position of each of the nodes for
each cluster is stored when the stable representation is reached, cf. figure 4.8.
2. The homeostatic variables of the agent are initialised to their optimal value. The home-
ostatic variables for these experiments are nutrition, stamina and restlessness. These are
controlled, respectively, by the drives hunger, fatigue and curiosity. Table 4.2 shows the
exponential decay parameters for each homeostatic variable, their optimal set points and
their range of variation.
3. The arbitration mechanism selects the behaviour whose related drive exhibits the highest
value at the beginning of each interaction episode. Each of these drives is satisfied via
sBy successful I mean the interaction exerting a positive effect on the agent's internal resources.
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Figure 4.9: Reinforced Values for Clusters in Environment 1 and 2, left and right, respectively.
Cluster ID correspond to the clusters labelled on the two top representations in figure 4.8. The
values represent the affordances that relate them. The value 1.0 means that an object close
to that cluster affords the behaviour with probability 1.0. Conversely, if the value is -1.0 the








Figure 4.10: Reinforced Values for Clusters in Environment 3 and 4, left and right, respectively.
Cluster ID corresponds to the clusters labelled on the two bottom representations in figure 4.8.
The values represent the affordances that relate them. The value 1.0 means that an object
close to that cluster affords the behaviour with probability 1.0. Conversely, if the value is -1.0
the behaviour is not afforded.
executing a behaviour, to which it is related, "nutrition" to grasp (eat), "stamina" to
shelter and "restlessness" to interact, respectively.
4. Once an object is encountered, the pattern is compared to every neural node in the topo¬
logical representation in order to locate the closest one.
5. A behaviour is selected at random and executed for exploration purposes. If the features




Figure 4.11: Grasping, Shelter and Interact Affordances (from left to right, respectively) for World
1. Values close to 1 mean that the behaviour is afforded, conversely, values close to -1 mean
that it is not afforded. Depending on the shape and size of the object, other intermediate values
have been obtained, resulting in these gradients.
Interact Affordance
Shelter Affordance Interact Affordance
Figure 4.12: Grasping, Shelter and Interact Affordances (from left to right, respectively) for World
2. Values close to 1 mean that the behaviour is afforded, conversely, values close to -1 mean
that it is not afforded. Depending on the shape and size of the object, other intermediate values
have been obtained, resulting in these gradients.
Nutrition Stamina Restlessness
T 1E-4 -1E-4 1E-4
Opt. Value 0.8 0.2 0.3
Range [0.0,1.0] [0.0,1.0] [0.0,1.0]
Drive Hunger Tiredness Restlessness
Behaviour Grasp Shelter Interact
Table 4.2: Homeostatic Variables: Simulation Parameters, x is their decay constant; Opt. Value
stands for their respective set points. Each variable is continuous and ranges between 0.0 and
1.0.
ostatic variable compensated due to the performance of a behaviour moves towards its
optimum. If the interaction fails, it has no physiological effect9.
9Unlike for the first set of experiments published in Cos-Aguilera et al. (2003), where a negative outcome
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6. Depending on the success or failure of the interaction, the satisfaction or frustration
hormone is triggered to strengthen or weaken the functional synapse between the active
node and the behaviour just executed.
This process is repeated in simulation over 500,000 steps (time units in the simulation
environment) for each scenario. 20 simulations of each time have been performed in order to
obtain statistically significant results. These are explained next.
4.4.2 Results
This experiment set has been tested in the four scenarios illustrated in figure 4.6 and 4.7, each
of which contains objects with different shapes and sizes. Each scenario contains two dif¬
ferent sets of objects, each with different features. Their resulting GNG networks have been
presented in figures 4.8 and their resulting histograms in figures 4.9 and 4.10. The values in
the histograms represent the likelihood of successfully performing a behaviour when that node
is active. Values range between -1 and 1 (1.0 means the maximum likelihood10 and -1.0 its
minimum). The columns specify the node (labelled as 1 to 7) and the rows the behaviour. For
illustrative purposes, I have also drawn the interpolated values for each behaviour (and affor-
dance likelihoods) in figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14. The x and y axes represent the shape
and size of the perception state, respectively, and the z (vertical) axis the resulting affordance
value.11
The left hand side graphs in figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 show that small objects afford
to be grasped more or less independently of their shape. Objects larger than 0.04 (the width
of the Khepera's gripper) do not afford to be grasped. A threshold is set for every scenario.
Objects whose size is larger than this will not provoke a compensation of the drive hunger
when the behaviour is executed. Consistently, the resulting likelihood values in the middle
graphs in figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 show that only objects larger than this threshold
afford to shelter. The easiest figures to interpret are those representing the likelihood of an
object to afford interaction (cf. right hand side graphs in figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14). All
objects offer this affordance, therefore the likelihood values equal 1.0.
These results demonstrate that this learning mechanism relates the agents' perception units
(the cues) to the potentiality of executing each behaviour within the agent's repertoire. It can
be said that agents could learn to "anticipate" the effect of executing a behaviour by using the
functional weights Xij as predictors of the potentiality of performing a behaviour. Every ex¬
ecution modifies the neural synapse estimating the likelihood of successfully performing that
l0This likelihood ranges between -1.0 and 1.0. In order to consider equal to the classical probabilistical concept
of likelihood, it should be normalised between 0.0 and 1.0.
' 'The continuity of the 3D representation is only for illustrative purposes; it does not imply that the concept of
affordance is continuous as well.
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Grasping Affordance
Shelter Affordance Interact Affordance
Figure 4.13: Grasping, Shelter and Interact Affordances (from left to right) for World 3. Values
close to 1 mean that the behaviour is afforded, conversely, values close to -1 mean that it is not
afforded. Depending on the shape and size of the object, other intermediate values have been
obtained, obtaining these gradients.
Figure 4.14: Grasping, Shelter and Interact Affordances (from left to right) for World 4. Values
close to 1 mean that the behaviour is afforded, conversely, values close to -1 mean that it is not
afforded. Depending on the shape and size of the object, other intermediate values have been
obtained, obtaining these gradients.
Grasping Affordance
Shelter Affordance Interact Affordance
behaviour. The final values of the neural synapses are the result of a statistical growing mech¬
anism and are based on the physiological effect of performing each behaviour. These synaptic
weights represent the affordance values in the framework of that agent and that particular sce¬
nario.
Beyond their predictive power, these affordances can also be viewed as a particular formu¬
lation of the grounding knowledge problem that binds together the agent and the environment
in dynamical terms. This has the inherent consequence of establishing a semantic base solely
valid in the context of that agent and that environment.
This first experiment set has highlighted the possibility of learning object affordances on
the basis of their features (shape and size). Nevertheless, despite the theoretical soundness
of this paradigm, its application necessitates the use of feature filters (Kohonen et al., 1997)
designed ad hoc to this end. Related to this, different types of neurons in the human brain
have been identified as resonators for stimuli exhibiting particular features, such as vertical or
horizontal lines (Tao et ah, 2004). Nevertheless, since the application is robotics, it may also be
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interesting to use raw sensory flow and to let the robot define its own features and their related
relevance. This idea is explored in the next section.
4.4.3 Clustering Raw Sensory Data
The possibility of clustering object features has been addressed by the previous set of exper¬
iments. This is useful from a theoretical perspective, since the principles formulated in this
framework firstly demonstrated that it is possible to learn object affordances. However, di¬
rectly perceiving object features is unrealistic for a robot environment unless feature filters are
used (Tao et al., 2004). Instead, it is also possible to formulate a framework where a robot
makes sense of its own environment by relating fluctuations of its internal physiology to other
fluctuations in its sensory flow. This section explores this possibility.
Therefore, this second set of experiments tests the learning principles in an architecture to
learn object affordances from raw sensory data. In order to simulate sensory flow, it would
be necessary to use a temporal stream of images at varying distances which would then would
have to be segmented. It is outside the scope of this thesis to do that. Instead, the sensory
signals will consist of steady images taken at a fixed distance from the objects. These pieces of
sensory information have been used to train the topological network.
This choice is coherent with the framework proposed (see explanation in the previous ex¬
perimental setup). The two approaches, feature based and sensory input based, differ in that the
nodes represent different things; for the former experiments combinations of sensory features,
for this case, sets of similar sensory patterns.
Furthermore, for the former experiments, a GNG network has been used to cluster the sen¬
sory space. However, this network has been openly criticised for several reasons (Marsland
et al., 2002). Firstly, this network does not directly respond to novelty. Instead, it adds a new
node every A time steps, independently of the convenience of doing so. Unlike this, the GWR
network monitors the distance between the sample and its closest node and the level of habitu¬
ation of this node. Two parameters are controlling this in a straightforward manner; the activity
parameter aj and the habituation threshold hi, respectively. These parameters condition the net¬
work to insert a new node. However, unlike the GNG network, the final decision on inserting a
new node depends on the distribution of the sensory signals. Secondly, it is straightforward to
understand that the accuracy of the topology is set via balancing the habituation of its nodes,
controlled by its decay constant T,- and by the maximum activity <27- (see section 4.2.4). If the
dispersion of the sensory data is low, the behaviour of the GNG and GWR networks will be
similar. However, the GWR network is more appropriate if the data exhibits a high or unknown
level of variability, since it can dynamically increase or reduce the number of nodes on demand
of the data it is trained with (Marsland et al., 2002).
The experimental method, analogously to the previous experiments, consists of two phases:
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1. Training the SOFM. The robot is placed in a scenario surrounded by objects with differ¬
ent shapes and sizes, cf. scenario in figure 4.8. Snapshots of the objects are taken when
the robot is centred and in front of an object. The data used to train the GWR are 64
horizontal element vectors of grey-level intensity, normalised between 0 and 1.
2. Affordance Learning. Each node in the GWR network is linked to each behaviour by a
synapse initialised to a small random value.
• A steady image taken at a constant distance from the object is used to identify it by
selecting the closest node in the GWR (in terms of Euclidean distance).
• A behaviour is selected at random and executed.
• The effect of behaviour execution reflects internally on the level of the hormone
satisfaction for the case of successful interaction (one or more deficits decrease).
Conversely, the hormone frustration will increase to 1.0 (the default value for both
of them is 0.0).
• The release of the hormone satisfaction or frustration strengthens or weakens the
synapse relating the behaviour just executed and the node just active according to
the Hebbian algorithm, cf. equation 4.11.
• The simulation stops when a minimum of 15 interactions per node are performed.
The final values are normalised.
There are two different scenarios, a simple one containing two different objects (see section
4.4.4) and a more complex one containing a large number of objects (see section 4.4.5).
The results for each of them are described in the next sections. Two different metrics are
proposed to assess the performance of the SOFM:
1. SOFM Accuracy. 10,000 image samples have been used to grow every SOFM, and 5,000
more have been used for testing purposes. The goal of this is to have a metric that allows
an easy choice of parameters given a required level of accuracy. This metric consists of
the mean fitting error specified by
I N-1
mxi = T7 1L II 1 ~Xi I! (4-12)^ i=0
where jq is the weight of node i (their expected final values are +1 or -1, affords the
behaviour or not, respectively) and N the number of nodes; and the related variance
fitting error












(a) 2N-GWR; aT = 0.7, hT =
0.01 agemax = 35
(b) 6N-GWR; aT = 0.5, hT =
0.2 agemax — 5
(c) 10N-GWR; = 0.5,
hT = 0.2 agemax = 20
error variance 0 014281




(d) 2N-GWR; Fitting Error. (e) 6N-GWR: Fitting Error. (f) 10N-GWR; Fitting Error.
Figure 4.15: These are three GWR networks of the simple environment with 2, 6 and 10 nodes,
from left to right, respectively. The red dots are the samples used for training. The resulting
GWR consists of the green nodes connected by the blue synapses. The histograms underneath
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(a) 15N-GWR;<2j = 0.6,
hT = 0.7, agemax = 30
(b) 20N-GWR; aT = 0.8, hT
0.3, agemax=5




' error variance 0.001618
i error mean 0.086483
error variance 0.002922
(d) 15N-GWR; Fitting Error. (e) 20N-GWR; Fitting Error. (f) 27N-GWR; Fitting Error.
Figure 4.16: These are three GWR networks of the simple environment with 15, 20 and 27
nodes, from left to right, respectively. The red dots are the samples used for training. The
resulting GWR consists of the green nodes connected by the blue synapses. The histograms
underneath show the mean fitting error of the sensory space for each of them.
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(a) 29N-GWR;ar = 0.8
hT = 0.9, agemax = 35
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(d) 29N-GWR; Fitting Error. (e) 35N-GWR; Fitting Error. (f) 40N-GWR; Fitting Error.
Figure 4.17: These are three GWR networks of the simple environment with 29, 35 and 40
nodes, from left to right, respectively. The red dots are the samples used for training. The
resulting GWR consists of the green nodes connected by the blue synapses. The histograms
underneath show the mean fitting error of the sensory space for each of them.
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N-1
<7t = £ o*,-}. (4.13)
i=0
Equations 4.12 and 4.13 refer to the calculation of the mean and variance values, respec¬
tively, of the reliability of the affordance values. m{ } is the mean value of the summation
of error variances for every node of the GWR. Both metrics are a statistical characteri¬
sation of the affordance values obtained. The affordance values Xi are calculated as an
average of successful and unsuccessful interactions with the set of objects clustered by
node i in a process driven by reward. For example, xequals 0.7 if the interaction was
successful 7 times out of 10. Ideally, the affordance values should be either 1.0 or -1.0,
meaning the prediction of executing a behaviour or not with full certainty. Therefore, it
is reasonable to use the metrics proposed by the equations above to assess the fitting of
the GWR network. These metrics are printed on the top-left corner of each histogram
(cf. figure 4.15 to 4.17, described below).
2. Since the learning mechanism relates fluctuations of internal physiological dynamics to
the agent's sensory space, it has been considered appropriate to use also viability indi¬
cators to measure the behavioural performance of the learnt affordance values (weight
values that relate the nodes to the behaviours). Two indicators have been chosen, namely
the physiological stability and overall comfort, as defined in equations 4.14 and 4.15,
respectively. These are measured throughout simulation once the affordance values are
stable.
1 N~]
Physiological Stability = — ^ dft) (4.14)N /=o
di represents one of the N deficits of the agent.
| N-1
Overall Comfort = — ^ a{d,(?)}. (4.15)N i=0
Where a stands for the variance and d, stands for deficit (or drive) i. These are similar indicators
to those defined by Avila-Garcfa and Canamero (2002) and also respond to the need of having
a behavioural measurement that relates the behavioural performance to an internal indicator
physiological balance. This will be further explained in chapter 5.
These two metrics respond to the two processes requiring assessment: the statistical fitting
(growing) of the GWR and the performance of the learning procedure that grows the functional
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synapses between the nodes of the GWR and each behaviour within the agent's repertoire (that
learns the affordance values). It is important to notice that the computation of the functional
weights considers the real interaction between the object and the robot's sensors and effectors,
the former prone to error in data collection for object identification, the latter prone to error
due to inaccurate proprioception and motor-command execution.
4.4.4 Learning Affordances in a Simple Environment
The simple environment contains only two types of objects, a small and a large object. This
environment is used in order to assess the performance of the GWR in an easy test-bed. Is it
really feasible to use a GWR to cluster objects to learn object affordances? Are the metrics pro¬
posed above significant? Is the learning principle correct? We need to address these questions
before further utilising this approach.
To this end, the first experiment set with raw sensory data aims at elucidating the GWR pa¬
rameters (activity aj, habituation threshold hj and maximum synaptic age agemax) for adapt¬
ing the topology to the given environment. These experiments have resulted in a series of
topologies represented in figures 4.15 to 4.17. The parameter space has been explored for the
following values; «r=0.5 to 0.9, hr=0.01 to 1.0 and agemax=5 to 40. The figures show a set of
2D neural representations resulting from projecting the N-dimensional network onto the plane.
These are also accompanied by the histograms of the metrics associated to each functional
synapse relating every node to every behaviour. The figures are listed in an ascending number
of nodes. These range from 2 to 40. Furthermore, these graphs are accompanied by a histogram
underneath, representing the mean value of the fitting error of the affordance values obtained
with the SOFM portrayed above. The mean and variance error of these graphs has been printed
in every graph for clarity purposes (values are too small to draw error bars).
Figures 4.15 to 4.17 show the topology of the SOFM (green nodes and blue synapses) pro¬
jected onto the data (red dots). As previously explained, the GWR used to cluster the sensory
images is controlled by three main parameters: activity aj, which controls the fitting accuracy
of the network, habituation threshold hj, which controls the time a node is allowed to reach
its final destination and the agemox, which sets the maximum time a synapse can exist in the
absence of excitation. When the habituation threshold hj of a node is larger than the threshold
hj, the node does not appreciably move from its location. This drives the growing of the GWR
in combination with the activity aj. If the activity of the closest node is smaller than aj the
sensory space is considered to be underrepresented; and a new node is inserted. Furthermore,
by increasing the habituation threshold hj I am reducing the time given to any node to reach its
final location, therefore also facilitating the insertion of new nodes. Consistently, when com¬
paring the networks in figure 4.17; I can appreciate that in figure 4.17(b); aj=0.9, hj=0.5 and
4.17(c); ar=0.9, hr=0.1 the sensitivity to a variation of 0.2 of the habituation threshold means
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(a) Mean Fitting Error; aj =
0.5
variance euro toi at 0 500000
(c) Mean Fitting Error; aj =
0.7
variance error lor at 0.700000
(b) Mean Fitting Error; aj =
0.6
(d) Variance Fitting Error; (e) Variance Fitting Error; (f) Variance Fitting Error;
aj = 0.5 aj = 0.6 aj = 0.7
Figure 4.18: The surfaces represent the fitting error for the GWR algorithm for the case of the
simple environment, mean and variance, top and bottom surfaces, respectively. The x and y
axis stand for the hT and the agemax parameters.
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(c) Variance Fitting Error; aj = 0.8 (d) Variance Fitting Error; aj = 0.9
Figure 4.19: The surfaces represent the fitting error for the GWR algorithm for the case of the
simple environment, mean and variance, top and bottom surfaces, respectively. The x and y
axis stand for the hT and the agemox parameters.
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an increase of 5 nodes in the network. This is expected, since by increasing the habituation
threshold hj I am reducing the time given to any node to reach its final location, therefore
facilitating the insertion of new nodes. Conversely, the shrinking of the network is mostly
controlled by the agem^ parameter. When synapses age over the agethreshold, these are
deleted together with the nodes that have no synapses. By comparing figure 4.15(b); r?7=0.5,
hj=0.2, agemax=5 to figure 4.15(c); ar=0.5, hr=0.2, agemax=20, it can be seen that the number
of nodes increases as well. In general terms, the results demonstrate the general tendencies for
each parameter of the network; namely, the higher the activity for each node aj (the accuracy),
the larger the number of nodes and consequently the more accurate is the topological map.
Furthermore, the larger the forgetting factor hj, the less time is given to the nodes to habituate,
hence the more nodes it contains. The larger ageinwc, the more synapses the network contains.
In addition to these results, I have also considered it appropriate to calculate the statistical
stability measured by the fitting error (equation 4.12) related for the affordance values averaged
over 10 simulations (10,000 steps each). These are calculated according to the formulae 4.12
and 4.13 and are presented as surface graphs of figures from 4.18 to 4.19. The x-axis is the
forgetting factor hj, the y-axis the agemax and the z-axis the mean or the variance of fitting
error for the topological network. In the sequence of figures it can be seen that the effect of an
increasing aj threshold between 0.5 and 0.9 diminishes the error of the affordance weights from
0.03 to 0.01. This error difference is significant, since from a behavioural perspective it means
being able to correctly identify a node. Furthermore, it can be observed that the habituation
factor hj (x-axis) has little effect on the results and that there is a significant change in the
fitting error for all graphs after a agemax larger than 30. After this value, the error dramatically
diminishes to its minimum, the age rises over this value, and more nodes survive the deletion
process; leaving the resulting GWR networks more densely populated.
Following these experiments, the criteria for a good parametrisation depends on the sensory
pattern. However, the designer has to balance between aj large enough to force the network
to reach a certain accuracy and hj low enough to allow the existing nodes in the network to
habituate to their best fitting locations. Furthermore, this must be encompassed with agemax
values large enough to allow this to happen before the synapses are deleted and the node is
pruned. Given the experiments shown in this section, the sensory space would require aj
larger than or equal to 0.7, and age^x larger than 30. Final accuracy values have been gathered
in figure 4.20, parametrised over the number of nodes of the resulting SOFM's. The conclusion
is that the SOFM requires some parametrisation. However, for the given scenarios, where only
two different objects are contained, two nodes seem to suffice for representing them (the error
is only 0.02 in this case, cf. figure 4.20). As shown by this figure, there is not a clear advantage
of using networks whose fitting error is larger. However, the next section will show that this is
not the case when considering physiological metrics, since an agent endowed with an accurate




Figure 4.20: This histogram displays the mean fitting error for every node of the GWR networks,
whose histograms have been previously shown
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Figure 4.21: Strategies for Behaviour Selection. The behaviour the intensity of which is highest
is dis-inhibited. Three procedures to calculate these intensities have been considered. From left
to right, at random, motivation driven and drive x affordance, respectively.
Physiological Measurements Finally, the analysis of this simple scenario is closed by a set
of experiments addressing the measure ofphysiological stability, defined in equations 4.14 and
4.15. Previous experiments have considered the fitting error of the GWR network as a measure
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(a) Physiological Stability; (b) Physiological Stability; (c) Physiological Stability;
Random Selection Motivation Driven Multiplicative Formula
Figure 4.22: Physiological stability. The mean and variance value of the three drives
(Blue=Hunger, Green=Tiredness, Red=Restlessness) averaged over 20 simulations are dis¬
played. Simulations are parametrised after the number of nodes, ranging from 5 to 50 (x-axis),
and after the policy to combine stimuli. Three different cases to combine stimuli have been
tested; figures from left to right: random action selection, motivation-driven action selection,
combined (multiplicative) action selection.
of quality to represent the environment. However, it is also important to consider the effect
that one parametrisation or another may have at the behavioural level. The behavioural metrics
have been introduced to this end, also parametrised after the different mechanisms to arbitrate
among behaviours, namely random selection, motivation-driven (the behaviour whose related
drive exhibits the highest value is selected) and a strategy using the multiplicative combination
of stimuli to calculate the behavioural intensity (affordance x drive), cf. figure 4.21. For
the last two cases, the behaviour whose intensity is highest is selected. Figure 4.22 shows
the stability for each homeostatic variable for the cases of (a) random action selection, (b)
motivation-driven action selection and (c) multiplicative stimuli arbitration mechanism. These
values are averaged over 10 simulations each. The best values correspond to the multiplicative
formula, since they exhibit, in mean value, the most stable values for the three homeostatic
variables. However, it can be seen that these values are not very far away from those obtained
using random selection and that the latter are even better than those obtained using motivation
driven policies. The explanation for this is that the multiplicative combination of stimuli is
concurrently considering the external and the internal drives for action. This is sufficient to
improve the stability of the agent's homeostatic variables. Furthermore, if only the internal
motivations are considered (middle graph), this results in a lower stability because the external
affordances are disregarded in the decision making. This highlights the notion that the way
stimuli are combined for decision making is fundamental to gaining stability and therefore
adaptation.
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4.4.5 Learning Affordances in a Complex Environment
The experiments in the previous scenario have demonstrated that the GWR and the Hebbian
learning algorithm proposed can be used to learn object affordances. Therefore, this same
learning schema is proposed to be used in a more complex scenario. In this case, the new
environment contains 10 octahedral objects, whose base-diameter size ranges from 0.01 to 0.1






Figure 4.23: Abundant Distribution of Affordances. The line indicates the interval of sizes where
that affordance is 1.0. G, S and T stand for grasping, shelter and touch, respectively.
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Figure 4.24: Scarce Distribution of Affordances. The line indicates the interval of sizes where
that affordance is 1.0. G, S and T stand for grasping, shelter and touch, respectively.
As designers, it has been considered appropriate to study two particular distributions of
affordances: an abundant and a scarce distribution of affordances. The former leads to a
scenario where most objects afford more than one behaviour to be executed; and the latter to a
scenario where every object affords a single behaviour to be executed. These distributions are
illustrated in figures 4.23 and 4.24, by showing the relationship between the size of an object
and the behaviours they afford.
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(a) 2N-GWR;o7 = 0.5, hj = 0.01, agemax = 5 (b) 13N-GWR; aj = 0.5, hj = 0.01, agemax -
20
Statistical Error vs. Node Number
| i ; -
error vari
-error mec
Statistical Error vs. Node Number
Max. Variance 0.0066
Max. Mean Error 0.1143
(c) 2N-GWR; Fitting Error. (d) 13N-GWR; Fitting Error.
Figure 4.25: Top: 2-D Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of two GWR networks built for the
case of the complex environment, with 2 and 24 nodes, left and right, respectively. The red dots
are the samples used to train the GWR networks. Each GWR consists of a set of green nodes
and blue synapses. Bottom: Histogram representing the mean fitting error for every node of the
GWR network represented on top for every node of them.











(a) 15N-GWR;aT = 0.5,
hT = 0.01, agemax = 5
(b) 20N-GWR; aT = 0.5,
hj = 0.01, agemax = 20
(c) 25N-GWR; aT = 0.5,
hT =0.01 ,agemax =20
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(d) 15N-GWR; Fitting Error. (e) 20N-GWR; Fitting Error. (f) 25N-GWR; Fitting Error.
Figure 4.26: Top: 2-D Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of three GWR networks built for the
case of the complex environment, with 15, 20 and 25 nodes, from left to right, respectively. The
red dots are the samples used to train the GWR networks. Each GWR consists of a set of green
nodes and blue synapses. Bottom: Histogram representing the mean fitting error for every node
of the GWR network represented on top for every node of them.
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(c) 40N-GWR; aT = 0.5,
hT = 0.01, agemax = 20
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(d) 31N-GWR; Fitting Error. (e) 34N-GWR; Fitting Error. (f) 40N-GWR; Fitting Error.
Figure 4.27: Top: 2-D Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of three GWR networks built for the
case of the complex environment, with 31, 34 and 40 nodes, from left to right, respectively. The
red dots are the samples used to train the GWR networks. Each GWR consists of a set of green
nodes and blue synapses. Bottom: Histogram representing the mean fitting error for every node
of the GWR network represented on top for every node of them.
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As for the previous set of experiments, the first goal is to study the quality of the fitting of
the sensory data that the GWR can provide. To this end, the distribution of affordances is irrel¬
evant, since the topology of the GWR solely depends on the sensory data. This is independent
of the function that any object affords to the agent. Therefore, the first (abundant) environment,
characterised by a distribution of affordances, has been chosen at random to run the first exper¬
iment set, which addresses the relationship of the parameters to the number of nodes and the
quality of the clustering of the sensory data. Furthermore, it also aims at analysing the statis¬
tical stability of the learnt affordance values. Figures 4.25 to 4.27 show the results obtained,
accompanied underneath by the mean fitting error for each node of the network. Each figure
shows on the top the 2D-PCA projection of the data (red dots) and the resulting GWR that
clusters this sensory space according to the parameters specified in each graph. The statistical
data is averaged over 10,000 steps of simulation —their overall mean error and variance over
all nodes on each graph has been printed on every graph for clarity purposes (values are too
small to draw error bars). The parameters used for simulation have been chosen between the
following pairs of values in order to provide an appropriate insight on the behaviour of the
GWR network, aj between 0.5 and 0.9, hj between 0.01 and 0.1, and age^ between 5 and
20.
The results show that similarly to the previous experiments, the number of nodes for this
scenario may be a vital parameter for the SOFM. In terms of fitting error, there is a dramatic
difference between a SOFM of 2 nodes and SOFM of more than 10 nodes. This is also re¬
flected in the mean error and variance of the weights linking the nodes and the behaviours.
Furthermore, networks with more than 30 nodes fit the data accurately and result in a fitting
error smaller than 0.05 on average.
This same error has been averaged over 20 simulations each and plotted in the 3D figures
displayed in figures 4.28 to 4.29. Despite being a more complex environment, the effects
observed are similar to those of a simple environment. The habituation threshold hj (y-axis)
has little effect. Conversely, the error sensibly diminishes when the activity of the nodes rises
over a threshold value of aj, since more nodes are necessary to cluster with a larger accuracy.
Similarly, the error also exhibits an inflection point depending on agemax (x-axis) and is allowed
to maintain sufficient nodes to cover the sensory space, as agemax increases, resulting in a larger
accuracy and in a better fitting of the sensory space.
The last experiments for this complex environment pursue a double goal. Firstly, to mea¬
sure the required number of nodes for the SOFM in order to reach an optimal fitting error for
the network, before starting to overfit the given environment. Secondly, these experiments also
intend to measure the effect of the different strategies for behaviour arbitration. As for the first
environment, the strategies compared are: random selection, motivation-driven selection and
selection according to the affordance x drives formula. Furthermore, a third parametrisation
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(a) Mean Fitting Error; aj = (b) Mean Fitting Error; ay = (c) Mean Fitting Error; aj
0.5 0.6 0.7
(d) Variance Fitting Error; (e) Variance Fitting Error; (f) Variance Fitting Error;
aj — 0.5 aj = 0.6 aj -- 0.7
Figure 4.28: Mean and Variance of the fitting accuracy of the GWR networks, top and bottom
surface graphs, respectively. The surfaces are parametrised after the activity of the GWR. It
displays data for aT=0.5, 0.6 and 0.7, from left to right, respectively. On x and y axes are plotted
the agents and hr parameters.
■ forgetting tact'
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mean error for at 0.800000 mean error for at 0.900000
ht - forgetting factor
(a) Mean Fitting Error; aj = 0.8 (b) Mean Fitting Error; aj = 0.9
variance error for at 0.800000 variance error for at 0.900000
(c) Variance Fitting Error; aj = 0.8 (d) Variance Fitting Error; aj = 0.9
Figure 4.29: Mean and Variance of the fitting accuracy of the GWR networks, top and bottom
surface graphs, respectively. The surfaces are parametrised after the activity of the GWR,
values a7-=0.8 and 0.9, left and right, respectively. The x and y axis are plotted the agemax and
hj parameters.
edges max age ht - forgetting factor
edges max age 40 1 ht - forgetting factor
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results from the types of affordance distributions considered, a scarce and an abundant distri¬
bution (cf. figures 4.23 and 4.24). The results, parametrised after the number of nodes of each
environment and after the arbitration mechanism are shown in figures 4.30 to 4.32 for each
distribution.
For both distributions, the top set of bar-graphs shows that for large number of nodes, 10 or
larger, the accuracy of the SOFM to fit the sensory space is already reasonably asymptotic. The
graphs in the centre show the values of physiological stability and overall comfort, calculated
according to equations 4.14 and 4.15 for each individual drive of the agent.
For the case of having an abundant distribution of affordances (Dl), the values obtained
are apparently very similar for either procedure to combine stimuli. However, the lower triad
of graphs in figure 4.30 shows that the worst strategy for combining stimuli is the motivation-
driven selection, since this disregards the object affordances for the selection. The winner
among the three is again the multiplicative strategy. Despite its mean value being slightly
higher than for the random selection, the error bars show a slightly smaller variance than for
the random selection strategy; as a result the distribution is more stable.
Interestingly, experiments performed in the scarce distribution (cf. figure 4.24) demon¬
strate that both the number of nodes and the physiological stability are highly dependent on
the influence of the external stimulus (the affordance). The centre and bottom graphs in figure
4.30 show that if the selection is at random or if it is motivation driven, the number of nodes
of the GWR is not as important, since the selection of behaviour is performed disregarding the
affordances in the scenario. However, the error bars on the right show that combining stimuli,
both external and internal (affordances and drives), the number of nodes becomes fundamental
to make decisions that lead towards a viable physiology. The reduction of physiological values
when the number of nodes is highest demonstrates that the clustering and learning mechanism
are working properly. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that it is necessary, for the scarce
distribution, to use a SOFM with a large number of nodes in order to obtain accurate enough
affordance values which, combined with the agent's internal drives, lead to the selection of
behaviours which give physiologically stable values. Figure 4.32, another case of scarce distri¬
bution of affordances, confirms these results by showing similar results to those in figure 4.31.
However, these results also highlight that the stability demonstrates a strong dependence on the
rhythms of the agent's internal physiology. This will be addressed in chapter 6.
These results also highlight the fact that this mechanism is able to learn object affordances
via relating the execution of a behaviour to the fluctuation that this provokes on the agent's
internal milieu. This fluctuation is recorded by the hormonal responses of the agent, which
control the synaptic weights relating the SOFM nodes to the behaviours; the affordance values
of that particular scenario to that particular agent. These experiments have also highlighted that
the fitting error quantifies the accuracy of the SOFM with respect to its sensory space. However,
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Figure 4.30: Physiological stability for the case of the scarce distribution of affordances, as
specified in figure 4.24 for homeostatic variables decay constant t = 10~4. The simulations
have been parametrised after the number of nodes, from 2 to 40 (x-axis) and after the policy for
the combination of stimuli; from left to right: random action selection, motivation-driven action
selection, combined (multiplicative) action selection. The top graphs show the mean fitting error
for the GWR networks used in these experiments. The middle graphs show the physiological
values (mean m, and variance c, of the physiological drives) for each drives of the agent. The
bottom graphs show the viability indicators (physiological stability and overall comfort). These
values have been obtained by averaging over 20 simulations. The colours, red, green and blue,
correspond to the drives hunger, tiredness and restlessness, respectively.
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Figure 4.31: Physiological stability for the case of the abundant distribution of affordances, as
specified in figure 4.23 for homeostatic variables decay constant t = 1CT3. The simulations
have been parametrised after the number of nodes, from 2 to 40 (x-axis) and after the policy for
the combination of stimuli; from left to right: random action selection, motivation-driven action
selection, combined (multiplicative) action selection. The top graphs show the mean fitting error
for the GWR networks used in these experiments. The middle graphs show the physiological
values (mean m, and variance C; of each individual drive of the agent). The bottom graphs
show the viability indicators, physiological stability and overall comfort. These values have been
obtained by averaging over 20 simulations. The colours, red, green and blue, correspond to the
drives hunger, tiredness and restlessness, respectively.
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Figure 4.32: Physiological stability for the case of the scarce distribution of affordances, as
specified in figure 4.23 for homeostatic variables decay constant x = 5 x 10~4. The simulations
have been parametrised after the number of nodes, from 2 to 40 (x-axis) and after the policy for
the combination of stimuli; from left to right: random action selection, motivation-driven action
selection, combined (multiplicative) action selection. The top graphs show the mean fitting error
for the GWR networks used in these experiments. The middle graphs show the physiological
values (mean m,- and variance o, of each individual drive of the agent). The bottom graphs
show the viability indicators, physiological stability and overall comfort. These values have been
obtained by averaging over 20 simulations. The colours, red, green and blue, correspond to the
drives hunger, tiredness and restlessness, respectively.
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as shown by the physiological metrics, this does not always mean that the agent will behave in
an adaptive manner. In this respect, what really matters to the agent is being able to perform
behaviours appropriately to maintain its physiological stability. This need of adaptiveness in
physiological terms is the ultimate criterion to support the need and the quality of this metric,
since only a behavioural demonstration, grounded in physiological measurements, can clearly
demonstrate that the environment is perceived via a sufficiently accurate GWR network to the
posed task.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter is about the ecological principle of adapting to the environment via learning object
affordances. This principle is based on the existence of an animal in an environment as the
result of their mutual interaction, at a developmental and at a genetic level.
The experiments introduced and discussed throughout this chapter focus on the develop¬
mental approach only; furthermore in the ability of learning the affordances offered by a set of
objects to a simulated robot. It is argued that this ability endows an agent with the ability to
adapt to a variety of scenarios in a straightforward manner. Furthermore, this approach can also
shed light on the understanding of biological mechanisms of adaptation and would also provide
an introductory assessment on whether these are applicable principles to mobile robotics.
Interaction with the environment throughout this chapter has been related to a formulation
of reward as the mechanism of interaction between the agent and its environment, perceived as
somato-sensory, kinaesthetic and sensory feedback affecting the agent. Modelling these phe¬
nomena in detail is a highly demanding task. However, for the goal at hand it is reasonable
to simplify this interaction by a quantification of the effect of the execution of a behaviour
on the agent's bodily dynamics. This formulation implies that the artificial agent exhibits an
analogous structure to natural organisms; therefore, it consists of a set of internal resources
(the homeostatic variables) and a set of drives signalling their status of deficit, normality or
excess. Also for biological resemblance, the hormones satisfaction and frustration have been
introduced to signal the sense of valence (Ackley and Littman, 1991) resulting from the ex¬
ecution of a behaviour (its beneficial or harmful consequences for the agent). Therefore, the
agent has been assumed to be a part of a dynamical system also including the environment.
This is conceptually novel from the perspective that the problem of relating perception to ac¬
tion (the problem addressed in mobile robotics since its most early stages) is now included in a
larger framework, where self-organisation and learning are the mechanisms guiding adaptation
at a developmental level. Biology has endowed animals with control mechanisms embodied in
their neural systems. This has inspired the combination of the SOFM used to cluster the agent's
sensory space and the Hebbian learning mechanism that builds up the agent's affordance pre-
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diction substrate. Both mechanisms, synaptic plasticity and structural plasticity, respond in a
concurrent fashion to the dynamics of interaction between the agent and its environment via
modifying the agent's internal neural structure to better attain the goal of surviving. This has
been related to maintaining the value of its drives as low as possible and making its internal
dynamics most stable, according to Ashby's notion of viability (Ashby, 1965).
Both mechanisms, to cluster the agent's sensory space and to grow the functional synapses
relating to the behaviours, are run concurrently within each simulation. This represents the
dynamic nature of this adaptive process, where the inclusion or objects with novel affordances
of a change in the distribution of affordances is tolerated by the agent if these changes are
sufficiently slow. The results demonstrate that learning object affordances is possible with this
formulation and that this learning enables the agents to maintain physiological stability in the
scenarios considered. Furthermore, since the agent and its environment behave in a closed
ecological loop, sensory input and behavioural responses are viewed as elements integrating
elements configuring a dynamical system.
The system introduced in this chapter also exhibits some limitations. Firstly, clustering the
sensory space and learning the synaptic weights relating each node to each behaviour have been
mathematically specified as related processes. This may have a double interpretation; it may
be argued that this has no conceptual effect and that the system is indeed based on the principle
of ecology, since the interaction with the environment, hence the delivery of feedback by the
environment is maintained. Nevertheless, it is correct that the biological resemblance is limited.
It is likely that the agent's framework is implemented at a neural level by a single process
integrating both the continuous processing of the sensory input (processing of the sensory flow)
and the Hebbian learning of the functional synapses relating to the behaviour repertoire. This I
have simulated by running both processes concurrently. Secondly, the source of feedback from
the scenario has been modelled as a physiological fluctuation. However, at a biological level,
the effect of an action may happen at different time-scales depending on the stimulus, e.g.,
the effect of being hit by a stone is nearly instantaneous, while that of eating a succulent meal
usually happens at different time-scales; at the first bite the level of hunger is already modulated
and does not stop until after it i sated. Finally, the assessment criterion used to attain the goal
has assumed that behaviours for which the execution is physiologically beneficial are 'good'
and that the others are 'bad'. It can be argued that this is common sense, since this is the same
assumption guiding most actions in our life. However, this is also equivalent to hard-coding
the sense of valence and therefore a restriction from a behavioural perspective, since addictive
agents are discarded from the very beginning by design.
The behavioural observations obtained from the last set of experiments also confirm that
beyond perception and triggering of behaviours, the strategy to arbitrate the selection of be¬
haviours is vital to adapt to the environment. This introduces the problem addressed by the
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following chapter: how does the agent learn behavioural patterns? Again this is guided by the
ecological principle as a process that interacts with the learning processes related to the agent's
perception: the learning of object affordances.
Summary
This chapter has introduced a framework to learn affordances based on the Gibsonian principle
of ecological interaction between the agent and its environment. Affordances have been formu¬
lated as a neural structure relating nodes of a SOFM representing similar objects to behaviours
within the agent's repertoire. The synapses of this structure are strengthened or weakened
according to a Hebbian algorithm controlled by the agent's hormonal level. Each behaviour
execution provokes a fluctuation in the internal physiology by increasing one homeostatic vari¬
able or another. This provokes the release of the hormones controlling the strengthening or
weakening of the functional synapse relating the active node in the SOFM to the behaviour ex¬
ecuted. This learning principle, relating interaction to physiology, is sufficient to learn object
affordances in this context.
This perception-related process has been studied in so far as it can provide a sufficient rep¬
resentation for adapting to its environment at the developmental level. The learning principle is
based on the relationship between the agent and its environment. The experiments have demon¬
strated that this is enough to learn object affordances. At a structural level the SOFM adds new
nodes on demand of the sensory input. If an object with different features than those already
represented is introduced in the scenario, a new node will be added when this is perceived.
Furthermore, new functional synapses between the new node and the behaviours will be added
to represent the affordances of the novel object. If changes are slow, the Hebbian algorithm
computing the synaptic weights will be capable of re-calibrating in a continuous manner for a
more efficient use of the resources. Conversely, abrupt changes in the environment may be too
demanding for this algorithm and may lead to the 'death' of the animat. Physiological stability
has been tested in scenarios containing small and large objects and distributions ranging from
the scarce to the abundant. The performance has been assessed at a behavioural level by mea¬
suring the stability of the learnt functional weights, demonstrating the ability of the SOFM and
of the Hebbian algorithm to continuously adapt to the given scenarios.
The use of affordances in the animal realm is not only controlled by perception but also
by the intensity of the agent's internal drives. Affordances must therefore be tested in a larger
framework of processes driving the agent's behaviour. I have performed a set of experiments to
test different strategies for the combination of affordances and internal drives for decision mak¬
ing. The results show that the multiplicative formula affordance x drive produces behavioural
patterns such that the agent's internal milieu is most stable. Furthermore, the differences in per-
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formance obtained by using different strategies have also highlighted that the way of combining
stimuli for decision making is critical for an efficient use of the affordances.
Affordances are learnt from the link between the selection and execution of a behaviour and
the resulting physiological effect. I argue that this, the ecological link, must also be consid¬
ered in the larger framework of adaptive processes, since ecology drives each adaptive process
within the agent. This should in principle suggest that agents designed according to these gen¬
eral ecological views should adapt to their scenario better than those of agents designed under
consideration of a single adaptive process, either perception or behaviour selection. Ecology
drives each adaptive process of the agent, also the process of behaviour arbitration, which is
addressed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5
The Actor-Critic learns Behavioural
Patterns
The actor-critic algorithm has been postulated to drive the learning of stimulus-reward asso¬
ciations in Pavlovian contingencies (Schultz et al., 1993). In addition to this, the actor-critic
has also been hypothesised to be involved in the learning of high level behavioural patterns
(McClure et al., 2003; Houk et al., 1995) in higher vertebrates, such as mammals. These two
hypotheses have been concurrently formulated in neuroscience; however, a model to concili¬
ate both views, biological learning and behaviour selection, of application to robotics is still
missing.
From the perspective of robotics, the use of reinforcement learning is far from being new,
and likewise the use of an actor-critic (Sutton and Barto, 1981). Unlike other reinforcement
learning algorithms, the actor-critic consists of two separate structures: the actor, to select
behaviours, and the critic, to modify the behavioural patterns. This structure has been demon¬
strated to offer a lesser performance in terms of learning velocity than other algorithms where
learning and selection are part of a single unit, e.g. Q-Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Nevertheless, evolution in animals seems to have adopted an actor-critic as a solution to learn
behavioural patterns, as supported by related studies of the role of the basal ganglia in mammals
(McClure et al., 2003). However, several issues, including the role of extra-synaptic dopamine,
still make its role difficult to understand. The learning hypothesis of Schultz (Schultz et al.,
1993) and the action selection hypothesis of Redgrave (Redgrave et al., 1999) are not recon¬
cilable at least due to the different roles hypothesised for extra-synaptic dopamine (DA). For
the former, DA signals the error in the prediction of reward, for the latter it is the threshold to
facilitate or hinder the selection of actions.
The model introduced in this chapter adheres to the view of Schultz and to the reinforce¬
ment learning view of the basal ganglia. However, it also aims at providing a justification of the
possibility of the basal ganglia being a centralised action selector according to Houk's hypoth-
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esis. This does not only consist of using the old actor-critic algorithm, but of defining a whole
framework for its integration in a biologically inspired model. This model has been designed
to this end; it consists of a motivational module and has integrated the perception system in¬
troduced in the preceding chapter. Therefore, if affordances can be viewed as a biologically
inspired implementation of a reactive architecture, the learning of behavioural patterns intro¬
duced in this chapter can be viewed as related to higher cognitive functions by modulating
behavioural responses. As an inspiration for this, learning is presented as a motivation-driven
mechanism, grounded in the causality of interactions with the environment and their effect on
the motivational state. Beyond the level of performance that these mechanisms may provide,
they are intended to provide a demonstration of the aforementioned hypotheses and a suitable
architecture to build autonomous agents with ideas inspired from neuroscience and ethology.
Experiments have been performed in a range of scenarios in a simulated robotic platform ad¬
dressing ethologically relevant situations.
5.1 Introduction
The issue of "knowing what to do next" has been addressed from different perspectives during
the last decade (McClure et al., 2003; Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Avila-Garcfa and Canamero,
2002; Cooper and Glasspool, 2002; Prescott, 2001; Spier and McFarland, 1996; Tyrrell, 1993).
Nevertheless, a grounded explanation of the effects, relating internal physiological dynamics,
reward-based decision making and the involved perception processes is lacking in the litera¬
ture. This chapter introduces a view of these processes as elements of adaptation. This has
been grounded on ideas of classical ethology, behavioural psychology and neuroscience and
has led to a model that integrates motivation, behaviour selection, learning and perception in a
biologically plausible manner.
Chapter 2 proposed a hierarchy of adaptive processes encompassing behaviour selection as
the process that manages the changes of activity of the agent, and learning as the supervising
process that modifies the patterns of selection. The interrelation between both has been implic¬
itly suggested by previous implementations, although Bindra was the first to explicitly suggest
a physiological and anatomical relationship between them: "the effects on behaviour produced
by reinforcement and motivation arise from a common set ofneuro-psychological mechanisms,
and the principle of reinforcement is a special case of the more fundamental principle ofmo¬
tivation" (Bindra, 1969). This explicitly relates motivation, behaviour and reinforcement as
processes sharing a common neuro-physiological substrate.
The concepts of motivation and reinforcement have been previously addressed and possess
different nuances. Motivation was introduced in its different flavours by McDougall (1913);
Freud (1940); Tinbergen (1951); Lorenz (1966). All of these definitions "share the idea of
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a substance, capable of energising behaviour, held back in a container and subsequently re¬
leased in action" (Hinde, 1960). According to this, motivation intrinsically relates the internal
physiology to the behaviours, whose execution affects the intensity of their related motivations
themselves. Therefore, motivation can be viewed as the modifier of behavioural tendencies via
response instigation1.
In a complementary manner, reinforcement events affect the future probability of choosing
a certain behaviour, depending on the outcome of the interactions. Therefore, one can view
response instigation as working forward in the direction from perception to action and that
response reinforcement works backwards. However, both processes modify the future proba¬
bility of choosing one behaviour over another. This mutual interaction, together with the use of
a common neural substrate, suggests that both motivation and reinforcement can be measured
with the same currency.
Related to this, the common currency problem (Redgrave et al., 1999; McFarland and Sibly,
1975) arises from the necessity to compare different motivational states in order to decide
the appropriate behaviour to execute next. Hereby, it is argued that the common currency
is reward. On the one hand, this would be consistent with the aforementioned notions of
motivation and reinforcement, since reward can be viewed as the strengthening principle of
the common neural substrate that instigates or discourages previously selected behavioural
tendencies. Furthermore, decision making could then be conceived as a simple comparison
among motivational states in terms of reward. The decision making (vanilla version), would
then consist of choosing the behaviour whose related motivation is the most intense, since this
is expected to lead to the highest reward. On the other hand, this definition of common currency
is consistent with current neurological views of hypothetical roles for the basal ganglia (Houk
et al., 1995).
In this respect, reward leads to reinforcement as a modulator of behavioural tendencies.
Learning can be naturally integrated in this context if neuro-modulatory phenomena (Fellous,
2004; Fellous and Suri, 2003; Usher and Davelaar, 2002; Fellous, 2001; Hebb, 1949) are con¬
sidered in the context of reinforcement comparison algorithms (Sutton and Barto, 1981). The
reason for this is that these algorithms have been hypothesised to drive the learning of be¬
haviour selection in circuits in the basal ganglia of vertebrates (Houk et al., 1995). Hence,
if these hypotheses hold, striatal cells in the basal ganglia may be the "common circuitry for
motivation and reinforcement" suggested by Bindra's hypothesis (Bindra, 1969).
However, traditional views on reinforcement, as shown in the model of Schultz et al.
(1997); Suri and Schultz (1998); Houk et al. (1995); Schultz et al. (1993) seem to contra¬
dict models on pure behaviour selection hypothesised for the same parts of the basal ganglia
(Gurney et al., 2001b,a; Redgrave et al., 1999). One of the goals of this chapter is to to help
'Biasing of a behavioural response.
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to disambiguate both views: Schultz's view on learning and Redgrave's hypothesis on action
selection. To this end, I have firstly decided to adhere to the view introduced by Schultz et al.
(1993) on the role of dopamine and propose to study a set of related ethological phenomena.
These can be tested at a behavioural level in order to demonstrate the coherence of this view
via criteria analogous to those used in ethology. The main difference between both sets of
models is the role of dopamine, which I assume to be the reinforcer (the error in the prediction
of reward) that tunes tendencies in favour of one behavioural strategy or another (for Redgrave,
dopamine only acts as a threshold that facilitates the disinhibition of a behaviour). In this light,
a computational model has been built to address the process of learning to select among any
sort of behaviours for a set of given environments. It has been tested in a simulated robotic
architecture.
One of the fundamental ideas for the integration of both views originates in the psycholog¬
ical literature. Thereby it is straightforward to view learning as a step beyond pure behaviour
selection. Behaviour selection is about changing activity and learning about modifying these
patterns responding to changes in the environment. Three main elements are affected by learn¬
ing: the behavioural patterns, the perception of the world (addressed in the previous chapter),
and the perception of the assessment (addressed in the next chapter) itself. This chapter focuses
on studying the underpinnings relating the availability and the distribution of affordances, the
effect of the execution of a behaviour and the resulting behavioural patterns. Furthermore,
from a more engineering perspective, I also aim at providing elements of design for long-term
autonomous agents in dynamic scenarios.
The next section introduces the biological elements on which the model is based. This
precedes a description of the elements used to build the behaviour selection and learning ar¬
chitecture. These are used to perform a series of experiments, addressing the integration of
appetitive and consummatory behaviours in the competitive architecture for behaviour selec¬
tion and learning. Furthermore, elements of design relating internal physiology dynamics are
introduced in the next section.
5.2 Principia Biologica
I address the problem of choosing what to do next taking inspiration from biological systems.
To that aim, the review in chapter 2 introduced the principles of learning prepared by Schultz
et al. (1993) and of behaviour selection that Redgrave et al. (1999) derived from studies of the
basal ganglia. The former argues that one of the roles of the basal ganglia is learning to relate
stimuli to reward, and that dopamine exerts the role of signalling the error in the prediction
of future reward. Conversely, the latter argues that the main role of the basal ganglia is the
selection of actions. The role of dopamine in this case consists in facilitating the selection
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by reducing (or increasing) its basal level (acting as a threshold for the activation of each
behaviour).
Both hypotheses, learning and behaviour selection, have differing inspirations and only
recently has it been suggested that both issues may be encompassed in the dynamics of a larger
context (McClure et al., 2003). A model of learning based on Schultz's hypothesis has been
proposed by Dayan and Montague (see Section 2.5). This is based on Schultz's hypothesis,
which suggests that DA-cells signal effective reinforcement in the process of associating stim¬
ulus to reward. That is, DA represents the difference between the real and the expected reward
given a certain stimulus. This is coherent with the experiments on macaques by Schultz (Suri
and Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1993), for which, after several trials training the macaque
with the same stimulus-reward sequence, the habituation of the level of DA can be interpreted
as a decrease of error in the prediction of reward for that particular stimulus.
Beyond the aforementioned interpretations, some further assumptions need to be made in
order to integrate learning and behaviour selection in the same framework in a robotic platform.
The contingency of learning observed in experiments with macaques is Pavlovian, i.e., when
a stimulus is presented to the monkey, a reward will follow (or not). Nonetheless, the relevant
observation is that the monkey has to perform no action to mediate its delivery. Unlike this,
instrumental learning includes an action that needs to be executed after the stimulus is presented
in order to deliver the reward. Hence, loosely speaking it is possible to view Pavlovian learning
as a subset of instrumental learning, where the action is missing, or more formally, where the
reward is mediated via the null action (in its absence). If this is correct, then the neural substrate
of learning instrumental contingencies could also be the substrate of learning the Pavlovian. In
the absence of further experimental data, it seems reasonable to assume that this is correct.
From a theoretical perspective, both hypothesised roles, that of reinforcement learning sys¬
tem and behaviour selection system, can be viewed as two particular sub-sets of a larger schema
addressing learning and behaviour selection concurrently. In fact, it can be argued that to exe¬
cute an action it is necessary to first select it. Furthermore, to that aim a strategy (which also
has to be learnt) has to be applied to learn stimulus - action - reward relationships.
The model of action selection of Gurney, Prescott and Redgrave (Gurney et al., 2001b) is
based on anatomical and physiological evidence and follows a bottom-up approach. Ethologi-
cal, evolutionary and physiological studies suggest that the basal ganglia is effectively playing
the role of a centralised action selector. I also support this view. However, Redgrave et al.
(1999) argue that phasic dopamine response is too fast to be the predictor of reward when it oc¬
curs in response to novel stimuli, since it happens before the saccade to the stimuli is complete
(assuming identification is necessary to signal reward). Conversely, recent evidence in neuro-
science (Ross et al., 2001) suggests that "representations of future visual images may influence
neural activity as if the saccade had already been executed (therefore, before the saccade), and
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thus the dopamine response may anticipate the saccade" (Fellous and Suri, 2003). I argue that
dopamine is signalling the reward of novelty, and that novelty can by itself be interpreted as a
rewarding event. In the light of these arguments, it seems reasonable to assume the hypothesis
of Schultz for the basal ganglia as an embodiment of an actor-critic reinforcement learning
algorithm. This would include the thesis on learning, supported by Schultz's experiments, and
partly also the thesis of Redgrave on behaviour selection. In this respect, the role of DA is as¬
sumed to signal not only effective reinforcement with regard to the stimulus, but also the error
in the prediction of reward for the execution of one behaviour or another.
Furthermore, the ideas proposed by these principia can be related to the general theory
on robotic architectures (Brooks, 1990). If affordances provide sufficient knowledge to build
reactive architectures, it seems natural to extend these by integrating this knowledge in the
actor-critic, since this would provide a superior layer to the architecture, which may extend its
behavioural patterns and consequently provide adaptivity to a larger range of environments.
Based on these assumptions, I have built an architecture to integrate the actor-critic and the
affordance-based perception system presented in chapter 4 in a single model. This is introduced
in the next section.
5.3 Learning Motivational States
5.3.1 Introduction
Despite the number of definitions of motivation (Hinde, 1971), they all "share the idea of a
substance, capable of energising behaviour, held back in a container and subsequently released
in action" (Hinde, I960). This principle was further formalised by McFarland and Sibly (1975),
who proposed a representation of motivation in a formal state-space, assuming that "it is always
possible to classify the behavioural repertoire of a species in such a way that the classes, which I
call activities, are mutually exclusive". Hence, McFarland and Sibly were grounding the notion
of motivation by relating internal physiology to behaviour, whose execution affects their related
motivations. McFarland's categories were labelled as activities (throughout this thesis, they
will be called behaviours), which can be uniquely determined if the causal factors, formalised
as motivational state (the internal and external stimuli) are known. This is reflected in the
following definition: "motivational state is the state value of all causal factors influencing a
setup of functionally related behavioural patterns. The motivational state maps onto a tendency
which is the strength of the behaviour in the competition for the final common path"2(Toates
and Jensen, 1990; McFarland and Sibly, 1975).
This chapter describes ways of learning the relationship between each motivational state
and the repertoire of behaviours, using the actor-critic based on the aforementioned princi-
2Re-phrased from the cited papers.
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pie of causality. According to the taxonomy of adaptive processes introduced in section 2.1,
learning is the process ofmodification of behavioural patterns according to physiological (self-
regulation) and environmental (availability, accessibility and distribution of resources) factors.
Therefore, finding a solution to this problem will require:
• detecting the necessary elements from the environment to successfully execute the be¬
haviour;
• knowing the appropriate behaviour to satisfy each internal homeostatic variable.
The previous chapter addressed the former point, formalised as learning object ajfordances.
The latter is the core of this chapter. Figure 5.1 introduces the architecture for learning to
select behaviours. The boxes for behaviour selection are depicted in black, in red are shown
the modules for learning.
LEARNING AND BEHAVIOUR SELECTION ARCHITECTURE
SENSORY PERCEPTION
Figure 5.1: Architecture for Behaviour Selection and Learning. It consists of an internal phys¬
iology (homeostatic variables and internal drives), a module to learn affordances, a behaviour
repertoire and the agent's actuators.
The motivational state consists of the set of motivations (Toates and Jensen, 1990) of the
agent, these being a combination of external (affordances) and internal (drives) stimuli (Dama-
sio, 2000; Toates and Jensen, 1990). The learning of affordances has been addressed in chapter
4. In this chapter it is assumed that the agent already knows the affordances of the objects in
its environment (unless otherwise stated). For the case of motivation-driven agents, these are
assumed to bias the execution of one behaviour over another, as shown by Avila-Garcfa and
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Canamero (2002). Hence, learning to select behaviours can be viewed as a search of the formu¬
lation that relates stimuli and drives (motivational state) to a sequence of behaviour executions
that maintains the internal physiology within its viability zone. The process of evaluation of
strategies is performed by the critic (represented by the red box in figure 5.1), which modifies
the values of parameters of the policy functions (which calculate the motivational state) accord¬
ing to the error in the prediction of reward. The reward is due to the execution of a behaviour
whose affordance is offered by the object the agent interacted with.
These principles set the framework for learning. However, a complete picture requires
more definition: the assessment criterion. It is fundamental to know whether the execution
of a behaviour is appropriate to the given motivational state; the problem is that there are as
many correct criteria as definitions of goodness. However, it seems reasonable to assume that
behaviours whose execution leads to a higher physiological stability are beneficial, conversely
they are considered to be harmful. This derives from Ashby's notion of viability (keeping
physiological variables within their viability zone). This assumption plays a dual role. On the
one hand, it defines the necessary criterion of assessment for learning, on the other, it implicitly
defines the sense of valency (the sense of goodness of an action) (Damoulas, 2004; Ackley and
Littman, 1991) for that particular agent.
The calculation of motivational states has already been addressed by several authors. In
particular, Spier and McFarland (1996) proposed the multiplicative constraint Cue x Drive3.
This and other arithmetic formulations to calculate the intensity of each motivation have had
some success in explaining some instances of animal behaviour. However, they have also failed
to provide an explanation that relates physiological values to behavioural responses such as
non-arousal (absence of stimulus should lead to a null motivational state) (McFarland, 1993)
or null behaviour (expression of motivational leading to behaviour execution in the absence
of stimulus). I argue that the formulation of the motivational state must be the result of a
combination of external and internal stimuli. However, the combination of stimuli has so far
been formulated according to multiplicative or additive formulae. Unlike this, I suggest that
the combination of stimuli is probably non-linear and that it seems more advisable to let the
interaction with the environment self-organise the behavioural responses on demand of the
environment. To this end, I have introduced a set of non-linear estimators to combine the
external and internal stimuli to be driven by interaction with the environment to learn these
behavioural patterns. Therefore, I argue that no other formula must be a-priori specified in the
learning process.
However, the calculation of motivational states does not explain the selection process. I
have assumed that the behaviour to execute next is the one exhibiting the highest motivational
3Throughout the thesis, external stimuli are referred to in terms of affordances (and not cues). This is discussed
in chapter 4.
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value. It is however important to stress, that this is not the only criterion to select behaviours.
Ours implicitly assumes that all motivations are measured with the same unit: reward, which
makes the comparison possible. Although this selection criterion follows classic patterns, a
restriction has been deliberately imposed: the calculation of the motivational states and the se¬
lection process should lead to a sequence ofbehaviours stabilising the physiology of the agent
and that maximises reward. Unlike the case of arithmetic formulae, this principle provides a
minimal restriction in the combination of stimuli. Furthermore, this has also been suggested to
be a criterion of natural selection (Dawkins, 1976; Ashby, 1965), which provides a sufficient
context for explaining a wide range of ethological phenomena.
A reward-based drive for behaviour selection has been proposed by different authors in
machine learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). However, this was not considered in neuroscience
until recently as a possible explanation for behavioural patterns (Rolls, 2003; Schultz et al.,
1993). The next section describes the implementation of these ideas and principles in our
simulation environment.
5.3.2 Policy Learning Model
This subsection introduces a phenomenological model for learning behavioural patterns as an
extension of a motivation-based behaviour selection architecture. The model consists of a
framework for behaviour selection and learning based on the actor-critic reinforcement learning
algorithm. The complete model is shown in figure 5.1, and consists of the following parts:
• The agent's internal physiology module integrates two sub-modules (cf. centre-left of
figure 5.1) are two. Firstly, the homeostatic variables, which are abstractions of the
agent's internal resources, and secondly the drives, which signal the status of deficit or
excess of any homeostatic variable; their value is the difference between the optimal and
the current value of their related variable.
• The agent's external stimuli (cf. top-left of figure 5.1). These are perceived as object
affordances. These are quantified as weights of the synapses relating neural structure
representing the sensory space (the SOFM) to the agent's behaviour repertoire. Refer to
chapter 4 for more detail.
• The actor-critic algorithm makes decisions provoking transitions between different states
in the Markovian state space. The state is uniquely determined by the values of the
affordances and the values of the drives. In order to better understand the framework
offered by the actor-critic algorithm, figure 5.1 shows a more detailed description of
its different elements and their interactions. The state is represented in the centre-left.
Based on this, the actor (top-centre) decides the behaviour to execute next. This piece
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of information is also shared with the critic (bottom-centre), which guides the learning
process on the grounds of the reward obtained due to behaviour execution.
• The behaviour repertoire is represented on the centre-right of figure 5.1.
Learning Framework As stated in the previous section, the calculation of the motivational
state is not specified by an arithmetic formula. Instead, the actor-critic learns, via interaction
with the environment, to compute the motivational states leading to an internal physiological
stability. To do this, a set of preference functions calculates the intensity of the motivation
for each behaviour; the behaviour related to the highest motivation is executed next. There¬
fore, the performance in terms of learning will be conditioned by the performance in selecting
behaviours, which depends itself on the correctness of the prediction of reward for each be¬
haviour. The predictions are updated after the execution of every behaviour by correcting the
weights of the network that predicts the motivational intensity of that behaviour with the value
of effective reinforcement, i.e., 8(/), the difference between the real and the expected reward.
To reach the correct policies for every state depends on two different conditions: firstly, to
satisfy the conditions of convergence for the actor critic and secondly, to have an appropriate
definition of reward. This definition should be a function of the effect of interactions on the
agent's internal physiology. However, there is a series of considerations with regard to its bio¬
logical plausibility. These are introduced below. On the one hand Houk et al. (1995); Schultz
et al. (1993) proposed that the basal ganglia was encoding stimulus-response for learning for
Pavlovian contingencies. On the other, it has been suggested that both Pavlovian and instru¬
mental learning partly share the same neural substrate, since both seem to learn in a stimulus-
response manner (McClure et al., 2003), as their only difference is that in instrumental learning
the delivery of reward is mediated by the execution of an action. Therefore, it seems reasonable
to extend a model that was originally proposed for Pavlovian learning, which also considers
the selection of the behaviour, to instrumental learning: the actor-critic.
This algorithm is a derivative of the originally proposed reinforcement comparison algo¬
rithms (Sutton and Barto, 1981). According to Sutton and Barto, the reinforcement learning
problem is "meant to be a straightforward framing of the problem of learning from interaction
to achieve the goal" (Sutton and Barto, 1998), pp. 51. Viewed from a machine learning per¬
spective, the problem includes three elements: the goal, the states among which the agent will
have to navigate and the way the reward (assessment) is introduced in the system. In a straight¬
forward manner, the states have been defined as a combination of internal physiological states
and the affordances of the objects encountered, and reaching the goal as leading the agent's
physiological space to its optimal zone. The definition of reward is addressed next.
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Defining Reward Definitions of reward have often been misleading, since different authors
mentioned reward when they refer to different phenomena. I define reward as an affective
qualification of the effect ofa behaviour on the agent's internal physiology, hence the feeling
(Damasio, 2000) of the effect that particular agent. Reinforcement is the strengthening or
weakening happening at a synaptic level.
The learning of behavioural patterns is based on the relationship between reward and the
agent's internal physiological stability (see equation 5.1).
DEFICIT 2(d2)
Figure 5.2: Definition of Reward. The x and y axes represent two deficits of the agent's internal
physiological state. The deficits are represented by the vectors d(t — 1) and d(t), before and af¬
ter the execution of a behaviour, respectively. The effect of executing a behaviour is represented
by the vector Effect.
The reward r(t) is the difference of the inverse of the square of the norms of the vectors
in figure 5.2, where d(t — 1) and d(t) are the vectors representing the initial and final states,
respectively, in the agent's physiological space.
r(t) =—d——I 2 I5-1!||rf(!)||2 1)||
In addition to respecting the overall goal of reaching and maintaining the optimal of the
agent's internal milieu (Ashby, 1965), this definition of reward has further consequences.
Firstly, it implicitly relates to the definition of the feeling of what is good and bad for the
agent, hence the sense of valence (Ackley and Littman, 1991) for this agent. Secondly, the non-
linearity of the formula of reward is biologically consistent. If the execution of the behaviour
leads the agent's physiological state to the origin (d(t) is close to the origin), the formula will
deliver more reward than if the effect leads the physiological vector d(t — 1) further away from
the origin. Hence, it is more rewarding to reach the stability zone than it is to just compensate
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an urging internal need. However, the formula will deliver a negative value (interpreted as a
punishment) if the behaviour executed tried to affect a related homeostatic variable.
From a conceptual perspective, it is important to note that reward only refers to positive
contributions and that punishment refers to its negative counterpart. Lastly, this definition of
reward is also defining the fitness of the individual (Dawkins, 1976), although this only has an
effect at a developmental level for a single agent.
Cycle of Execution In most reinforcement learning algorithms, the selection of actions and
the learning from the environment are integrated in the same module, e.g. Q-Values (Watkins,
1989). For the actor-critic module, these are deliberately separated. The actor is responsible for
the measurement of the motivational state and for selection of the behaviour to execute next.
The critic provides the necessary feedback for improving the policies for behaviour selection
(cf. figure 5.3). On the one hand, this facilitates the selection of actions, since behaviour
selection results from a comparison among the preference values (motivation values), on the
other, "they [agents] can learn an explicitly stochastic policy; that is, they can leam the optimal
probabilities of selecting various actions" (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Figure 5.3: The Reinforcement Learning Schema consists of an Actor-Critic reinforcement
learning schema. Its state consists of the set of perceived affordances and of the values of
the agent's internal drives. This information is used to calculate the policy values associated
to that state to make decisions. The critic provides the feedback to update the policies on the
basis of the reward provided by the execution of each behaviour.
Hence, the learning algorithm has two phases. First phase: the calculation of the mo¬
tivational state as a function of the physiological state and the selection of the behaviour to
execute next. The physiological state s(r) (see equation 5.2) is a vector of real numbers, rang¬
ing between 0.0 and 1.0 and representing the drives d(t) and the affordances a(t). There are
N homeostatic variables (hence drives) and L affordances. The mapping between the physio¬
logical and the motivational states is performed by feed-forward neural networks (non-linear
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estimators); there is one network doing this mapping for each behaviour. The physiological
state is updated, by perceiving the affordances of the object nearby and by reading the instan¬
taneous values of the internal drives. Then the networks associated to each behaviour calculate
the intensity of each motivation to execute each of them. The behaviour selection follows a
greedy policy; 80% of the time the behaviour whose related motivation exhibits the highest
intensity value — or policy value — (11^. is the policy function, see equation 5.3) is selected
for execution. The rest of the time a random behaviour is selected to explore the state space.
s(t) = {{d(t)}h{a(t)}j},i e {1 -N},j € {1..L} (5.2)
b(s(t)) = argmax II^ (s(t)) (5.3)
Second phase: the learning phase, which occurs after the selected behaviour has been se¬
lected and executed. The reward obtained via the execution of the behaviour, r(f), is compared
with the prediction of the critic. The difference between both is the error in the prediction of
reward 8(f), see equation 5.4. y is the discount factor (0 < y < 1), specifying the influence of
past states on the current state.
8(f) = r(t) -yV(s(t)) + V(s(t- 1)) (5.4)
The critic estimates the value V(s(f)) of the state s(f), in other words the cumulative value
reward resulting from the successive interactions with the environment, from an initial state
until the goal (the viability zone) is reached. The value function is calculated by a feed-forward
neural network.
Therefore, equation 5.4 shows the difference between the real reward and the predicted
reward: 8(f). This scalar is on the one hand used to update the weights of the critic for refining
the prediction of reward for the next estimation via back-propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986).
This algorithm minimises the Minimum Square Eror (MSE) (E = 1 /2Yg=\{dj — aj)2), where
dj are the desired output values and aj the real outputs values, L is the number of units at the
output layer. The goal is to minimise this error; hence the error is diminished at every step by
gradient descent according to
dE
(5-5)
where COis the weight of the synapse connecting unit j at the middle layer to unit i at the
output layer (or j at the middle layer and i at the input layer). Depending on whether the weight
connects the output to the middle layer or the middle to the input layer, the expression of the
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where am is the real output and dm is the desired output. For the latter case, the expression of




where <Bm, is the weight connecting the i input unit to the m middle layer unit, a, is the value
of input i and g(sm) (g is the sigmoid function) is the output of unit m, CD^m is the weight
connecting the middle layer unit m to the output unit k. d* is the desired output value and ak
the real output layer value at the output unit k.
Equations 5.6 and 5.7 describe the process of updating the weights of the output and middle
layers for the critic and for every behaviour network included in the actor. I need to notice two
main differences with respect to the usual algorithm. The first one is that the output layer
has a single unit, since the prediction of reward for the critic and the policy functions of the
actor are scalars. Therefore, the summation over k units is reduced to a single term. The
second difference is that for every one of these cases, the output layer is linear, since the policy
functions and the error in the prediction of reward are unbounded.
The same process of weight updating is performed for the networks estimating the policy
function for every behaviour. From a biological perspective, these two updates model the
learning guided by the dopamine signal, the error in the prediction of reward in an instrumental
contingency. Thus 8(t) can be linked to the dopamine signal, the error in the prediction of
reward observed for Pavlovian learning (Schultz et al., 1993). Both selection and learning
operations are repeated until convergence. The convergence is facilitated by a positive reward
(r(t)) when the effect of the chosen behaviour diminishes the drives of the agent, conversely
for any other case.
It is argued that the framework introduced in this section, together with the aforementioned
ideas on motivation and reward are a sufficient context for integrating learning and behaviour
selection in a biologically plausible manner. This argument will be addressed in the following
sections by testing the learnt policies in a set of scenarios, where the availability, accessibility
and distribution of resources has been distributed in a biologically plausible manner.
5.3.3 Experimental Setup
The principle for learning appropriate behavioural patterns consists of grounding the interaction
with the environment to its physiological effect. This relates to the reward obtained by that
execution, which depends on the dynamics of the internal physiology. For testing purposes, a
set of different environments have been engineered, varying the availability, accessibility and
distribution of resources. It is expected that any change in these variables will be reflected in
appropriate changes in the behavioural patterns in order to adapt to each scenario.
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The model is composed of three homeostatic variables and three drives. These are struc¬
tured in modules, as introduced in section 4.1. Three homeostatic variables have been labelled
as Nutrition, Stamina and Boredom. Each of them has a related drive, namely hunger, tiredness
and restlessness, respectively. Their value is computed as the difference between the optimal
and the current level of the related homeostatic variable.
The behaviours are coarse grained and integrate a set of actions. The behaviours used for
the experiments are the following: to grasp, to drink, to shelter, to touch and to avoid. They are
consummatory, except the last one, which is appetitive4. One of the constraints of the agent is
that only one behaviour can access its actuators at a time. The rest of the time the behaviour
must be inhibited. The task of the actor-critic model is to learn to associate each state to the
suitable behaviour, the state being the combination of external affordances and internal drives,
cf. equation 4.2.
Metrics The overall goal is to select behaviours appropriately to maintain the agent's internal
physiology within its viability zone. Three sets of metrics are introduced in order to assess the
performance of the learning algorithm.
Firstly, it has been considered appropriate to measure the time it takes to learn the be¬
havioural patterns to respond to the environment. To this end, the number of steps to reach
stability has been sampled every 2000 decisions until a stable value is reached (the error in the
prediction of reward 8 is smaller than £). The time to reach this is the time of convergence for
the optimal selection pattern, given the particular scenario and the conditions of the algorithm.
Secondly, the goal of the algorithm is to bring stability to the agent's internal physiology. To
this end, two viability indicators: physiological stability and overall comfort (refer to equations
4.14 and 4.15, respectively), are measured at intervals of 2000 decisions; until convergence is
reached. Physiological Stability measures the mean value of the deficits, and overall comfort
measures how much these vary. The optimal value is 0 for both cases. The evolution of
these indicators over time displays the effect of the different behaviour selection strategies in
physiological terms, starting with the initial policy (at random) and concluding with the final
(reward optimal) policy.
Lastly, for ethologists, it is fundamental to observe behavioural responses. I have gone one
step further than this by relating the behavioural responses to their physiological state. To this
end, behavioural and physiological cycles5 have been drawn with a dual goal; on the one hand
to depict the relationship between the physiological state and the learnt behavioural patterns
(considered appropriate to the situation described by the state); on the other to have an element
4A behaviour is considered consummatory if its execution provides immediate reward to the agent. Otherwise
it is considered appetitive.
5A behavioural cycle is the sequence of behaviours chosen and executed by the agent to compensate a physio¬
logical state. It ends when every deficit has been covered.
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of behavioural analysis analogous to ethological cycles6 (McFarland and Spier, 1997).
5.3.4 Relating Physiology, Behaviours and the Environment
I firstly intend to test the capacity of the proposed algorithm to learn to respond to the current
physiological state with the right behaviour by interacting with its environment. To this end, an
environment consisting of a set of objects has been engineered. The encounter with objects in
the environment has been simulated in order to speed up the experiments. Objects are encoun¬
tered on a random basis. These simulated environments have been characterised according to
the distribution of affordances of the objects as a function of their physical features. In this
section, the goal is to test the learning algorithm in two environments D1 and D2, D1 is an
environment where every object affords every behaviour to be performed. In distribution D2
objects whose size is smaller than 0.04 afford grasping. Objects larger than that size afford to
shelter; all objects afford to be touched (cf. figure 5.4). This distribution is such that 50% of
the objects afford shelter and 50% afford grasping. 100% of the objects afford to be touched.







Figure 5.4: D2 Distribution of affordances. The line indicates the interval of sizes where that
affordance is 1.0. G, S and T stand for grasping, shelter and touch, respectively. Object sizes
range from 0.0 to 0.1.
The learning procedure consists of the following steps:
1. The agent encounters an object, whose affordances are known to the agent.
2. The policy values (motivational state) are calculated for each behaviour given the current
state (the values of the affordances of the closest object and of the drives).
3. The behaviour that maximises the expectation of reward (whose motivational state ex¬
hibits the highest value) is selected and executed 80% of the time. Selection is at random
the rest of the time.
6Ethological cycles are sequences of behaviour selection executions aimed at compensating certain needs.
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4. If the execution is successful, it has a compensatory effect on one or more homeostatic
variables; conversely, there is no effect.
5. The real reward is calculated as a function of this effect.
6. The critic performs the correction for its prediction of reward according to equation 5.4,
and the actor corrects its preferences for the behaviour selected and executed, given that
state.
These simulations address the following issues:
• The learning of the correspondence between the drives and the behaviours. This
has to be evaluated via cycles of behaviour execution and a metric of effectiveness, see
equation 5.8.
• The characterisation of the learning process. The metrics for these are: the mean
number of decisions required to reach the goal from a random initial point, the nec¬
essary number of decisions to reach the shortest cycle and the final stable values of
physiological stability and overall comfort.
Learning Performance and Physiological Stability The experiment aims to demonstrate
the capacity of the architecture above to relate the dynamics of the internal physiology, char¬
acterised by the decay of the homeostatic variables (t = 10-3), to the execution of behaviours
for different scenarios. These scenarios have been parametrised after the distribution of af-
fordances, D1 and D2 in this section, and the experiments aim at characterising the final be¬
havioural patterns for both distributions. The experiments take place in the simulated environ¬
ment described in section 5.3.4.
Graphs in figure 5.5 show the evolution of the length of the cycle of behaviour executions,
averaged over 20 simulations. The cycle7 starts at a random value in the agent's physiologi¬
cal space and ends in the optimal zone of the agent's physiology (where deficits are close to
zero). The changes are due to the execution of behaviours and are used as an evaluation pro¬
cedure. These graphs show that the mean number of decisions required to reach the optimal
physiological zone decreases for both affordance distributions (top left graphs, red and blue
curves, respectively) until a stationary value is reached (about 11 and 17 for cases D1 and D2,
respectively). Analogously for the statistical metric of variance, cf. top right graph in figure
5.5. Furthermore, ca. 16 x 104 iterations (80 time steps) are necessary to reach the stationary
value.
Similarly, the viability indicators, physiological stability and the overall comfort averaged
over 20 simulations each (bottom graphs, left and right, respectively), show that stability and
7The name cycle is assigned by analogy with the notion of ethological cycle.
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Figure 5.5: Top Graphs: Evolution of the Number of Decisions to Reach Goal for two distri¬
butions of affordances, D1 and D2. The graphs represent the mean and variance, left and
right, respectively. Bottom Graphs: Evolution of the Physiological Stability and Overall Comfort
(viability indicators), left and right, respectively.
overall comfort improve with the learning process, until a stationary value is reached. For
both the metrics, learning is demonstrated to make the system more stable and more efficient
in terms of its internal physiology. Final physiological values around 0.5 and 0.02 have been
reached for case D1 and D2, respectively. Overall comfort values reached are under 10 .
These results demonstrate that the actor-critic has been able to learn appropriate policies, and
that making the physiology stability is very much related to the consecution of a short be¬
havioural pattern.
Behaviour Assessment The correspondence between drives and behaviours is shown in
figure 5.6. The learning process is presented in terms of learning cycles, shown in the left and
central graphs. The learning is divided into episodes, starting with the reset of the homeostatic
variables at random values and ending when these reach the optimal zone. Graphs on the left
and in the centre illustrate the initial and final cycles of the drives and of the policy functions
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Figure 5.6: These graphs characterise the evolution of the relationship between the drives and
the behaviours throughout the simulation for the case of an environment with uniformly dis¬
tributed affordances (D1). The graphs, for the left and central case, show, from top to bottom:
the level of each drive, the level of each associated policy value, the winning Drive, the winning
policy (each drive and its related behaviour is drawn with the same colour (Red for Hunger-Eat
(behaviour 1), Green for Tiredness-Rest (behaviour 2), Blue for Restlessness-Touch (behaviour
3)). The graph on the right shows the percentage of agreement between the winner drive (WTA-
D) and the winning policy function (WTA-P) along the simulation.
(expressing preference for one or another behaviour. For the given situation, each drive can be
satisfied by a single behaviour). The right match has been stressed by using the same colour to
depict the drive and its related behaviour (red for the Hunger/Eat, Green for Tiredness/Rest and
Blue for Restlessness/Touch, drives/behaviours, respectively). The learning cycles are shown at
the beginning and end of the simulation, left and central graphs, respectively. The procedure for
selection consists of selecting the behaviour whose policy exhibits the highest value. Keeping
this in mind, the actor-critic should learn that the most urgent drive has to be served first, hence
if a behaviour exhibits the highest intensity (largest related motivation), its related motivation
should also be the most intense. The two bottom graphs in the left and central groups show
the winner drive (WTA-D) and of the policies (WTA-P), respectively. This is coherent with the
results: the graphs on the left (beginning of the simulation) show a high level of discordance
between both WTA graphs, but this decreases gradually during the simulation, cf. central graph
on figure 5.6 (end of the simulation). The graph on the right hand side on figure 5.6 shows an
average over 20 simulations of the percentage of agreement between the behaviour related to
the winner drive (the one that should be executed according to the aforementioned criterion of
selection) and the behaviour selected in simulation. The evolution of this matching starts from
20%, and reaches a final value ca. 70%. Higher values are not likely to be reached due to the
20% of random selection and due to the numerical accuracy boundaries of the neural networks.
The actor-critic has demonstrated, in this context, its ability to relate drives and behaviours
in such a manner that reward is maximised. Hence, to define contributions towards stability as
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Figure 5.7: The picture on the left is an illustration of an example of two sets of effects (in red)
due to behaviour execution. These start at a random point in the agent's physiological space and
end in its optimal physiological zone. Both the effects are due to the execution of a sequence
of behaviours. The picture on the right shows the four initial states considered for experiments
shown in graphs 5.8 and 5.9.
OPTIMAL ZONE
Drive 1
positive suffices to come up with a strategy for selection that relates every need of the agent
to an appropriate behavioural response. This suggests that the actor-critic algorithm is able
not only to learn to relate stimulus to responses, but also capable of learning to select the
most appropriate behaviour that mediates the maximisation of reward. I need to stress that
these results are so far solely valid for the definition of reward that interprets as good those
actions leading to an overall more stable physiological situation. This may also suggest that,
in principle, the thesis supported by Schultz (1998) arguing that some parts of the brain behave
as an actor-critic to mediate Pavlovian learning can also be extended to the instrumental case,
and that this may be one of the mechanisms within the strategy for selecting the behaviour to
execute next in biological beings. In addition to this, this is also consistent with the view of
Rolls (2003) and Sutton and Barto (1998) on behaviour selection: at each level of the hierarchy,
the behaviour to execute next tends to be within a sequence leading to the highest cumulative
reward. In this particular case, this is equivalent to selecting the behaviour whose associated
drive expresses the highest urge for compensation 70% of the time. Hence, the most urgent
drive is served first.
To further test the consistency of the aforementioned results, I have performed four differ¬
ent simulations with the same parameters used in these last experiments. However, a learning
and an assessment phase alternate every 2000 decisions, during which the cycle starts from a
fixed position in the agent's physiological space (cf. figure 5.7). Four different initial physio¬
logical values have been deliberately chosen to test the behavioural response for four different
physiological imbalances. Each assessment phase extends over 1000 decisions. During ev-
5.3. Learning Motivational States 119
ery assessment phase, values of effectiveness and cycles of execution of behaviour have been
recorded and plotted in figures 5.8 and 5.9.
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Figure 5.8: Representation of the Evolution of the Behavioural Cycles throughout the Learning
Process. Two different initial physiological states have been chosen. For each case, the top
graph shows the evolution of the sequence of behaviours executed from the same initial phys¬
iological state to reach the optimal zone in a 2-D physical space. The sequences of behaviour
execution start on top of the figure, and flow down the y-axis. The colours are Red for Grasp,
Green for Shelter, Blue for Touch. Grey means that the goal has been reached. The bottom
graph of each pair shows the evolution of the effectiveness metric, calculated according to equa¬
tion 5.8. Initial states (hunger,tiredness,restlessness) are: (0.9, 0.8, 0.7) and (0.5, 0.8, 0.9), left
and right, respectively.
These results are necessary to reach an element of ethological comparison, inspired by
McFarland's physiological cycles (McFarland and Spier, 1997). So far, cycles of execution
have been mainly portrayed in two dimensions only. This representation can be used in N
dimensions. Furthermore, it is accompanied by a metric of effectiveness of behaviour execution
designed, ad hoc. This is introduced by equation 5.8 (Ar,- being the size of the effect of the
execution of the ith behaviour within the cycle and N the total number of executions during
that cycle) and figure 5.7. Effectiveness is defined as a quotient between the sum of the effects
from the beginning of the cycle until the optimal zone is reached, normalised by the number of
executions entailed in the process. Hence, if most executions have an effect, the value of the
metric will approach sequentially A (0.3 in this case).
j N-1
Effectiveness — — ^ Ar,- (5.8)N i=0
Hence, if the agent is learning the shortest path towards the optimal zone, the sequence
should resemble a straight line from the initial state to the origin of the physiological state.
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Figure 5.9: Representation of the Evolution of the Behavioural Cycles throughout the Learn¬
ing Process. Two different initial physiological states have been chosen. For each case, the
top graph shows the evolution of the sequence of behaviours executed from the same initial
physiological state to reach the optimal zone. The sequences of behaviour execution start on
top of the figure, and flow along the y-axis. The colours are Red for Grasp, Green for Shelter,
Blue for Touch. Grey means that the goal has been reached. The bottom graph of each pair
shows the evolution of the effectiveness metric, calculated according to equation 5.8. Initial
states (hunger,tiredness, restlessness) are: (0.9, 0.5, 0.8) and (0.9, 0.8, 0.5), left and right,
respectively.
The effectiveness metric has been designed to be independent of the initial state. In fact, only
the proportion between effective and non-effective behaviours executed will matter, e.g., a
sequence entailing 5 effective and 2 non-effective behaviours will have the same effectiveness
as a sequence entailing 10 effective and 4 non-effective behaviours = ^yp). Furthermore,
the sequence of behaviours executed in the second case (arbitrarily chosen) at each evaluation
phase has been stored.
Both metrics, the behavioural sequence and the effectiveness have been plotted in graphs
5.8 and 5.9. The first (figure 5.8, left graph) aims at offering a complete behavioural sequence
starting always from a physiological state where deficits are very high (0.9, 0.8, 0.7). Be¬
haviours are identified by colour. The top figures show that the sequence of behaviours at the
beginning of the simulation exhibits very long cycles, since a sensible pattern has still not been
learnt and the same behaviour is repeated aimlessly. However, at around 100 (X-axis), cycles
start shortening, and a pattern of execution of behaviours starts to emerge (with some varia¬
tions from value 250 onwards). Red, green and blue behaviours can be seen repeating in the
y-direction, indicating that all three behaviours are chosen in turn to decrease the deficits in
each of the three drives. This also relates to the value of effectiveness displayed underneath,
which increases from the same x-value onwards.
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Similarly, the three other cases of study aim at showing the sequence of behaviours when
the starting physiological state is most deficitary in each of its 3 dimensions. Consistently, the
initial states are, for Hunger, Tiredness and Restlessness, respectively, (0.5, 0.8, 0.9), (0.9, 0.5,
0.8) and (0.9, 0.8, 0.5). Hence, for each case, it can be observed that most of the behaviours
in the behaviour sequence at the end of the simulation correspond to those behaviours whose
deficit is the highest. Hence, for the first case (figure 5.8, right graph), most behaviours are
touch and shelter (blue and green), for the second case (figure 5.9, left graph) they are grasp
and touch (red and blue) and for the third case (figure 5.9, right graph) they are grasp and
shelter (red and green). The stable value of effectiveness corresponds to the moment when the
pattern of effective behaviour execution arises.
The metrics introduced in this section, to assess learning, behaviour selection, physio¬
logical stability and cycles of execution will be used in a set of ethologically relevant cases
introduced next.
5.4 Learning to Select Consummatory Behaviours
This section is devoted to reporting studies on the effect of the distribution and availability of
resources in the learning process. The hypothesis is that both the environment and the internal
drives modulate the definition and the learning of the motivational state, wherein decisions
are made. This is, the distribution of resources (in the form of affordances) should control the
range of behaviours that the actor-critic learns, ranging between the stimulus and the motivation
driven.
Furthermore, the internal drives will also bias the selection in one or another manner, e.g.,
when hunger is the dominant drive, the agent should strongly bias the selection of behaviours
compensating that need. However, this can only happen if the object faced affords to perform
those behaviours. In this respect, I introduce two particular cases of distribution: a stimu¬
lus driven environment (distribution Kl, cf. figure 5.10), where every object affords a single
behaviour, and a motivation driven distribution where every object affords every behaviour
(distribution K2).
In a stimulus driven environment the agent has the choice of executing the behaviour af¬
forded by the object nearby to compensate its internal drives. The selection of other behaviours
will report a loss of reward to the agent. Therefore, since the actor-critic aims at accumulating
reward, its final policies for selecting behaviour should demonstrate that the external stimuli
dominate over the internal. For our experiments, a stimulus driven environment has been de¬
signed by distributing the availability of the resources in the environment to every object as a
function of their size in a non-overlapping manner, cf. figure 5.10.
The converse case to this environment is the motivation driven environment. An agent in
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Figure 5.10: K1 Distribution of affordances. The line indicates the interval of object sizes where
that affordance is 1.0. G, S and T stand for grasping, shelter and touch, respectively. Object
sizes range from 0.0 to 0.1.
this second type of environment should not make decisions conditioned on external stimuli,
but on the internal drives only. I hypothesise, within the context of the actor-critic, that both
stimulus and motivation driven patterns of behaviour selection should emerge naturally via in¬
teraction with the environment. The argument supporting this is that the actor-critic maximises
the expectation of reward, and this should be at its maximum when every decision exerts an
effect towards the stability of the internal physiology. This occurs when the behaviour has a
compensatory internal effect on the internal drives of the agent, therefore when the behaviour
selected matches one of the affordances offered by the object nearby.
In this light, convergence can be studied in terms of the number of decisions required to
lead the physiological state to the viability zone, which decreases over time (cf. figure 5.11
mean and variance, top-left and top-right, respectively). Furthermore, I have also measured the
evolution of the physiological stability and overall comfort throughout the simulation, which
decreases while the convergence increases, hence demonstrating that convergence and stability
of the behaviour selection pattern are learnt by the actor-critic.
The top pictures of figure 5.12 show a sample of the cycles at the beginning and end of the
simulation, left and centre, respectively. It can be observed that once the policies for selecting
behaviours have been learnt, the perceived affordances match the behaviours selected by these
policies. The set of graphs in the third and fourth rows of each set compare the learning perfor¬
mance by showing the affordances offered by the objects aside to the policy functions to select
behaviours at the beginning and end of the simulation, left and middle graphs, respectively.
The graph on the right hand side shows the evolution of the percentage of matching between
the winner policy and the winner drive (labelled as motivation driven) for the environments K1
and K2, top and bottom, respectively. Furthermore, for the K1 environment only, the evolu¬
tion of the matching between the winner policy and the affordance offered at every encounter
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Figure 5.11: Top Graphs: Evolution of the Number of Decisions to Reach Goal for distributions
K1 and K2, see figure 5.10. The graphs represent the mean and variance, left and right, respec¬
tively. Bottom Graphs: Evolution of the Physiological Stability and the Overall Comfort (viability
indicators), left and right, respectively.
throughout the simulation is also shown (labelled as incentive driven).
The results show that learning is more difficult in the environment K1 than in the environ¬
ment K2. The explanation for this is that the only behaviour afforded by each object in the
environment K1 is the one afforded by the environment, hence there is no choice if reward is to
be maximised. The learning process is aimed at finding the right distribution such that reward
is maximised. The only way is to effectively profit from every opportunity, therefore to disre¬
gard the internal needs and to choose to execute the behaviour offered by the object nearby at
every encounter.
The level of agreement between the curves on the right hand side of figure 5.12 shows that
the actor-critic becomes stimulus driven after 12 x 104 decisions. This number of decisions
may seem large if compared to biological data (Schultz et al., 1997). However, it is important
to consider that its biological counterpart has been hypothesised to incorporate a model from
the pre-frontal cortex, whereas our learning is solely based on TD-Learning (which is model-
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Figure 5.12: These graphs characterise the evolution of the relationship between the drives
and the behaviours throughout the simulation for the case of an environment with uniformly
distributed affordances (K1), cf. figure 5.10. The graphs, for the left and middle case, show,
from top to bottom: the level of each drive, the level of each associated policy value, the WTA
of the Affordances (i.e., the affordance available at the moment of decision making), the WTA
of the Policies (each drive and its related behaviour are drawn with the same colour (Red for
Hunger-Eat, Green for Tiredness-Rest, Blue for Restlessness-Touch)). The graph on the right
hand side shows the percentage of coincidence between the WTA-A (the affordance) and the
behaviour selected (WTA-P). The top graph compares distributions K1 and K2. The lower case
only refers to distribution K2.
free). Furthermore, the results show that for environment K1 (incentive environment), the
behavioural pattern becomes stimulus driven for around 60-65% of the encounters after 240 x
104 decisions. To this extent, the agent is exhibiting a reactive behaviour. The reasons for this
are that 20% of selection is at random for exploratory purposes and that the numerical accuracy
of the neural networks estimating the motivational state is limited. Furthermore, the decay of
the homeostatic variables has been fixed for these experiments at (x = 10-3), which provokes
a noticeable effect of satiation when the policies are learnt. If the behaviour afforded by the
object encountered corresponds to a drive already satisfied, the effect of its execution is close
to 0. The satiation effect contributes to reduce the metric by a significant 10-15%.
Graphs in figure 5.13 and 5.14 show the cycles for the case of an incentive environment
Kl. In this case, it is necessary to consider that every object in this environment offers a
single affordance and that interaction occurs on a random basis. Hence, despite the learnt
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Figure 5.13: Representation of the Evolution of the Behavioural Cycles throughout the Learning
Process for the case of reactive environment. Two different initial physiological states have
been chosen. For each case, the top graph shows the evolution of the sequence of behaviours
executed from the same initial physiological state to reach the optimal zone in a 2-D physical
space. The sequences of behaviour execution start on top of the figure, and flow down the y-
axis. Only the first 20 behaviours composing the cycle are displayed (it is expected that the cycle
will be shorter than that by the end of the simulation). The colours are Red for Grasp, Green
for Shelter, Blue for Touch. Grey means that the goal has been reached. The bottom graph of
each pair shows the evolution of the effectiveness metric, calculated according to equation 5.8.
Initial states (hunger,tiredness,restlessness) are: (0.9, 0.8, 0.7) and (0.5, 0.8, 0.9), left and right,
respectively.
patterns being shorter and rewarding to the agent, these should be different among themselves.
Accordingly, these figures show that the behavioural patterns shorten throughout time due to
the learning. However, the final behavioural cycles vary substantially among themselves in
every one of the four situations considered (the colours among behavioural cycles of the same
figure alternate without any certain regularity). This suggests that the patterns respond to the
behaviour affordances offered at every interaction, and therefore that the behavioural responses
are reactive.
5.4.1 Behaviours with Double Effect
The results in the previous section have demonstrated that the learning architecture does learn
a stable behavioural pattern for environments endowed with distributions of affordances rang¬
ing from the stimulus driven to the motivation driven. Furthermore, the behavioural patterns
have demonstrated that they suffice to maintain the stability of the internal resources for the
given conditions. However, the reach of these conclusions is bounded by the use of a unique
correspondence between every drive of the agent and a particular behaviour.
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Figure 5.14: Representation of the Evolution of the Behavioural Cycles throughout the Learn¬
ing Process. Two different initial physiological states have been chosen. For each case, the
top graph shows the evolution of the sequence of behaviours executed from the same initial
physiological state to reach the optimal zone in a 2-D physical space. The sequences of be¬
haviour execution start on top of the figure, and flow down the y-axis. The colours are Red for
Grasp, Green for Shelter, Blue for Touch. Grey means that the goal has been reached. The
bottom graph of each pair shows the evolution of the effectiveness metric, calculated according
to equation 5.8. Initial states (hunger, tiredness and restlessness) are: (0.9, 0.5, 0.8) and (0.9,
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Figure 5.15: L1 Distribution of affordances. The line indicates the interval of object sizes where
that affordance is 1.0. G, S, T, D stand for grasping, shelter, touch and drink, respectively. Object
sizes range from 0.0 to 0.1. Distribution L2 is a uniform distribution, where every behaviour is
afforded by every object.
In order to extend these conclusions, this section adds asymmetry to the relationship be¬
tween drives and behaviours by adding a new behaviour to the agent's repertoire. Furthermore,
this new behaviour has been chosen in such a manner that when executed, it concurrently di¬
minishes two deficits (hunger and tiredness); therefore introducing multiple solutions for the
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compensation of the agent's physiological deficits. Now it will be possible for the agent to
either sequentially execute to rest and to eat or to execute the new behaviour to reduce the
aforementioned drives.
Figure 5.16: This figure shows the physiological effect of executing a behaviour that compen¬
sates two drives (in red) in comparison with the effect of a behaviour that compensates only
one drive (in black). The cartesian representation stands for a two dimensional physiological
state, where x and y are the two deficits. Optimally, the agent's deficits should remain within the
optimal zone.
The top graphs in figure 5.17 show the evolution of the mean length of the behavioural
cycle throughout the simulation. The cycle starts at a random value of the physiological state,
and ends when the agent's drives are close to zero (have reached the optimal zone). The two
lines correspond to the two distributions of affordances LI and L2 described above (cf. figure
5.15), in red and blue, respectively. In a complementary fashion, the bottom graphs of the same
figure show the evolution of the viability indicators, physiological stability and overall comfort.
Both the length of the behavioural cycle and the viability indicators exhibit a similar tendency
that responds to a similar pattern to those shown in previous sections. Once the actor-critic
has learnt a rewarding policy, the length of the cycle diminishes, and the viability indicators
reduce their values, meaning that the agent has learnt to compensate its needs by selecting
the appropriate behaviour within the agent's repertoire. The graphs are the result of averaging
these metrics over 20 simulations.
The influence of adding one more behaviour has some effect, since the mean length of
the behavioural cycle is shorter than for the case of having only three behaviours (you can
compare with graphs in figure 5.11). Likewise, the viability indicators exhibit smaller values,
meaning that the addition of the new behaviour has increased the ways to correct a deficit and
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Figure 5.17: Top Graphs: Evolution of the Number of Decisions to Reach Goal for the distri¬
bution of affordances L1 and L2. The graphs represent the mean and variance, left and right,
respectively. Bottom Graphs: Evolution of the Physiological Stability and the Overall Comfort
(viability indicators), left and right, respectively.
consequently lowered the final viability values. However, in addition to these beneficial effects,
adding one more behaviour has also had an additional cost in terms of computation, since now
the actor-critic's state space extends over 4 dimensions, which explains the rise of the necessary
number of decisions to reach convergence, from 24 x 104 to 30 x 104.
Furthermore, given the lack of symmetry of the responses of behaviours to the homeostatic
variables, the analysis of cycles for this case must differ from the previous cases. As for the
previous experiments, the trials shown in this section aim at analysing the policies learnt by the
actor-critic. However, in order to attain this goal for this case, the comparison to motivation-
driven or stimulus-driven policies is simply not possible when every situation offers more than
one possible behavioural response. To solve this problem I need to relate to the formulation
of principles during the literature review. When introducing the actor-critic (see section 2.5.3),
I stated that the combination of stimuli to select behaviours would respond neither to a multi¬
plicative nor to an additive formulation of stimuli. Unlike this, the selection of behaviours in
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Figure 5.18: These graphs characterise the evolution of the relationship between the theoreti¬
cally most rewarding decision and the decision that the agent has learnt throughout the simula¬
tion. The graphs,for the left and central case, show, from top to bottom: the level of theoretical
functions (driven by reward), the actor-critic policies, the WTA of the theoretical policies, the
WTA of the real policies (every behaviour are drawn with the same colour as its policy (Red for
Eat, Green for Rest, Blue for Touch, Yellow for Drink, Cyan for Avoid). The graph on the right
shows the percentage of agreement between the theoretical and the stimulus driven throughout
the whole simulation.
ourmodel exhibits patterns arisen via interaction with the environment. This is in turn assessed
by the reward or punishment resulting from the execution of its behaviours, related to the stabil¬
ity of the agent's internal milieu. Therefore, if the best patterns are the most rewarding, it also
makes sense to compare this theoretical assumption to the real patterns obtained in simulation.
Therefore, our analysis has consisted of calculating the theoretically best behavioural response
at every encounter in terms of reward (top graphs, centre and middle groups, beginning and
end of the simulation, respectively) at every encounter and of comparing this with the decision
that the agent really made. The bottom graphs for the same groups show the theoretical winner
in terms of reward and the real responses learnt by the actor-critic. By comparing them, I can
observe their resemblance at the end of the simulation (central group of graphs).Therefore, this
demonstrates that if the object encountered affords two different behaviours to be performed,
the system executes the behaviour providing the most reward. For this case, the behavioural
response may also differ if the level of one homeostatic variable or another is already sated.
In equal affordance conditions, the actor-critic should learn to attend first to the homeostatic
variable exhibiting the highest deficit. These ideas reflect on the graphs on the right hand side,
which compare the degree of similarity of the theoretical and real decisional pattern for the dis¬
tributions LI and L2 throughout the simulation. The satiation of some homeostatic variables
(therefore the fast pace of decision making of the agent compared to the internal consumption)
leads to results that demonstrate that making the most rewarding decision is not necessary ap¬
proximately 40% of the time (cf. blue graph). The same effect can also be appreciated for the
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Figure 5.19: Representation of the Evolution of the Behavioural Cycles throughout the Learning
Process. Four different initial physiological states have been chosen. The bottom graph of each
pair shows the evolution of the effectiveness metric, calculated according to equation 5.8. The
initial state (hunger,tiredness,restlessness) is (0.9, 0.5, 0.8). The colours stand for: Red for Eat,
Green for Rest, Blue for Touch, Orange for Drink.).
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The analysis of cycles has been performed for a single case. The orange areas in figure
5.19 demonstrate that the actor-critic has been able to incorporate a fourth behaviour (labelled
as "to drink"), which compensates two different homeostatic variables. The final length of
the cycle is around 7. Furthermore, it can be observed that the final pattern consists of two
behaviours, to drink (orange colour), which compensates the variables nutrition and stamina
and the blue behaviour (touch), which compensates curiosity. This also indicates that this is
the most rewarding path to reach the viability zone and at the same time, the shortest path to
this end.
Beyond the learning effect, it can also be observed that the length of the simulation has
significantly increased due to the addition of one more behaviour. This is due to the extension,
by one more dimension, of the search space. As for the former cases, this could be palliated by
using an internal model in the need of scaling to higher dimensional spaces.
5.5 Learning Policies in an Asymmetric Architecture with Appeti¬
tive and Consummatory Behaviours
Previous experiments in this chapter have addressed the learning of patterns of decisions among
consummatory behaviours only. However, the integration of these with appetitive behaviours
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in the competition of the agent's actuators is still an unclear matter.
This section does not intend to provide a complete answer to this question, the reach of
which is very extensive. However, it does intend to highlight that the actor-critic can, under
some circumstances, learn to integrate appetitive and consummatory behaviours in a success¬
ful manner. I argue that there is a motivation related to each behaviour, both appetitive and
consummatory, within the agent's repertoire and that it is the beneficial combination in terms
of reward of appetitive and consummatory behaviours which makes this combination possible.
Mean Number of Decisions to Reach Goal
Figure 5.20: Top Graphs: Evolution of the Number of Decisions to Reach Goal forthe distribution
of affordances presented by figure 5.10 with an agent endowed with an appetitive behaviour:
to avoid. The graphs represent the mean and variance, left and right, respectively. Bottom
Graphs: Evolution of the Physiological Stability and the Overall Comfort (viability indicators), left
and right, respectively.
Time Steps (1 Step = 2000 Decisions)
Physiological Stability Overall Comfort
Time Steps (1 Step=2000 Decisions) (1 Step=2000 Decisions)
5.5.1 Integration Appetitive and Consummatory Behaviours
The integration of appetitive and consummatory behaviours is a problem extending in several
directions (Toates and Jensen, 1990). Although this problem has been addressed during the
last decade by several authors (Blumberg, 1997, 1994; Tyrrell, 1993), an appropriate solution
(1 Step = 2000 Decisions)
Variance Number of Decisions to Reach Goal
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to the problem is still missing. The main difficulty is the lack of perspective when formulating
the integration of appetitive and consummatory behaviours in a single motivational framework,
where behaviours compete with one another to gain control of the actuators. Related to this, the
first difficulty is the disagreement on the need of integrating both sorts of behaviours in the same
motivation driven framework, since some authors suggest that appetitive behaviours are not
motivation driven. In this respect, I adhere to the view ofMcFarland and Spier (1997) arguing
that "all behaviour of any animal will by definition will be guided by a motivational state".
Furthermore, I suggest that the integration of both sorts of behaviours is possible if considered
in a reinforcement learning framework. In such a framework, the execution of behaviours can
be assimilated to the transition between physiological states, for whose execution there no need
of immediate reward.
Policy Function Values Policy Function Values
Time Steps Time Steps
Figure 5.21: Top Graphs: Policy functions at the end of two different simulations, left and right,
respectively. The colours stand for the behaviours grasp (red), rest (green), touch (blue), drink
(cyan), avoid (orange). Every behaviour has also been labelled by numbers, from 0 to 4, as¬
signed in the same order, respectively. The bottom graphs display the WTA of the preference
functions shown in the figures above at the end of the same two simulations.
In order to test this, a fifth behaviour (to avoid) has been included in the architecture. Unlike
its competitors, it does not provoke any compensation of the physiological state. However,
in the same way as the rest of the behaviours, its execution does encompass a consumption
of internal resources. It is argued that this assumption is reasonable, since even though its
execution takes a shorter time than any consummatory behaviour, and does not imply anything
but the avoidance of the object, it still needs resources. Hence, this behaviour is competing
in equal conditions to consummatory behaviours at the moment of decision making though it
does not affect the internal physiology in the same manner. While the consummatory behaviour
may exert an internal deficit compensation, the appetitive behaviour is only helpful to situate
the agent to appropriately select a consummatory behaviour.
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The experimental framework has consisted of the same environment LI used in the pre¬
vious section. However, in addition to the affordance distribution of behaviour affordances,
every object affords to be avoided. The same agent, endowed with three homeostatic variables,
nutrition, stamina and curiosity, and three drives, hunger, tiredness and restlessness has been
used for simulation. The effect of every consummatory behaviour (to grasp, to shelter, to touch,
to drink) is 0.3 (a,*) in equation 4.1, and their decay constant of every homoestatic variable is
T = 10"3.
Figure 5.21 shows the policy functions at the end of two different simulations and demon¬
strates that the behaviour avoid has been learnt is selected in some situations. The avoid policy
values (orange line) has the same mean value as the resting of the consummatory behaviours.
This common mean value indicates that these are all competing in equal conditions and that
each of them is, depending on the input state, deliberately selected. In fact, it can be observed
that the behaviour four (to avoid) is selected on several occasions. In order to analyse the
circumstances of this decision making, the final cycles of this experiment are shown in figure
5.22. The patterns displayed in this figure correspond to two trials using the same simulation
parameters. The top patterns show an overall view throughout both simulations, from begin¬
ning to end. The bottom patterns show the final cycles of this simulation. The colours in this
figure are assigned in the following manner: red (grasp), green (shelter), blue (touch), magenta
(drink) and yellow (avoid). In both bottom patterns, it can be observed that the behaviour avoid
has been integrated into the decision patterns, although it is not as frequent as its consumma¬
tory competitors. This demonstrates that this behaviour can be convenient from the perspective
of reward. In other words, for a certain distribution of afifordances, there will be situations
where the need of the agent cannot be met by the object encountered. In this moment, instead
of attempting the execution of any consummatory behaviour, which would fail and leave the
need unsatisfied, it may be more intelligent to avoid the object and to search for another object,
more appropriate to the agent's needs. This decision will spare the consumption of internal
resources. The results show that this reasoning emerges naturally from the relationship to the
environment in the agent's behavioural patterns.
The results introduced in this section do not justify every case of appetitive behaviour;
whose integration with consummatory ones should be analysed on an individual basis. How¬
ever, it has demonstrated that the actor-critic, via the principle of ecology, can learn to integrate
this single appetitive behaviour in equal conditions to its consummatory competitors in its de¬
cision patterns. This issue completes the cases of study considered for the actor-critic and
confirms its adaptivity to a variety of architectures and environments. This issue is further
completed in the chapter's conclusion.
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Figure 5.22: Representation of the Evolution of the Behavioural Cycles throughout the Learning
Process. The learning cycle has always been started at the same initial physiological set of
values: (hunger,tiredness,restlessness) are (0.9, 0.5, 0.8). The top graphs show the evolution
of the execution cycle throughout the whole simulation :every cycle starts at a random value
of the agent's physiological state and finishes when the optimal zone has been reached. The
colours stand for the behaviours grasp (red), shelter (green), touch (blue), drink (cyan), avoid
(orange). The cycles below show the last 150 behavioural cycles of the cases shown above.
The dotted graphs in red show the evolution of the effectiveness of the behaviour executions,
calculated according to equation 5.8.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a biologically inspired model that is designed to learn to select
behaviours. I have addressed high-level behaviour selection by implementing the hypothesis
of DA mediating Pavlovian learning in the Basal Ganglia (BG) and extending this to the case
of instrumental learning. In order to test this hypothesis, a learning framework including the
actor-critic has been modelled together with a series of modules simulating an artificial phys¬
iology, which have been integrated in a single architecture. The architecture, implemented in
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a simulated robot, has been tested in a set of simulated environments reproducing a variety
of ethologically significant situations. The environments have been characterised according to
their distribution and availability of resources (affordances); these range from the abundant to
the scarce and from the stimulus driven to the motivation driven.
The learning architecture has been conceived as an extension of the perception architec¬
ture proposed in the previous chapter, however focusing on the behaviour selection and related
processes that modulate to adapt to the environment. To this end, the architecture has not
imposed any further constraint on the combination of stimuli than the relationship to the en¬
vironment that is perceived via the reward that results from executing behaviours. Therefore,
in this case there is no specific formula to combine stimuli but solely a sense (the simulated
DA signal) that evaluates the choice and performance of every behaviour. In order to test this
approach, the experiments in this chapter have addressed: the integration of external and in¬
ternal stimuli in a variety of situations, the quickness of the learning process, and the quality
of the adaptation via the behavioural analysis of the patterns learnt by the agent. This analysis
initiates with an architecture consisting of three homeostatic variables, three drives and three
behaviours; each of them related in a one to one fashion, e.g., the homeostatic variable nu¬
trition expresses its status of deficit or excess via the drive hunger; both are compensated via
executing the behaviour to eat. The actor-critic has demonstrated for both a stimulus driven
and a motivation driven environment, that appropriate behavioural patterns can be learnt by
interacting with the environment in a trial and error manner to maintain homeostasis (keep the
physiological variables within their optimal values). This same analysis has been extended to
two particular cases. Firstly, to an agent endowed with a new behaviour: to drink, the execution
of which compensates several homeostatic variables. Secondly to the integration of appetitive
and consummatory behaviours in a common competition for the agent's resources. For the
aforementioned situations, the actor-critic and the learning paradigm have demonstrated that
they are able to provide behavioural patterns that adapt the agent to this scenario, and to do so
in such a manner that the agent's internal physiology remains stable.
The metrics and the presentation of results have been chosen to capture significant elements
in the adaptation process to make them comparable to the methods used in ethology. In this
respect, it is clear that the biological inspiration used to design the model does not suffice to
explain several ethological phenomena; e.g., the combination of several appetitive behaviours
in a single competition process is still limited. In this respect, it is important to highlight
that this is a basic architecture aimed at understanding the way stimuli combine for a robotic
application. Therefore, a single layered architectural behaviour has been considered for this
aim. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached within this chapter suggest that this same architec¬
ture could be extended to build a multi-layered behavioural architecture where behaviours can
self-organise according to their similarities, assessed by the environment, by using the same
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learning paradigm.
The model introduced is inspired after the principle of ecology and after the learning hy¬
pothesis of the DA neurotransmitter as a effective reinforcement signal. These, supported by
the results, suggest that learning and decision making are two complementary processes, in¬
grained in the hierarchy of adaption. Consequently, this leads one to view the several sorts of
learning commonly classified as different processes in the psychological literature as particular
cases of learning in a framework of ecological adaptation. The experiments have demonstrated
that the learning process is a balancing process relating both sorts of stimuli with a single goal:
homeostasis, hence maintaining the internal physiology within the viability range. Our main
contribution to this understanding consists of viewing this process as a single dynamical pro¬
cess, where the dynamics of perception, internal physiology and interaction are sub-dynamics
interacting with one another. Within this framework, this chapter has studied the effect of a
variety of environments, demonstrating that the actor-critic can adapt to abundant and scarce
environments as long as interaction is frequent enough to guarantee that its learning procedures
can modify the behavioural patterns to survive. At a neurological level, these results suggest
that the part of the brain participating in Pavlovian learning may also actively participate in the
arbitration of motivation-mediated behaviours. However, this conclusion does extend to reflex
movements or non-voluntary actions, since I argue that their execution is not based on reward.
Finally, it is argued that relevance of stimuli (measured in terms of reward) and habituation
are fundamental to providing a sensible explanation for the motives that integrate external and
internal stimuli in the way nature does. The learning process in this chapter has been mostly
studied from the perspective of the environment. What changes in the agent's behavioural
patterns are provoked by a change of the environment? However, there is a whole other set of
elements affecting this process, the dynamics of the same agent's internal physiology. These
are elements addressed in the next experimental chapter.
Chapter 6
Internal Modulation of Behavioural
Patterns
The previous chapter has addressed the influence of the distribution and availability of envi¬
ronmental affordances in the learning of the actor-critic algorithm. The behavioural patterns
arising from the interaction of the perception of external stimuli with the internal bodily dynam¬
ics have been assessed by measuring the physiological stability reached by each of them. These
experiments have demonstrated that for the given environments, the actor-critic is capable of
learning behavioural patterns and therefore capable of adapting on demand to the environment
in a manner that fits ethological data. However, some patterns of animal behaviour cannot
be understood if the environment is the only parameter considered experimentally. The be¬
haviours of an animal exhibit large patterns of variation which can be better explained if both
the internal and the external stimuli are considered as sources of adaptation. Therefore, in a
complementary fashion to the preceding, this chapter focuses on the dynamics of the agent's
internal physiology as a bias for adaptation. This process has been studied in the framework
of a model, built to provide experimental data that help our understanding of how adaptive
behavioural patterns emerge out of the combination of external and internal stimuli.
In an analogous fashion to previous ethological models, which were tested on robotic plat¬
forms (Spier and McFarland, 1996), I have embedded ours in a simulated robot for testing
purposes. However, unlike for its previous counterparts, the goal of the experiments presented
here is the study of the influence of the dynamics of the agent's internal physiology on its
behavioural patterns. This relationship is one of the fundamental processes controlling the
relationship of any animal with its niche.
The motivational model introduced in the previous chapter (see section 6.1) integrates in¬
ternal and external stimuli in a single motivational state (Toates, 1986), which is used for learn¬
ing and decision making in the context of an actor-critic. Previous experiments have indirectly
tackled a qualitative idea of the influence of the internal physiological dynamics on the learning
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LEARNING AND BEHAVIOUR SELECTION ARCHITECTURE
SENSORY PERCEPTION
Figure 6.1: Architecture for Behaviour Selection and Learning. It consists of an internal physiol¬
ogy, a module to learn affordances, a behaviour repertoire and a set of actuators.
speed and on the behavioural patterns, but do not provide a quantitative account of these ef¬
fects. This chapter aims at covering these deficiencies by studying a set of representative cases
of modulation of behavioural patterns by the internal physiological dynamics. At this moment,
it is important to note that among the different sorts of feedback provided by the environment,
only reward has been considered. The notion of reward has been broadly addressed in the pre¬
vious chapters. However, it is important to point out that reward is is in fact the simplest and
most widespread sort of feedback in the animal world; animals ranging from a simple amoeba
to higher vertebrates experience some type of feedback, which can be assimilated to some sort
of reward, refer to section 4.2. Formally, I have adopted the following definition of reward:
"an operational concept for discovering the positive and negative values that a creature as¬
cribes to an object, a behavioural act or an internal physiological state" (Schultz et al., 1997).
I argue that this value association is the cause of the modification of high-level goal-directed
behavioural patterns, hence a method to improve the agent's adaptation. This argument is anal¬
ysed in this chapter in the context of mobile robotics by considering the ecological principle as
a boundary for acceptable solutions.
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section introduces the elements of the model
concerning the characterisation of the agent's internal physiology and the context of study. This
is followed by a description of the experimental setup preceding the experimental section.
6.1. Background Considerations 139
6.1 Background Considerations
6.1.1 Modelling Internal Physiology
This section reviews the concepts of internal physiology with special emphasis on their influ¬
ence on the learning and behaviour selection processes. The reader can refer to chapter 3 for a
general overview of the model, to chapter 4 for further information about the manner in which
perception has been modelled and to chapter 5 for a description of the learning and behaviour
selection model, respectively. In a complementary fashion, this section will solely focus on the
internal elements of modulation of the behavioural patterns, the physiological space (McFar-
land and Sibly, 1975), consisting of the homeostatic variables, their related drives and on their
integration with the rest of the model.
Figure 6.1 shows an overview of the model. The homeostatic variables and their related
drives are included in the internal physiology module. These variables represent the agent's
internal resources, governed by the following dynamics (I repeat the equation from chapter 4
for convenience):
ZiVi = -Vi + Ytctik8(t-tj), (6.1)
j
where V-, is the value of the homeostatic variable i and T,■ its related decay constant. The value
of the variable is also affected by the execution of behaviours at times tj. In case of a behaviour
being successful, it provokes an instantaneous rise of a,*, k is the index of behaviour b\. and
i the index of the ith homeostatic variable. The homeostatic variables express their status of
deficit or excess through one or more related drives, as shown by
A = t a^VKP ~ Vk) + I bjVj, (6.2)
£=1 7=1
in its most general case. Vkop is the optimal value of the k'h related homeostatic variable. This
relationship has been simplified in order to facilitate the analysis by associating every drive to
a single homeostatic variable (there is a single index k in the first addition) and the dependence
on the derivative of the homeostatic variable has been suppressed (bj = OVj).
Di = ai(Viop-Vi), (6.3)
which can also be expressed as
Dit = ai((Vit_l-(l/xi)Vik_l)-Vior), (6.4)
in its discretised form for simulation. Therefore, in this model the regulation of each of the
agent's drives depends on two parameters', the Vop (optimal value or variable's set point) and
the T (decay constant) of its related variable. The system is endowed with three homeostatic
variables: nutrition, stamina and curiosity, related one-to-one to the following drives: hunger,
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tiredness and restlessness, respectively. The next section introduces two cases for the study of
the influence of the internal stimuli in the process of behaviour selection and learning: stimulus
driven and motivation driven.
6.1.2 Stimulus vs. Motivation Driven Learning and Behaviour Selection
The interaction between external and internal stimuli leads to behavioural patterns ranging from
the stimulus driven (also called reactive) to the motivation driven, which are solely controlled
by the agent's internal drives. Under normal circumstances, it seems reasonable that the result¬
ing behavioural patterns would respond to a composite from both the demands of the internal
physiology and the offers from the environment. In other words I adhere to the view that a good
behaviour selection strategy should exhibit the right amounts of persistence and opportunism
(McFarland and Spier, 1997; Tyrrell, 1993; Maes, 1991). Persistence is the capacity of contin¬
uing the execution of a behaviour the right amount of time and opportunism is the capacity of
profiting from external stimuli despite having to contradict internal physiological advice (the
drives).
I hypothesise that the actor-critic can naturally learn behavioural patterns exhibiting the
right amounts ofpersistence and opportunism. The actor-critic maximises reward, in terms of
which it has to learn to maintain the balance between stimulus and motivation driven behaviour
selection strategies. In other words, this means persisting in the execution of a behaviour until
its related homeostatic variable reaches its set point and to respond to the object affordances of¬
fered by the environment. However, following the tendency suggested by internal and external
stimuli will often lead to incompatibilities. In these terms, it seems reasonable that opportunis¬
tic behaviour should dominate when the resources in the environment are scarce compared to
the decay rate of its internal variables (see section 5.4). For example, a high need for food will
be continuously expressed in the motivational state, thus biasing the selection of behaviours
contributing to palliate this need when the environment affords to do so to the agent. These are
demanding situations to address if the environment is not abundant in every sort of resource re¬
quired by the agent. This can be perceived if I consider that the agent has often a single choice,
the behaviour afforded by the stimulus. Therefore, if the encountered stimuli do not afford the
behaviour to compensate the drive exhibiting the highest value, this may lead to values of the
viability indicators, which could rise over the agent's lethal boundaries. Not for nothing did
these situations exhibit the largest Risk of Death (RoD) (Avila-Garcia and Canamero, 2004).
The actor-critic is hypothesised to provide patterns exhibiting opportunism and persistence
that maximise reward by balancing the effect of the environment and of the internal physio¬
logical dynamics. If experiments in the previous chapter focused on the effect provoked by
changes in the environment, this concentrates on the effect due to fluctuations of the agent's
internal physiology at a behavioural level. This has been partly addressed by studying the
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effect of the environment on the behavioural patterns in the previous chapter. In a complemen¬
tary fashion, the experiments shown in this chapter address a quantification of the relationship
between the agent's physiological dynamics and the behavioural patterns in two different sce¬
narios. The first scenario represents an abundant environment where every object affords each
behaviour to the agent. The second is a scarce environment only containing objects affording a
single behaviour. As explained above, these two environments should give rise to reactive and
motivation driven behavioural patterns, which are two extreme cases in terms of their distribu¬
tions of resources, and should also lead to radically different strategies for behaviour selection.
Furthermore, as a conclusion to the chapter, it also shows some experiments to survey the in¬
fluence of the amount of compensatory effect on the homeostatic variables and therefore on
the agent's adaptation. The next section introduces the experiments studying the effect of the
dynamics of the agent's internal physiology on the learning and behaviour selection processes.
6.2 Experiments
6.2.1 Experimental Setup
The goal of the experiments is to analyse the influence of the internal bodily dynamics in the
process of learning and behaviour selection. To this end, a simulated environment containing
10 objects has been engineered. Object encounters have been also simulated to minimise the
simulation time. Therefore, objects are presented at random to the agent with equal frequency,
and this executes a behaviour in a simulated time every time this happens. The agent's goal is
to learn to keep its internal physiology stable, i.e., to reach its optimal physiological zone. To
do so, the agent learns to execute sequences of behaviours in cycles, starting at a random point
of its physiological space and finishing when its optimal physiological zone has been reached.
At this moment the next cycle is started by resetting each homeostatic variable. It is expected
that the learning process should statistically reduce the length of the cycle until reaching an
optimal value.
The results have been analysed from a dual perspective. On the one hand, the internal
physiology is monitored via the viability indicators; physiological stability and overall comfort
(see equations 4.14 and 4.15). On the other, I have drawn the cycles of execution of behaviours
and the measure of effectiveness during the execution of behaviours (see equation 5.8) for
the different decay values (t) considered. In order to isolate the effect of the dynamics of
the internal physiology on the agent's behavioural responses, the amount of compensation a,*
caused by the execution of behaviour bk (if it is successful) on variable V) has been fixed to
0.3, being the only parametrisation in addition to the variable's decay constant T,. This latter
parameter rules the pace of consumption of the agent's internal resources and should therefore
influence the agent to interact to the environment. These effects are studied in two different
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niches; in an abundant and in a scarce environment. These are introduced in the next two
subsections.
6.2.2 Motivation Driven Opportunistic Agents
This section studies the influence of the agent's physiology on the learning and selection pat¬
terns for the case of an abundant environment. In this niche, every object affords every be¬
haviour to be performed to our agent. This distribution of affordances is fixed throughout every
simulation presented in this section; however, in order to test the influence of the internal phys¬
iological parameters on the learning process, two different physiological situations have been
considered. Firstly, three sets of trials, where each homeostatic variable assumes the same x
value: 3 x 10~3, 10~3 and 10~4 for every set of trials, respectively. Secondly, the fourth set
of experiments will test the effect of having different decay constants for each homeostatic
variable.
For the cases of having homogeneous decay constant values, figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the
evolution of the mean cycle length and of the evolution of the viability parameters, respectively.
The evolution of the cycle length over the simulation (cf. figure 6.2) shows that the learning
response depends on the decay of the homeostatic variables (x) for the values of x = 3 x 10-3,
x = 10~3 and x = 10~4.
The larger its value, the longer needs the robot to minimise the length of the cycle. The
final mean number of decisions varies between 5 and 7 and its variance between 2 and 3,
depending on the decay constant. Furthermore, I can guarantee that for the given scenario any
decision has an effect on the internal physiological dynamics (unless the satiation boundary
has been reached) since any object affords every behaviour to be executed. Furthermore, these
viability values are the lowest boundary values that can be reached by this agent provided that
the amount of compensation by any behaviour is fixed at a„t=0.3. Furthermore, it has been
experimentally demonstrated that the actor-critic diverges for x values larger than 3 x 10-3 (for
the given a% value). When all three homeostatic variables decay this fast, the compensatory
effect due to behaviour's execution is not sufficient to compensate their related deficits, which
leads to the death of the agent.
In a similar fashion, figure 6.3 shows that X has a similar effect on both the physiological
stability and the overall comfort. These indicators improve (diminish their values) when the
decay constant exhibits its lowest values. Their stationary values exhibit the same pattern. The
stability ranges lower than 0.1, and the overall comfort under 0.005. These are the lowest
values that can be reached for the given experimental setup.
However, in order to reach conclusions about the influence of the physiology it is necessary
to analyse the resulting behavioural patterns. To this end, figure 6.4 compares the matching be¬
tween the learnt patterns and purely motivation driven ones. The graphs obtained demonstrate
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Mean # Decisions per Cycle
Figure 6.2: Mean length of the behavioural cycle for the case of the abundant behaviour, mean
and variance, left and right, respectively. The x-axis is time, measured in number of decisions.
The tick values are divided by 2000 (multiply by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions).
The y-axes is the length of the learning cycle.
Figure 6.3: Effect of Internal Modulation on the Evolution of the Viability Indicators, physiological
stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively. The x-axis is time, measured in number
of decisions. The tick vaiues are normalised by a factor of 2000. The tick values are divided by
2000 (multiply by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions). The y-axis are the physiological
stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively.
that for the case of this abundant environment and for the given decay constants and a,* pa¬
rameters, the learnt patterns are close to being exclusively driven by the agent's physiology. To
understand how the calculations have been performed, it is necessary to consider that in this
architecture and experimental setup every behaviour is related one-to-one to a drive. In other
words, this graph shows the percentage of matching between the behaviour selected at time t
and the behaviour related to the drive exhibiting its highest value at time t (the one expressing
the highest urgency). At the end of the simulation the percentage of matching is around 90%
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which means that the agent's internal drives are controlling the strategy to select behaviours.
Informally, the agent has learnt to serve its most urgent drive. This pattern is consistent if I
consider that any object in this abundant environment affords every behaviour to the agent.
Therefore, any decision that matches the agent's internal needs (motivation driven) will be
rewarding independently of the sensory input.
0 50 100 150 200 250
# Decisions
% of Motivation Driven Decision Pattern
Figure 6.4: Evolution of the percentage of motivation-driven decision pattern. Since each be¬
haviour is related one-to-one to a drive, this indicates the percentage of decisions where the
behaviour selected corresponds to the drive exhibiting the highest urgency, therefore the per¬
centage of decisions driven by the internal drive values.
The first three sets of experiments have demonstrated that the internal physiology in this
environment has a clear effect on the learning performance and that the learnt behavioural pat¬
terns are primarily motivation driven if the resources are abundant in their scenario. However,
more experiments have to be performed in order to assess the types of responses that the in¬
ternal physiology provokes at a behavioural level. To this aim, a fourth set of experiments has
been used for comparison with the former. In this case the decay constant of each homeostatic
variable is different: the level of nutrition of the first agent decreases very fast (T = 3 x 10~3),
its level of stamina decreases at an intermediate pace (x = 10~3) and its level of restlessness
decreases very slowly (x = 10~4). Does the agent serve more often the behaviour whose related
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homeostatic variable decays faster? The evolution of the mean length of the cycle of execution
to reach the viability zone and the evolution of the viability parameters are presented in figures
6.5 and 6.6, respectively.
Mean # Decisions per Cycle Variance # Decisions per Cycle
Figure 6.5: Mean length of the behavioural cycle for the case of the abundant environment,
mean and variance, left and right, respectively. The x-axis is time, measured in number of
decisions. The tick values are normalised by a factor of 2000. The tick values are divided by
2000 (multiply by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions). The y-axis is the length of the
learning cycle.
Figure 6.5 shows the mean and the variance of the cycle length averaged over 20 simu¬
lations. The results obtained from this fourth set of experiments are compared to two of the
former cases (symmetric X = 10~3 and X = 10~4). It shows that the results for this case lie
between the two former cases.
Figure 6.6 shows the evolution of the viability indicators, physiological balance and overall
comfort, for this fourth set of experiments. The values are compared to two of the simulation
sets performed with an agent endowed with the same x decay constant for every one of its
homeostatic variables, x = 3x 10~3 and X = 10~4, respectively. Consistently with the graphs in
figure 6.5, the viability indicators improve throughout the simulation in a manner that averages
both the former cases. This is due to the fact that the mean decay value of the three asymmetric
X values lies between the two symmetric x values, which suggests that the actor-critic is learning
patterns which are an average of the patterns exhibited in the two cases used for comparison. To
confirm this, it is necessary to observe the behavioural patterns obtained in both cases. These
are shown in figure 6.7. On the left hand side, the case of having the three symmetric x values
equal to 10-3, on the right hand side the aforementioned asymmetric distribution of X.
Cycles of Execution The pattern has been executed by starting at the point (0.1, 0.5, 0.5),
where each coordinate stands for the hunger, tiredness and restlessness drive values, respec-





Figure 6.6: Effect of Internal Modulation on the Evolution of the Viability Indicators, physiological
stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively. The x-axis is time, measured in number
of decisions. The tick values are normalised by a factor of 2000. The tick values are divided by
2000 (multiply by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions). The y-axis are the physiological
stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively.
Figure 6.7: The top graphs represent the evolution of the behavioural cycles for the case of t =
3 x 10~3 for each variable and for the case of nutrition (x = 3 x 10~3), stamina (x — 10~3) and
restlessness (x= 10~4)), left and right, respectively. The bottom graph shows the effectiveness
of the behaviour execution. The behaviours are represented by colour: red (grasp), green (to
shelter) and blue (touch).
tively. Therefore, every time the cycle starts, the agent experiences a high need for nutritional
supplements as expressed by the value of its related drive. This reflects on the behavioural
patterns independently of the agent's internal physiological parameters. The pattern shows the
evolution of the sequence of execution of behaviours from beginning to the end of the sim¬
ulation. Each cycle is represented by a vertical line flowing from top to bottom, where the
execution of every behaviour is represented as a dot, in red, green and blue for the behaviours
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eat, rest and touch, respectively. The patterns in figure 6.7 show that the pattern becomes
shorter after 150 iterations. This means that the behavioural pattern is starting to be effective
(as expressed by the red dots drawn below —their optimal value is 0.4 and for both cases, the
final value reached is about 0.35). The influence of the internal physiology is noticeably. The
cycle on the right hand side exhibits a lot more red colour (more executions of the grasping
behaviour), which means that an agent becoming hungrier at a very fast pace also learns to
compensate this need by executing the behaviour grasping more frequently. In terms of persis¬
tence, it can be argued that the execution of a behaviour is maintained until its physiological
needs are covered.
These results, obtained in four different cases, demonstrate that the internal physiological
dynamics do exert an influence on the learning process and on the final learnt behavioural pat¬
terns. However, this holds when the sensory input carries no information, since the niche has
been designed in a manner that any object affords to do anything to the agent. Therefore, it
could be expected that the internal physiological dynamics do influence the agent's learning
and decision processes. In order to complete this view, the opposite case of niche has been
considered, a second environment with a particular distribution of affordances. In this case the
sensory input does carry some information that the agent has to learn to consider to make deci¬
sions. However, what is the influence of the internal dynamics in this case? This is addressed
in the next section.
6.3 Stimulus Driven Behaviour
To complete the comparative analysis introduced in the experiments of the previous section, the
experiments presented here are performed in an environment where each object affords a single
behaviour to be executed. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the learning of behavioural
patterns for such environments turns out to he more difficult, since the only reasonable choice in
terms of reward consists of reacting to the offered affordance (see section 5.4). The distribution
of affordances used for the experiments in this section is shown in figure 6.8.
Therefore, if the behavioural pattern is correctly learnt, the expected response should ignore
the internal physiological dynamics independently of its t decay values. To test this, three sets
of experiments have been parametrised after X. In each set of experiments the three decay
constants of the three homeostatic variables have been endowed with the same value. The x
values for each set of experiments have been 2 x 10-3, 10~~3 and 10"4.
Figure 6.9 shows the evolution of the length of the cycle obtained by averaging 10 simula¬
tions for each x value. These results confirm that the cycle grows longer when the x becomes
larger. Furthermore, it also takes longer to learn for high t values. It is important to notice that
patterns to maximise reward arise in this environment only when the decay constant is smaller
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Behavior Affordances
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Figure 6.8: Scarce Distribution of affordances. The line indicates the interval of object size
where that affordance is 1.0. G, S and T stand for grasping, shelter and interact, respectively.
Object sizes range from 0.0 to 0.1.
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Figure 6.9: Mean length of the behavioural cycle for the case of the abundant environment,
mean and variance, left and right, respectively. The x-axis is time, measured in number of
decisions. The tick values are normalised by a factor of 2000. The tick values are divided by
2000 (multiply by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions). The y-axis is the length of the
learning cycle.
than x = 2 x 10~3. The evolution of the cycle length for this x value is plotted in blue, which al¬
ready exhibits a noticeable longer time until stationarity and strong oscillations during the first
half of the simulation. The main reason for the reduction of the range of X values arises from
the fact that this environment is far more hostile than the abundant environment. In this case
it does not permit the agent to perform the behaviour it needs to compensate its most urgent
drive. Instead, it is forcing the agent to, at most, react to the offered affordances in a manner
that may not be appropriate to the agent's needs.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the viability indicators shown in figure 6.10. Again,
Mean # Decisions per Cycle
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Figure 6.10: Effect of Internal Modulation on the Evolution of the Viability Indicators, physiologi¬
cal stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively. These values have been measured
for the case of a scarce environment. The x-axis is time, measured in number of decisions. The
tick values are normalised by a factor of 2000. The tick values are divided by 2000 (multiply
by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions). The y-axis are the physiological stability and
overall comfort, left and right, respectively.
# Decisions
Physiological Stability Overall Comfort
these graphs are the result of averaging over 10 simulations each. The graph of the physiolog¬
ical stability shows that optimal (minimal) values are reached when the cycle of execution
reaches its shortest length. Their stationary values are for all three cases under 0.1 (10% of
the range of the drives). The graph on the right hand side indicates the overall comfort, which
again exhibits how the deficits vary throughout simulation. Despite having a rough start, the
final stationary values lie within 0.01, which can be considered as extremely good (less than
1% of the range of the drives). These figures together with figure 6.9 suggest that the dynamics
of learning process and of the viability indicators are intrinsically related. However, reaching
further conclusions requires some further exploration.
To this end, I have analysed the patterns of behaviour selection by comparing them with
two extreme behavioural cases: a purely stimulus driven behavioural pattern and a purely mo¬
tivation driven behavioural pattern. The method applied consists of comparing every decision
of the pattern learnt by the agent with a reactive and a motivation driven pattern. Figure 6.11
shows these comparisons, left and right, respectively.
These show that the internal physiological dynamics has severe implications on the learning
process, as depending on the internal rhythm, the behavioural pattern resembles more a reactive
pattern or a motivation-driven pattern. For large t values, such as 2 x 10~~3 and 10~3, the
influence of the stimulus grows over time and is maintained throughout the entire simulation.
However, for the smallest value 1CT4 (line in red) it consistently grows until reaching 80%
of the stimulus-driven pattern and then decreases until 50%. I suggest that there is a double
150 Chapter 6. Internal Modulation of Behavioural Patterns
% of Stimulus Driven Decision Pattern % of Motivation Driven Decision Pattern
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Figure 6.11: Percentage of matching of matching between the learnt behavioural patterns in a
scarce environment and the purely stimulus or motivation driven behavioural patterns, left and
right, respectively. These values are compared for three different values of t x = 3 x 10~3,
t — 1 X 10"3, t= 10"4.
effect. Firstly the patterns are learnt, however, the more efficient these are, the more sated is the
agent and therefore, the least needed is that efficiency in selecting the right behaviour. Since
x is very small, the reward that results from executing the reactive behaviour suggested by the
stimulus may not be incentive enough for its execution. For the case of very slight physiological
decays, it may not be necessary to execute a consummatory behaviour at every opportunity,
hence choosing instead any behaviour may not have a negative effect in this particular case.
The difference between left and right graphs may suggest that a loss in reactivity turns into
a gain of drive-driven behavioural pattern. However, if our previous assumption is correct,
this conclusion would only be partly right, since both the gain in drive influence and the loss
of affordance influence would be a result of the lack of necessity of the agent to perform a
behaviour, therefore just a consequence of physiological constant decays that are very slow. In
a way, this also suggests that the agent has learnt to balance the opportunism and persistence.
Opportunism to react appropriately to the given stimuli and persistence to continue executing
the same pattern, since it leads to more stable physiological values (as shown in figure 6.10).
These conclusions, however, have been reached only for the case of a symmetric distribu¬
tion of decay values. To extend this to a more general case, a fourth set of experiments has
been performed where each homeostatic variable is endowed with a different x decay value.
For this case, the level of nutrition of the first agent decreases very fast (2 x 10~3), its level
of stamina decreases at an intermediate pace (10~3) and its level of restlessness decreases the
slowest (10~4).
The final behavioural patterns exhibit again an appropriate level of persistence and of op¬
portunism. Figure 6.12 shows the evolution of the mean length of the cycle of execution from
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Figure 6.12: Mean length of the behavioural cycle for the case of the abundant environment,
mean and variance, left and right, respectively. The x-axis is time, measured in number of
decisions. The tick values are normalised by a factor of 2000. The tick values are divided by
2000 (multiply by 2000 to get the actual number of decisions). The y-axis is the length of the
learning cycle.
a random starting point to the agent's optimal zone (each curve has been obtained by averaging
over 10 simulations) for the case of asymmetric decay constants (in green), and compares its
behaviour with the cases of x = 2 x 10~3 and x = 10~4. The green line shows that the length of
the cycle decreases until it reaches a stationary value, which is nearly independent of the decay
constant. This is important, since when I pay attention to the viability indicators, cf. figure
6.13, there are significant differences between the three cases, laying the case of asymmetric
decay constants between the two boundary cases (the graphs are obtained by averaging over
10 simulations). In fact, the smaller the decay constant of the related homeostatic variable the
smaller the values of physiological stability and overall comfort.
In order to ground this difference, it is necessary to pay some attention to the behavioural
patterns studied in the three preceding cases, where the x was the same for each homeostatic
variable. When comparing the behavioural patterns in figure 6.11, I observe a shift of the
behavioural patterns from more stimulus driven to more motivation driven. This change is
probably due to satiation; the better the patterns, the more reward it will get and the more
stable will be the agent's physiology. Therefore, it is likely that every homeostatic variable
will from then onwards be constantly sated. In such a state there is no difference in terms of
physiological stability and it can be argued that the performance of any behaviour, either more
stimulus driven or more motivation driven, has no effect either in terms of stability or in terms
of reward, since there is no need for a particular behaviour's execution.
Figure 6.14 illustrates the behavioural patterns obtained in simulation for two different
cases. For the first one, its homeostatic variables decay with the same X value equal to 10~3;
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Figure 6.13: Effect of Internal Modulation on the Evolution of the Viability Indicators, physio¬
logical stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively. The x-axis are the number of
decisions considered analogously to time. The tick values are normalised by a factor of 2000.
The y-axis are the physiological stability and overall comfort, left and right, respectively
# Decisions # Decisions
Physiological Stability Overall Comfort
for the second agent, the variables are endowed with the asymmetric values introduced above.
Evolution of the Sequence of Behaviours Evolution of the Sequence of Behaviours
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Figure 6.14: Evolution of the percentage of motivation-driven and stimulus-driven decision pat¬
tern. Since each behaviour is related one-to-one to a drive, and every affordance is by def¬
inition related to a single behaviour, these graphs show the percentages of decisions where
the behaviour selected corresponds to the drive exhibiting the highest urgency (left) and the
percentage of reactive behaviour (on the right hand side).
The patterns show cycles starting always at the same point of the physiological space: (0.1,
0.5, 0.5), the coordinates of which stand for hunger, tiredness and restlessness, respectively.
Therefore, at the beginning of every cycle, the homeostatic variables are reset to the following
values: nutrition to 0.9, stamina to 0.5 and boredom to 0.5. It can be observed that in the case
of having different X decay constants (cf. pattern on the left in figure 6.14), the agent leams to
responds faster to those homeostatic variables experiencing a faster depletion. This is shown
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by more executions of the behaviour shelter (green). The behaviour to grasp is executed less
frequently than the rest, despite having a larger x constant, this homeostatic variable is sated
at the beginning of the cycle. It can be observed that the cycles at the end of the simulation
rarely start with the execution of this behaviour; the few cycles in which this happens are
due to random selection. Conversely, for the case of having homogeneous X decay constants
(cf. pattern on the right in figure 6.14), the patterns appear to contain frequent executions of
the behaviours shelter and touch (green and blue), and slightly less executions of the behaviour
grasp (red). This may suggest that effectively, the cycle tends to respond to the needs expressing
the highest urge; in this case to shelter and interact.
These results demonstrate that the internal physiological dynamics do exert an influence
during the learning process and on the final behavioural patterns. Furthermore, the effects ob¬
served in these results confirm that the dynamics of the agent and of the environment are part of
a single dynamics, where needs and availability of resources influence the manner in which we
interact with the environment. These also show that it is the combined influence of the external
and internal stimuli that determines the patterns. It does not suffice to explain that the most
restrictive of both stimuli, the external or the internal, drives the decision making (this could
be explained via the affordance x drives multiplicative formula to calculate the intensity of
the related motivations). However, this multiplicative rule does not explain stimulus driven
behaviour (according to the formula, the intensity of this motivation should be zero if the drive
is zero); a behaviour that the actor-critic has been demonstrated to be able to learn. This has
been demonstrated to hold for the case of having a symmetric effect value (afor every be¬
haviour, furthermore when the effect is related to the reward by the formula introduced in figure
5.2. This also demonstrates that both the environment and the dynamics of the agent's internal
physiology influence the learning process and the resulting behavioural patterns. However, the
actor-critic has shown that the resulting learnt behavioural patterns do exhibit an appropriate
level of persistence and opportunism for the set of environments and for the physiology used
for simulation.
Nevertheless, these results are a consequence of the assumption that behaviours contribut¬
ing to the internal physiological stability are to be considered good and are therefore associated
to a positive reward value. Otherwise the value is negative. This may not necessarily always
be the case, since there is not a unique relationship between the effect of a behaviour and the
reward I experience. This is introduced in the next section.
6.4 From Effect to Reward
The term reward has been so far used in an abstract sense that refers to the event consistently
following the presentation of a stimulus. However, reward is a broad concept with significant
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cognitive implications. Reward can also be referred to as the valency Ackley and Littman
(1991), which is the affective interpretation of the physiological effect provoked by the execu¬
tion of a behaviour. This sense may have arisen because it facilitates survival in a competitive
niche. It is straightforward that animals that associate a good feeling to behaviours that improve
their physiological state have a larger probability of surviving than others. This is an enhanced
solution to the need of maintaining physiological stability proposed by Ashby (1965), which
we have used as an ethological constraint. Therefore, reward can be modelled as an assessment
of the physiological effect provoked by a behaviour. Through this perspective I have designed
a reward formula inspired from these principles. It delivers reward for any decision leading
towards physiological stability and a punishment otherwise. Among the infinite formulae that





where dj(t) and d/(t — 1) are the current and the previous physiological states, respectively.
This formula relates effects diminishing the deficits to a positive value, coherently with the





OPTIMAL ZONE DEFICIT 1 (dl) 1.0
Figure 6.15: Definition of Reward in a 2D Physiological Space. d(t — 1) and d(t) stand for the
state before and after the execution of a behaviour. The vector of effect stands for the amount
of effect due to the execution of a behaviour. The Optimal Zone represents the area of minimal
deficits.
The hypothesis introduced by formula 6.5 is vital for several reasons. On the one hand it
introduces the sufficient constraints to extend the learning hypothesis of Schultz et al. (1993) to
instrumental learning (Houk et al., 1995), since now the delivery of reward is always mediated
by the execution of the appropriate behaviour. On the other, this formula respects basic etholog¬
ical constraints while not imposing any additive or multiplicative formulae to combine external
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and internal stimuli to compute the motivational state. The only inherent condition imposed
on the behavioural patterns of the algorithm is that these must maximise the reward within the
cycle of execution. Reward-driven decision making has also been suggested in neuroscience
(Rolls, 2003).
This relationship between reward and effect has been tested by running a series of simu¬
lations where several (3 values in equation 6.5 have been used to distort this relationship. The
experimental setup used is introduced next.
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
For both experiment sets, the robot is placed in two sets of environments as described in the
previous sections.
The same metrics on learning velocity and physiological stability introduced in section
5.3.3 have been again applied to the experiments of this section. The robot navigates at random.
Every time an object is encountered, the state is updated by perceiving the set of external
(ajfordances) of the object encountered and by reading the instantaneous value of the agent's
internal drives (drives). The actor calculates then the motivational state (the policy values)
and the behaviour whose related motivation exhibits the highest value is selected and executed.
Then the object is abandoned, to wander at random until another object is encountered to re¬
start the cycle of execution.
The goal of the experiment set is to evaluate the influence of effect in the physiological
stability. The amount of effect and its consequent interpretation as reward during the learning
process determine not only the pace of learning, but also the quality of the final values for
convergence. To this aim, the effect of a behaviour (|3 parameter) has been parametrised for
each behaviour between 0.15 and 0.35.
Decisions to Reach Optimal Zone (Param. after effect) Mean stability values
Figure 6.16: Decisions per Cycle and Physiological Stability for different amounts of effect, left
and right, respectively.
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The results shown in figure 6.16 show that the level of distortion is directly proportional to
the values of stability obtained for simulation. The larger is the effect of each behaviour (its
step value (3), the shorter is the cycle of execution and the smaller is the stationary value of the
physiological stability.
This has to be considered in the ecological framework that characterises the relationship
between the agent, in terms of internal physiology, and the environment in terms of how this
affects the agent. The more available are the resources in the environment, the easier it should
be to learn policies to satisfy internal needs. Likewise, the larger is the effect with regard to the
pace of growth of the deficits, the shorter is the cycle and the lower the mean of the deficits, cf.
figure 6.16.
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the study of the influence of the decay constants of the agent's
homeostatic variables and of their effect on the learning process and on the behavioural pat¬
terns. The results have demonstrated that these two internal factors (the decay constants and
the amount of effect due to every behaviour) condition the resulting behavioural patterns.
The decay constants of the homeostatic variables are demonstrated to influence the learning
and behavioural patterns in a variety ofmanners. In order to study these effects, I have designed
several sets of experiments considering the phenomena which depend on the environment (see
chapter 5 for further detail). Experiments in chapter 5 have demonstrated that the responses
of the actor-critic vary depending on the availability of resources of a scenario. Therefore, a
scarce and an abundant environment have been engineered and used for simulation.
The experiments in the abundant environment have highlighted that the smaller the de¬
creasing factor of the homeostatic variables, the longer the time needed to learn the optimal
behavioural patterns and the worse the final viability values will be. However, these experi¬
ments have assumed that every single homeostatic variable exhibits the same decay rate. In
terms of the actor-critic, this means that every homeostatic variable equally contributes to the
reward signal used for training (cf. figure 5.2). However, this does not extend the palette of
behavioural responses that the actor-critic can obtain under the effect of the internal physiology
only. To cover this, a second set of experiments where every homeostatic variable is endowed
with a different decay constant has been performed. The behavioural patterns obtained in this
case demonstrate that the actor-critic has learnt to respond more frequently to the variables
decreasing faster. These first experiments have highlighted that the X decay constant has a
strong influence on the learning and on the behavioural patterns. However, this covers so far
only an environment where every single object affords every behaviour to be performed by the
agent. Under these circumstances it seems natural that the decay constant will dominate the
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actor-critic responses.
For this reason, a scarce environment has also been considered as a testbed. Objects in
this environment afford a single action to be performed by the agent. This niche had been
previously considered in chapter 5, where it demonstrated that the most efficient behavioural
pattern in terms of reward was reactive behaviour; therefore a niche where the internal phys¬
iology seemed to have little or no influence. However, after running a series of experiments
parametrised after the decay constant, it has been demonstrated that physiology does influence
both the learning and the behavioural patterns also in this case. In particular, when the decay
constant reaches very small values in proportion to the compensatory effect of every behaviour,
the final behavioural patterns differ from a reactive pattern. In contrast, the final pattern be¬
comes partly motivation driven and partly stimulus driven. I observe that the same viability
values have been reached for different decay parameter values in the stationary regime. It is
therefore straightforward to conclude that the homeostatic variables for small decay constants
become easily sated and that several behavioural responses exhibit the same performance in
terms of internal physiological stability. An explanation results if I consider that slow varying
homeostatic variables tend to be sated when the behavioural executions are quicker than the
internal needs can express. The satiation boundary is reached in this case, for which any vari¬
ation in the behavioural patterns does not provide any better physiological stability, as shown
by the aforementioned experiments. This has also been confirmed by the behavioural patterns
shown in figure 6.14. The two patterns shown compare the case of three homeostatic variables
endowed with the same decay value to a final case where every decay constant is different. The
patterns show that there is not a constant pattern as happened in the abundant environment,
since although every cycle starts with the same physiological deficits, the behaviour is mostly
reactive. This is because it depends on the affordances of the objects encountered at random.
However, since the x decay constant of the homeostatic variable nutrition is larger than the rest,
the behaviour grasping is executed more often than the rest. These experiments, performed in
two environments endowed with very different distributions of resources, have demonstrated
that the pace of decrease of the homeostatic variables does condition the learning process and
the final behavioural patterns.
The influence of the internal physiology does not only depend on the decay constant of the
homeostatic variables. The probability of an agent of persisting in one behaviour or another
or of being more or less opportunistic (reactive) also depends on reward and how reward is
defined. At the beginning of the chapter I argued that this is one of the simplest manners
for the environment to affect the agent's internal stability. In an introductory fashion I have
introduced a last set of experiments to measure the influence of the amount of effect due to the
execution of behaviour on the agent's homeostatic variables. These have shown that the internal
physiological stability depends on the amount of compensation provided by every behaviour.
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In general terms, the larger the compensation the better the viability values.
With these sets of experiments, the actor-critic has been demonstrated to provide appropri¬
ate policies to maintain physiological stability in a variety of scenarios, with different avail¬
ability and accessibility of resources and parametrisation of its internal physiology. This also
suggests that reward is related to stability and that our formulation of reward is sufficient to
provide explanation of a variety of ethologically resemblant patterns with a simple model. Fur¬
thermore, this also supports the hypothesis that dopamine (DA) in the basal ganglia is not only
the error of the prediction of reward for Pavlovian, but also for Instrumental learning. Hence,
it does not only learn to relate stimulus to responses, it may also be biasing the selection of
one behaviour over another. This suggests, from a physiological perspective, that the parts of
the brain involved in learning Pavlovian contingencies (as the experiments of Schultz demon¬
strate), would also be involved in instrumental learning.
Chapter 7
Discussion
This dissertation has addressed adaptation from the perspective of a situated, embodied agent
(Agre and Chapman, 1987) by adhering to a view on intelligence based on the principle of
interaction with the environment. This perspective of intelligence is partly motivated as a re¬
sponse to the limitations demonstrated by symbolic classic AI (Brooks, 1986). Clearly, despite
novel and classic AI sharing the term intelligence, its semantics have a different flavour in each
case (Steels, 1994). While symbolic AI has been mostly concerned with intelligence as a log¬
ical manipulation of beliefs and with faithful representations of the world (Gardenfors, 1992;
Harnad, 1990), novel AI is most concerned with intelligence in terms of effective interaction
with the environment, where even a model of the environment is often not necessary. A natural
consequence of this approach has been that the problems on which AI has primarily focused
are relatively simple (nonetheless interesting) ones related to the interaction with the environ¬
ment. This has also facilitated further contact with related disciplines, such as neuroscience
and ethology (Avila-Garcfa and Canamero, 2002; Redgrave et al., 1999; Spier and McFarland,
1997). The cross-fertilisation of different scientific disciplines provides multiple benefits, e.g.,
a better understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying behaviour selection (Gurney et al.,
2001b,a, 1998).
The animat approach was born in a concurrent and complementary fashion to these, propos¬
ing the study of developmental and evolutionary biology as sources of inspiration for modelling
intelligent processes in a bottom-up fashion (Meyer, 1995; Wilson, 1991). In this context, the
"animat" (the synthetic animal) is an ideal testbed of the aforementioned principles of intelli¬
gence, since it exhibits situatedness, embodiment and autonomy similarly to biological beings
(Ziemke, 1998; Meyer, 1997). A concept which has gained my attention and partly overlaps
with the aforementioned is self-sufficiency, since this provides a "baseline from which he (the
experimenter) can judge the performance of the agent; either the agent is self-sufficient or not"
(Spier and McFarland, 1997). The same authors also argue that the concept of self-sufficiency
may provide a framework to assess the behavioural responses and the feedback from its own
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internal state. The principles of learning proposed in previous chapters are examples of this
feedback. Both the principles and the metrics have been inspired by ethological observations
and measurements performed by experimental neuroscientists. Further discussion of this anal¬
ogy will follow later in the text.
Assuming self-sufficiency as a criterion of optimality (Stephens and Krebs, 1986) is equiv¬
alent to providing an upper-boundary for performance, which depends on the particular agent
studied. However, this equivalence is tautological, since the concept of optimality requires an
observer to define it. Animals do not have this problem, since the criterion has emerged out
of evolutionary processes and developmental interaction. The most elegant manner for solving
the optimality issue for animats consists of applying the same evolutionary and developmental
criteria experienced by animals. However, I have deliberately avoided this in the experimental
approach. Instead of mimicking their processes at all levels, I have opted for a careful and rea¬
sonable analogy between animals and animats at a developmental level only. If animals have
reached a good criterion to pair the feedback from the environment to their motivational state
to be able to act appropriately, I can extract some analogous principles from their behaviour to
use and test with our agent.
To frame this approach, the perspective of the animat focusing on the interaction with the
environment as a source of intelligence, I draw on the ideas of J. J. Gibson in the field of eco¬
logical psychology (Gibson, 1966). He mostly focused on perception; however, he proposed
the evolutionary nature of the cognitive processes (from perception to action selection) embod¬
ied by an animal. In fact, if I can assume that each animal and each species are the result of a
process of mutual interaction with their niche, it should be straightforward to assume that their
cognitive processes encompass the same principles. It was again the limitation of symbolic AI
to provide an understanding of these cognitive processes which motivated a novel interest in the
situated nature of cognition (Suchman, 1987) from the perspective of ecological psychology.
This thesis also adheres to the view of situated and embodied intelligence and to the neces¬
sity of providing not only feedback from the environment, but furthermore concrete criteria to
analyse the underlying mechanisms of self-sufficiency. In this light, this study has focused on
the principles giving rise to intelligence from an ecological perspective that grounds the agent
to its environment: affordance learning and the learning ofbehavioural patterns.
Learning Affordances Situatedness has been one of the most often mentioned notions that
an agent needs to exhibit intelligent behaviour (Ziemke, 1998). Beyond definitions, this dis¬
sertation has also addressed a study of the process of affordance learning as a possible way of
situating an agent in its environment.
The approach I have followed in designing the architecture for learning affordances and
the process itself has mainly followed three sets of ideas. Firstly, the ideas of Gibson on
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ecological perception (Gibson, 1966). Gibson focused his attention on the interaction with
the environment as a source of inspiration for understanding the visual system. The main
conclusion of his work is that effective animal perception is shaped by the environment and
by the needs of the animal. In a more formal manner, he defined the concept of affordance
as the functional relationship between the perception of a cue or set of cues and a behaviour
from the animal's repertoire. However, the notion of affordance has been heavily criticised
due to the ambiguity with which Gibson proposed it and also partly due to the cognitivist
mainstream in psychology. Secondly, behaviour based AI revisited ecological ideas in the early
80's establishing an initial conceptual framework to address intelligence from an ecological
perspective. The third set of ideas follows as a natural consequence of this. AI scientists have
looked at biology for inspiration to build synthetic agents. Coherently with ecology, perception
has been viewed as one more process of interaction with the environment of the agent. In other
words, from an ecological perspective it is not possible to consider perception, action selection
and learning separately if the agent has to exhibit situatedness. Therefore, affordance learning
is part of the process of situating the agent in its environment. Affordances will be related only
to the agent itself, since these will not only depend on the objects or features of the environment,
but also on every piece of the agent. The self-observation of the internal bodily dynamics and
the relationship between these and the perception of and interaction with the environment is
the principle driving the learning mechanism.
One of the contributions of this thesis has been a method to learn affordances in this frame¬
work. This contribution can also be viewed as a formalisation of a method to situate an agent.
Indeed, the animat consists of a set of internal variables, drives, behaviours. By relating the
fluctuations of the agent's internal dynamics to the execution of each behaviour and to the cues
that were concurrently active when the behaviour was engaged, the agent is implicitly ground¬
ing the semantics of each interaction with regard to its internal needs and to its perception of
the environment.
This learning method has been implemented taking into account two main relevant issues.
Firstly that the amount of data provided by the sensors is very large. In this respect, it has
been considered appropriate to apply data reduction techniques in the form of a Grow When
Required (GWR) Network to dynamically group together sets of similar sensory patterns in a
single topological node. On the one hand this simplification facilitates the analysis, on the other
this network naturally adapts to newly perceived sensory patterns in a dynamic fashion. Sec¬
ondly, a neural structure connecting the GWR nodal representation to the behaviour repertoire
has been grown in a Hebbian manner, driven by the fluctuations of the internal physiology pro¬
voked by the execution of behaviours. Both the neural structure and the values of its synaptic
weights are the affordances of the objects with respect to that agent. Deliberately, this neu¬
ral structure is single layered, suggesting a direct relationship between the perception and the
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action layers (a reactive architecture).
The adaptiveness of this architecture and of the learning process has been tested in an en¬
vironment by varying the availability and the distribution of resources. The general conclusion
is that for the given objects and situations it is possible to grow a neural structure to represent
affordances in a dynamic fashion. The boundary to this is imposed by the causality between
the perception of a sensory pattern and a certain fluctuation of its internal physiology. If both
can be consistently related, the affordance of the behaviour involved in that fluctuation can
be learnt. Both neural structures, the clustering (topological network) and the affordance net¬
works, have been grown concurrently for biological coherence. However, there are still some
controversial theoretical elements. First, the sensory system is based on snapshots of objects
extracted from the sensory flow. This simplification has been assumed as a first approximation
to reduce the amount of sensory information to be processed. Although this does not invalidate
the experimental data, I suggest that the schema should be extended to handle sensory flow
directly. I propose to do this by relating continuous time fluctuations of the agent's internal
physiology to the Hebbian synaptic growing of the neural structure relating the topological
nodes to the behaviours of the agent. This is an issue to be addressed in the future.
Furthermore, also from a biological perspective, I acknowledge that there is a set of inter¬
nal processes, included in the process of affordance learning and excluded from the notion of
grounding or situatedness. These could be grouped together under the label of affective phe¬
nomena; which modulate perception in an active manner. In fact, I do not perceive the function
of the same object in the same manner when I am in different moods. This would probably
introduce neuromodulation of perception, and the possibility of studying how animals adapt
their perception according to an emotional state induced by itself and by its perception of the
environment. Understanding these processes is a necessity to build new and more adaptive
agents.
Biological Inspiration and Implication Behaviour selection has been individually addressed
by different authors in the fields of animation (Blumberg, 1994), robotics (Avila-Garcfa and
Canamero, 2004), and ethology (Spier and McFarland, 1997). However, the link that allows us
to view behaviour selection as an adaptive process has arisen. Recent experiments and models
in neuroscience (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Dayan, 2001; Suri and Schultz,
1998; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997; Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1993) suggest that
dopamine (DA) projections from the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) and Substantia Nigra Pars
Compacta (SNC) to striatal cells in the basal ganglia (BG) of some vertebrates acts as an error in
the prediction of reward of a Stimulus-Response learning cycle (Pavlovian learning). Beyond
the neuro-physiological evidence, striatal cells do receive synaptic projections from most parts
of the cortex and from the VTA and SNC, and project themselves to the BG output nuclei, the
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Globus Pallidus Internal Segment (GP,) and substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr). Furthermore,
experiments show habituation of the DA signal when the cycle is repeated several times. Once
the relationship is learnt, the error is zero.
However, this has been suggested for the case of Pavlovian contingencies only, hence when
the release of reward is not mediated by the execution of any action or behaviour. In this
thesis, I have extended this learning hypothesis for the case of instrumental learning, hence
considering the cases for which reward is mediated by the execution of behaviour. This has
direct consequences. Firstly, behaviour selection and learning are viewed as two interacting
processes in a single framework. Secondly, this implicitly suggests that they partly share a
common neural substrate and that one of the roles of Dopamine (DA) is to act as an error
signal for learning behavioural patterns.
Motivation, Reward and the Actor Critic There have been two main sources of inspira¬
tion for embedding the actor-critic in the biologically inspired learning framework described
throughout this thesis. These are Sutton and Barto (1981) and Houk et al. (1995). R. Sutton (in
machine learning) suggested an algorithm for behaviour selection and learning in the frame¬
work of reinforcement learning: the actor-critic. This algorithm, unlike most reinforcement
learning algorithms (e.g., Q-Learning (Watkins, 1989)), computes the error in the prediction
and the policy to select behaviours separately. A critic relating states to the expected reward
(SR fashion ones) calculates the error in the prediction of reward, and an actor learns policies
to select behaviours to maximise the cumulative reward (Behaviour Selection). This same al¬
gorithm was also used by Houk (Houk et al., 1995) as a possible hypothesis for the processes
embodied in the basal ganglia. Its separation between behaviour selection and learning makes
it most attractive from a biological perspective. From the perspective of developmental biology,
it seems reasonable to assume that simple animals do not need a critic, since their behaviour
arbitration may work on a reactive basis. However, more complex animals have needed to
modify their behavioural patterns on demand of the environment. The actor critic seems to be
developed to this end. In this respect, evolutionary studies on the development of the biology
of the basal ganglia may shed some light on this issue.
This view also relates to Bindra (1969), who suggested the presence of a common sub¬
strate for reward and motivation. This implicitly grounds the concept of self-sufficiency and
optimality suggested by Spier and McFarland (1997) to the processes of interaction with the
environment, based on reward and motivation. On the one hand, the motivational state is a
combination of the internal physiological state of the agent (its internal drives) and of the state
of the environment (its perceived affordances). On the other, the reward is mediated by the
execution of a behaviour, a behaviour that has to be chosen in a manner that facilitates the
agent's survival. At this point, it is convenient to draw on Ashby's notion of viability: "agents
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need to be physiologically stable to survive" (Ashby, 1965). Following this, I have assumed
that the feedback from the environment must be positive (good) when the execution of a be¬
haviour leads towards values of higher stability and negative (bad) for other cases. This has also
some theoretical implications, since I am assuming that the notions of reward and punishment
correspond to positive and negative values, respectively.
From an ethological perspective, the environment and the agent's internal physiology inter¬
act with one another. The actor-critic has to lead this interaction towards behavioural patterns
that maintain the viability of the agent. This has been tested in a series of scenarios, and the
influence of the external and internal stimuli in forming these strategies has been quantified.
This is further discussed in the next sections.
Neurological Implications Neuroscience has been one of the major sources of inspiration
for this thesis. From this perspective, I would like to comment on some issues that the results
introduced in the previous chapters have contributed to clarify. These are presented next.
• DA in the Basal Ganglia acts as the error in the prediction of reward following a certain
stimulus. This view is supported by the experiments in the previous experiments, where
the 8(r) (DA shot) is effectively signalling the error in the prediction of reward when
this happens. This suggests that both the failure when selecting a behaviour is assessed
by the DA signal, which makes learning possible. However, this must be dissociated
from the notion of aversiveness, since learning in our case occurs after several iterations.
The value of an aversive stimulus is learnt at the first trial. Therefore, I am suggesting
that learning, via matching the right behaviour to maximise reward and failing at the
selection, occurs in the same neural circuitry. Nevertheless, this does not directly enter
the discussion on whether reward and punishment may be computed by different neural
circuits, as suggested by Redgrave et al. (1999).
However, it may also make sense that reward and punishment, once they have been cal¬
culated, enter the same neural circuit in order to modify the synaptic weights affecting
the patterns of selection, since aversive stimuli tend to govern typical behavioural re¬
sponses, e.g., to avoid the stimulus. Related to this, a recent hypothesis also argues that
there might be different types of reward, whose compatibility with the hypothesis of the
actor-critic would be interesting to investigate.
• In our architecture, the correction of the policies and of the critic itself is based on the
difference between the expected reward calculated a priori for the execution of a be¬
haviour and the real reward obtained a posteriori. This neuromodulatory behaviour is
analogous to that assumed for DA in the basal ganglia. However, other authors argue
that DA is only acting as a threshold that facilitates or complicates the release of a be¬
haviour (Gurney et al., 2001 b,a, 1998). In this respect I argue that both hypotheses may
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be right. In fact, I fundamentally agree that the basal ganglia are acting as a centralised
action selector. However, this is not its only role. Firstly, there is strong evidence for
a learning role (Reynolds et al., 2001). Secondly, Redgrave et al. (1999) have argued
that DA cannot be mediating the error in the prediction of reward since it cannot account
for aversive stimuli. On the contrary, if, as I have assumed, punishment can be taken as
negative reward, the hypothesis suggested by Schultz and Houk would hold. However,
there is still no experimental evidence supporting this. Thirdly, if I assume that novel
events are rewarding by themselves, it would be coherent that dopamine would signal
events of this sort, as observed experimentally (Schultz et al., 1997).
Influence from The Environment The actor-critic has been hypothesised to be the embod¬
iment of the biological algorithm modifying the agent's behavioural patterns. This has been
tested in chapter 5 in a set of different environments. These have been engineered to cover a
variety of situations, ranging from the scarcity of resources to their abundance. The actor-critic
has been demonstrated to learn faster and to reach better values of internal physiological stabil¬
ity for the abundant environment than for the scarce. However, it has also been able to modify
its behavioural patterns to adapt to situations where certain resources are scarcer than others
by exhibiting reactive behaviour to that stimulus when this is presented. Unlike this, when an
object affords more than one behaviour, our simulated agent tends to select the resource whose
availability is lower. Therefore, the experimental results have demonstrated that the actor-critic
is capable of modulating the agent's behavioural patterns, responding to variations in the avail¬
ability and distribution of resources with appropriate behavioural cycles that lead the agent's
deficits to zero in a successful manner.
Appetitive and Consummatory Behaviours Each behaviour considered throughout this the¬
sis is motivation driven (Toates and Jensen, 1990). A motivation results from the combination
of the the agent's internal drives and of the external affordances. In the architecture introduced
in this thesis, motivations bias the agent's behavioural patterns on the basis of their intensity,
which is in turn controlled by the expectation of reward. The larger the reward for a certain be¬
haviour, the more likely that behaviour will be chosen for that motivational state in the future.
This highlights that reward and motivation are intrinsically related, even for behaviours whose
immediate reward is considered to be zero. These are the so-called appetitive behaviours, the
ingraining of which in the competition for behaviour selection is still a controversial issue.
This thesis does not address this issue in its whole spectrum. However, the actor-critic
architecture at hand has provided the opportunity of studying the case of a single appetitive be¬
haviour (to avoid), which has been successfully integrated in the motivation driven architecture
in an equal fashion to the remaining consummatory behaviours, see section 5.5.1. The exper¬
iments have shown that the behaviour "to avoid" is consistently executed when the agent is
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sated and when the object at hand does not offer the possibility of satisfying any of the agent's
drives. The agent therefore learns that it is more convenient to avoid spending any energy on
a consummatory behaviour whose execution is not going to provide any reward and instead to
execute the appetitive one which may lead at the next step to a positive reward.
This result is however bound by the assumption that the execution of the appetitive be¬
haviour is less energy consuming than any consummatory one. This makes sense for the case
of avoiding, since it can be argued that any consummatory behaviour is more energy consum¬
ing than this. However, it is important to stress this result, which is only valid for the behaviour
to avoid, could also be extended to other appetitive behaviours with relatively simple modifica¬
tions. So far the selection of the appetitive behaviour is possible because the policy that biases
the selection has learnt to exclude the consummatory behaviours from that state. Therefore,
the selection of the appetitive behaviour is performed by exclusion of the others. This could
however change if the selection mechanism did not consist of selecting the winner policy (refer
to section 5.3.2). This policy has served to faithfully explain a series of experimental cases.
However, it can be argued that for complex organisms, exhibiting complex behaviours, an im¬
mediate benefit is not necessarily selected. This opens the possibility of theoretically learning
to sequentially select appetitive behaviours when convenient for the given motivational state.
In fact, if the policy update were not TD, it would be theoretically possible to integrate other
appetitive behaviours in equal conditions to the consummatory ones in the competition. This
is, however, to be addressed in the future.
To be consistent with the hypothesis that each behaviour is motivation driven, I have de¬
signed our decision framework to solely work on the basis of future reward, the same reward
that alters the internal physiology and modifies the motivations themselves in preparation for
the next selection. In conclusion, it is argued that appetitive behaviours are also motivation
driven, and that they are used in the chain of events as a filling for the time gaps between two
consummatory behaviours to maximise the global reward, therefore to maximise the physio¬
logical stability.
Internal Modulation I have also performed experiments to quantify the effect of the dynam¬
ics of the agent's internal physiology on the resulting behavioural patterns. Several different
agents, each with a different physiology, were tested in scarce and abundant environments. The
results demonstrate that the actor-critic can also explain influences other than external stimuli
in the learning of behavioural patterns. If a homeostatic variable exhibits a fast decay, the
agent will more likely select the behaviour that compensates this drive even if its value is not
at a critical level; furthermore even if the resource needed to execute that behaviour is not very
abundant in that scenario. On the contrary, if the homeostatic variable decays very slowly, any
associated behaviour will be executed at most once or twice per cycle.
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However, the experiments performed in chapter 6 have shown that the influence of the
interna] dynamics on the learning and on the behavioural patterns strongly depends on the
environment. By comparing the behavioural patterns obtained for an abundant and for a scarce
environment I can observe that in the former case the patterns turn out to be mostly driven by
the agent's internal physiology. Conversely, for the latter case the agent mostly reacts to the
affordance offered by the object encountered, hence exhibits reactive behaviour. However, the
results show that in this case there is also some influence of the agent's internal physiology
since for slow varying metabolisms the behavioural responses differ approx. 50% from the
reactive pattern. The explanation for this is that for the case of behaviours exhibiting very
slow internal physiological values, failing the execution of several behaviours within a cycle
is insignificant in terms of reward and in terms of physiological stability. This highlights the
idea that the emergence of the behavioural patterns depends on the combination of the internal
physiology and of the external affordances. These cannot be considered as independent factors
when analysing the behavioural patterns delivered by the actor-critic.
Another axis of influence of the agent's internal physiology is the function that relates effect
to reward in the learning process. As mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, adaptation
is driven in our agent by the reward resulting from the execution of behaviours. However, the
procedure to calculate the reward related to a physiological effect due to the execution of a
behaviour is controversial. To this end I have extended the definition of reward introduced by
Schultz (Schultz et al., 1997) and have bound it to Ashby's notion of viability (Ashby, 1965).
The principle consists of assuming that effects contributing to the agent's internal physiology
are beneficial, or they are harmful. On this basis, the reward function introduced in chapter
5 delivers a positive value for the former case and a negative value for the latter. In this way
I am extending the definition of reward to include as well the notion of punishment (negative
reward) in a single framework. However, the biological plausibility of this extension seems still
incomplete. A negative effect seems to be accounted for by different neural circuits depending
on its intensity. If the effect is mildly negative the effect may be considered via the same
method I have proposed. However, aversive experiences do not need to be repeated, they are
learnt at once, hence suggesting that there are parallel neural pathways to learn about mildly
negative and aversive situations. Much of this will have to be tested in future studies. However,
a basic set of simulations studying the influence of the relationship between effect and reward
has been illustrated in figure 5.2. The experiments have tested the sensitivity of varying the
amount of effect in the same environments for the same behaviour execution, suggesting that a
high amount of compensation is preferred for the given environment. This is reasonable, since
this contributes to a higher internal physiological stability.
To conclude the discussion, the next subsection discusses the reach of the ecological prin¬
ciple in the approach I have followed throughout this thesis.
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So far the Ecological Approach The principle of ecology has been mentioned on several
occasions throughout this thesis as the criterion which drives adaptation and our design con¬
siderations in the animal world in an analogous fashion. This is the biological inspiration
introduced and discussed at the beginning of this discussion chapter.
For perception, the ecological principle has helped to formalise a set of sensory patterns
to be processed into a functional signal related to a set of behaviours within the agent's reper¬
toire. Therefore, perception is a process intrinsically related to the way in which the agent
elicits actions and interacts with its environment. Affordances imply an integrated view of the
perception and action suggesting that an agent endowed with the capability of exploring its
environment may be able to adapt to a variety of environments via interaction. Therefore this
is a core idea of an attractive synthetic framework. Related to this, the model I have introduced
is the first implementation of an affordance learning model embedded in a robotic platform.
This has been tested in a variety of appositely engineered scenarios with different distributions
of affordances. The learning is provoked by the interaction with the environment, which occurs
when a behaviour is selected and executed. The resulting fluctuation provoked at the internal
physiological level is then the drive modifying the neural substrate that represents the affor¬
dances and the policy to select behaviours in a way that promotes beneficial decisions in terms
of physiological stability. The results have demonstrated that the agent has adapted to these
environments by learning the affordances offered. By using this information, the agent can
predict whether it will be able to perform that behaviour with that particular object.
Secondly, ecology has also been the inspiration for using the actor-critic in this schema. If
affordances relate perception to the potentiality of performing an action, this part of the archi¬
tecture drives and assesses the use of this information when interacting with the environment.
The actor-critic in the animal world was hypothesised by Houk as a result of the observation of
physiological and anatomical data in vertebrates as the algorithm that integrates learning and
behaviour selection. However, besides the algorithm, a framework analogous to its natural con¬
text is required when used in a synthetic perspective. The neural substrate of the actor-critic in
a vertebrate receives projections from every part of the cortex and the thalamus therefore sug¬
gesting that every piece of information, internal and external is assessed in this part of the brain
for action selection. In an analogous fashion, our agent perceives data from its environment
and from the internal physiology and learns to associate potentialities of action to every object
and to every internal state. The consequences of this are that the affordances of the objects are
filtered depending on the agent's motivational state giving rise to a set of policies to drive the
agent's behaviour. It is important to stress that this is a way for the agent to ground knowledge
with regard to its own perception of the environment.
Every learning process requires some assessment, which for the case of the actor-critic is
the difference between the predicted and the real reward due to interaction with the environ-
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ment. In a way, this closes the loop from perception to action in an ecological manner and
satisfies the constraints imposed by ethological and neurological data.
In a way, this agent embodies a model of a learning architecture capable of adapting to a
variety of environments provided that the agent has been endowed with the ability to explore.
I have based our design principles on the idea that animals strive for survival and that the in¬
ternal criterion to control this is the internal physiological stability. This is an interpretation
of Ashby's notion of viability who suggested a set of essential physiological variables whose
boundaries must be respected in order for the animal to exist. Furthermore, the architecture
works in a biologically inspired manner. However, this architecture also exhibits some limi¬
tations both in terms of adaptation and of biological resemblance. These are addressed in the
next and final section.
A Comparison with Redgrave's Model on Action Selection It has been considered appro¬
priate to include a comparison between the model introduced by Redgrave, Gurney and Prescott
(Redgrave et al., 1999; Gurney et ah, 2001a) with the model introduced in this thesis at the end
of this chapter.
Redgrave's model is based on the assumption that the main role of a vertebrate's basal
ganglia is to arbitrate among the animal's behaviours in a centralised manner. The model intro¬
duced in this thesis also argues in favour of this hypothesis. However, our model also assumes
other roles than selecting behaviours for the basal ganglia, such as learning behavioural pat¬
terns.
The robotic model of Redgrave, Gurney and Prescott is based on the assimilation of the bi¬
ological hypothesis of action selection postulated by Redgrave: the basal ganglia is distributed
into two subsystems exerting two complementary roles to select actions: selection and control.
The cortex and the thalamus are considered to be input to the system, whose cells project to
striatal cells and to the Sub-Thalamic Nucleus (STN). These structures project to the output
nuclei, the Globus Pallidus Internal and External Segment (GP, and GPe, respectively). Fur¬
thermore, the projections from the Thalamus and the Cortices onto striatal cells are viewed as
a set of parallel projections of sensory data. Based on these, the striatal cells elaborate the level
of saliency, to contribute to disinhibit one output pathway or another in the GP,. In order to
do this calculation, striatal cells are supposedly organised in local recurrent networks, whose
mutual interaction results in a saliency level for each pathway. As the reader may have already
guessed, the incoming projections to the striatum are associated to the sensory input, while
the projections from the GP, back to the cortex and to the thalamus are considered to be the
behavioural output in an analogous fashion to an artificial agent. Depending on the striatal cell
receptor type, D1 or D2, the cell will inhibit or disinhibit, respectively, the nucleus it projects
to. Therefore, D1 type cells, together with the projections of the STN, perform the selection
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of behaviours per se, while the role of the D2 type cells is to act as a feedback loop increasing
the saliency of those nuclei on the GPj in such a manner that nuclei already active increase
their activity, therefore magnifying the gradient of activity between the winner nucleus and
its neighbours. Hence, if the nuclei in charge of the selection per se compose the selection
pathway, those in charge of this magnification are labelled as the control pathway. This model
suggest a very interesting process, both for the calculation of the saliency (which is computed
in a single currency for each behavioural pathway), and for providing a reasonable explanation
to the process of disinhibition itself.
Our model also makes similar assumptions with respect to the input and output projections
as sensory and behavioural pathways, respectively. However, its inspiration, goals and reach
are different. The model presented in this thesis is aimed at learning to perceive the environ¬
ment and to learn behavioural patterns in a way that provides adaptation to the agent to live in
this environment. Therefore, a comparison with the previous model is only partially possible.
The anatomical elements shared by both models relate the cortical and thalamic projections to
striatal cells, and these to the GP, as the only pathway to select behaviours. However, I have
also included the necessary anatomical elements to support the hypothesis that striatal cells are
used to modify the calculation of the saliency for one or another behaviour depending on the re¬
lationship that striatal cells perceive from the cortex and thalamus via the dopamine projection
from the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) and Substantia Nigra Pars Compacta (SNC). Further¬
more, our model does not make a distinction between striatal cells with D1 and D2 receptors.
Instead, I focus our attention on the overall effect that dopamine has as a neuromodulator driv¬
ing learning in these neural structures. This model supports the hypothesis that DA projections
affect the synapses of these cells in terms of reward.
From an experimental perspective, both models share the aim of selecting roles, but there is
a fundamental difference between them. Our model is suggesting the selection of motivation-
driven actions based on the prediction of future reward that every behaviour may deliver. Ac¬
cording to the hierarchy of adaptive processes introduced in chapter 2, our model implements
behaviour selection, as does Redgrave's model; however, it also implements the learning of
behavioural patterns in a biologically plausible manner. Therefore, it goes one level higher in
the hierarchy of adaptive processes than Redgrave's model. By doing this, I have intrinsically
related the concepts of motivation, reinforcement and reward, integrated in the same architec¬
ture to allow the modification of behavioural patterns. This argument has been extrapolated
from the neurological and psychological literature. Furthermore support comes from the ex¬
periments of Schultz (Schultz et al., 1997), where it is suggested that it may also make sense
that both reward and punishment, once they have been calculated, enter the same neural cir¬
cuit in order to modify the synaptic weights affecting the patterns of selection, since aversive
stimuli tend to govern typical behavioural responses, e.g., to avoid the stimulus.
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In our architecture, the correction of the policies and of the critic itself is based on the
difference between the expected reward calculated a priori for the execution of a behaviour
and the real reward obtained a posteriori. This neuromodulatory behaviour is analogous to that
assumed for DA in the basal ganglia. However, other authors argue that DA is only acting as
a threshold that facilitates or complicates the release of a behaviour (Gurney et al., 2001b,a,
1998). In this respect I argue that both hypotheses may be right. In fact, I fundamentally agree
that the basal ganglia are acting as a centralised action selector. However, this is not its only
role. Firstly, there is strong evidence for a learning role (Reynolds et ah, 2001). Secondly,
Redgrave et ah (1999) have argued that DA cannot be mediating the error in the prediction
of reward since it cannot account aversive stimuli. On the contrary, if, as I have assumed
punishment can be taken as negative reward, the hypothesis suggested by Schultz and Houk
would hold. However, there is still no experimental evidence supporting this. Thirdly, if I
assume that novel events are rewarding by themselves, it would be coherent that dopamine
would signal events of this sort, as observed experimentally (Schultz et ah, 1997).
As for the model of Redgrave, an agent endowed with the same model has been capable
of selecting behaviours and of doing so in a biologically plausible manner. Furthermore, it
has been also possible for the same agent to modify its own behavioural patterns to adapt to
changes in the environment based on the ecological principle that relates the environment to
the agent's internal physiology. This has been demonstrated in a variety of cases in chapters 5
and 6. This suggests that this model may be correct in assuming that adaptation, lead by reward
and punishment, may be working according to the principles listed throughout this thesis.
Future Work In this thesis affordances and internal physiology have been combined into
a new learning framework, which enables adaptation by modifying the agent's own internal
patterns and interacting with the environment.
However, ecology is a principle extending to dimensions beyond high level perception or
behaviour selection. The model I have embedded in an agent adapts to the environment by
exploiting the feedback provided by the environment in terms of reward in such a way that it
modifies the neural weights encoding the agent's perception and behavioural patterns. Nev¬
ertheless, when comparing this model with a real animal interacting with its environment it
becomes obvious that there are many interaction elements that continuously modify its struc¬
ture in a manner that has not reproduced. Apart from highlighting the limitations ofmy model,
this also spots a path to continue building ecological robots and agents. If this first model has
mirrored the phenomenological processes playing a role in interaction with the environment,
there are several ways to resume this approach:
• In the biological case, assessing the execution of a behaviour involves reward as mod¬
elled in our simulation environment, hence a signal of goodness or badness about the
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action just performed. However, it is important to point out that the perception of reward
is far more complex than a single signal reporting a feeling of satisfaction or disgust after
the execution of a behaviour. Reward from a wider perspective involves other sorts of
feedback than the post-proprioceptive feedback which has been used to calculate a simu¬
lated perception of reward for our agent. The feedback from the environment in its more
general case precedes, encompasses and follows the execution of a behaviour involving
a variety of phenomena. For example, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic feedback report
information based on the self-perception of the execution of a behaviour and the result¬
ing measure of reward directly depends on whether this feedback is correctly processed
and used. Therefore, if future agents have to demonstrate adaptation from an ecological
manner in complex environments and demanding tasks, I need to propose procedures to
integrate these sorts of feedbacks in an ecological manner.
• From a phenomenological perspective, I have also modelled the learning of object af-
fordances. Proprioception has been used in this case to reinforce or weaken the neural
substrate that learns the affordances of a set of objects in the agent's environment. As
extensions to this, the same suggestions introduced in the former point can be used to
control the necessary mechanisms of neural plasticity to learn affordances.
• Related to this, I also have to argue that it is likely that the combination of several sources
of feedback with the continuous processing of the sensory flow would be necessary to
scale the model and the principles tested throughout this thesis.
• It is also necessary to point out that I have considered affordances in a very general
manner. Affordances are the knowledge representing the potentiality of performing a
behaviour when a set of cues is perceived. I have addressed this point by considering
elementary object features or raw sensory data; other authors also argue that affordances
are based on the integration of simple features that are separately extracted in the visual
cortex of superior mammals (Tao et al., 2004), e.g., vertical and horizontal lines. I do
not argue that this is a healthy way to continue in its most strict sense. However, recent
studies of the visual cortex in macaques reveal that cells sensitive to horizontal cells and
those sensitive to vertical cells are annealed in a complex non-linear recurrent network.
This would suggest that these cells organise themselves after the ecological principle
to interact with one another in such a manner that the appropriate information can be
delivered to the F5 area in the pre-motor cortex to help to select behaviours. If these
structures have emerged out of evolutionary and developmental processes to this end, it
would be extremely interesting to understand the principles underlying the organisation
of these neural structures from the perspective of an artificial agent.
• It is important to highlight that the model introduced by this thesis implements behaviour
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selection as a process within a hierarchy of processes. According to this, learning and be¬
haviour selection are processes that mutually influence one another. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that the actor-critic were part of the implementation of these principles in the
vertebrate's brain. However, this view shares and opposes that of Gurney and Prescott
on how behaviour selection occurs. On the one hand the role of dopamine (DA) for Gur¬
ney and Prescott is viewed as a threshold signal to inhibit or facilitate the selection of
behaviours. On the other dopamine acts for us as the error in the prediction of reward
preceding the selection of a behaviour. A future issue to be addressed is the integration
of both views on adaptation for behaviour selection and learning.
• Finally, it is also important to highlight that there are some limitations regarding the im¬
plementation. The estimation of the behaviour intensities and of the state value function
of the critic has been performed via back-propagation of error (a variety of gradient de¬
scent). This has demonstrated to suffice for the environments at hand, therefore that this
is a correct implementation from a phenomenological perspective. However, it would
not be correct to assume that this is an intrinsically correct biological implementation of
the phenomenon. Therefore, if a thorough biological model is to be designed, it would be
necessary to transfer our perspective to the electro-physiological and biochemical level
of description.
These possible extensions are considered from an ecological perspective but with an eye
on the robotic applications and real problems that would need to be addressed in order to get
a general model that integrates all the aforementioned processes. Unless it is proven wrong,
the purpose of a model is to account for a set of phenomena it can explain. Hopefully the fate
of this model is to become a particular case of a more general theory of ecological adaptation,
where a single dynamics between the agent and its environment is thoroughly explained.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This dissertation is about learning as a mechanism to adapt to a given scenario. In this respect,
learning has been introduced from a biological perspective as a reward-driven process which
guides perception and behaviour selection as interacting processes. Both are related via the
ecological principle, which grounds the agent's perception and behavioural responses on the
dynamics of its internal resources and on the dynamics of the interaction with the environment.
Both these issues, ecological perception and the learning of behavioural patterns, have been
addressed as phenomena ingrained in the adaptive process. To this end, a robotics architecture
inspired on ecological and biological principles has been designed to test these hypotheses in a
variety of meaningful situations.
The perception of this architecture is affordance-based. An affordance has been defined as
the relationship between a cue or set of cues and a single behaviour, meaning the potentiality
for a particular agent to perform that behaviour. This has straightforward implications in adap¬
tive terms, since affordances implicitly represent the necessary knowledge to exhibit reactive
behavioural patterns. Hence, from the perspective of an architecture, affordances could be seen
as the lowest level of perception-action coupling in a hierarchical architecture for behaviour
selection.
Behaviour selection and learning have been considered as two continuous levels of a hier¬
archy of adaptive processes. Behaviour selection from a traditional, ethological viewpoint has
been formulated in an analytical fashion relating the agent's motivational state to the intensity
of each behaviour. The selection consists then of choosing the behaviour exhibiting the highest
intensity. The architecture introduced here fundamentally differs from this perspective, since a
contribution of this thesis is the formulation of the selection of behaviour as a sub-problem of
the learning of behavioural patterns. Based on the fact that learning by reinforcement can mod¬
ulate the selection of behaviours, I have not imposed any specific formula to combine stimuli,
since this is not required. Instead, behavioural patterns arise via interaction with the environ¬
ment and are assessed via the reward signal. The actor-critic algorithm modifies the behavioural
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patterns in such a manner that reward is maximised within a cycle of execution (leading the
agent's deficits to their minimal values). The only constraint imposed has consisted of assign¬
ing a positive reward to effects of behaviour executions that contribute to diminish the agent's
deficits and a negative value to those effects contributing in the opposite direction. These con¬
straints have been suggested in the light of recent experiments in neuroscience and ethological
observations.
The learning of object affordances has been addressed in chapter 4. This introduced the
agent's model of internal physiology and a description of the internal homeostatic processes
and external interactions regulating the learning and selection of behaviours. The learning of
affordances is implicitly related to the effect that interacting (executing a behaviour) with an
object may have. Based on this, two parallel processes, clustering (hence building a topological
map) and synaptic growth (defining the weights of the synapses connecting each node to every
behaviour) have been proposed and described as adaptation processes related to perception in
analogy to those exhibited by animals. Two different topological network algorithms, GNG
and GWR, have been tested in a variety of environments (varying in terms of shape and size
of the objects, and of availability and distribution of objects). The results demonstrate that the
process of clustering requires a minimum level of accuracy (represented by the final number
of nodes of the topological map). Otherwise, the level of accuracy of the objects represented
is not sufficient to grow functionally meaningful synaptic weights between the nodes and the
behaviour repertoire of the agent. It is important to stress that the final synaptic weights arise
through statistical (Hebbian) accounting of the effects that each individual behaviour provokes
on the motivational state when executed in combination with every sort of object in the envi¬
ronment.
Chapter 5 addressed adaptation by considering behaviour selection and learning as two in¬
teracting processes. It firstly introduces the hierarchy of adaptive processes and the criterion
that relates effect to reward. The models introduced address high-level behaviour selection in
coherence with the hypothesis of dopamine (DA) mediating instrumental learning in the Basal
Ganglia (BG). This suggests that this part of the brain also participates in the arbitration and en¬
gagement of goal directed actions. Therefore, low level, reflex movements or reward-unrelated
actions would be unrelated to the conclusions reached within this context. The experiments
have addressed the integration of external and internal stimuli for behaviour selection from an
ecological perspective, varying in a set of appositely engineered scenarios, and in the availabil¬
ity and distribution of resources according to a set of hypotheses. A first and second version of
the same architecture have been built and tested.
• The first architecture only considers the internal drives to bias one behaviour over an¬
other, with the final decision being computed via a multiplicative formula (intensity of
each behaviour x perceived affordance values). For the proposed scenarios and for the
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first proposed ethologica! boundary —maintain the stability of the internal milieu—,
this is sufficient for scenarios with abundant resources. Nevertheless, the policies exhib¬
ited by agents using this architecture show a high level of opportunism, which has only
demonstrated itself to be an intelligent strategy in scenarios where some resources are
scarce.
• The second architecture introduced designs policies integrating the external and internal
information as part of the state of the actor-critic algorithm. Therefore, the resulting de¬
cision patterns depend on the interaction with the environment, on the dynamic imposed
by the learning algorithm and on the internal perception of reward. The experiments
conducted have addressed these three degrees of freedom, suggesting the possibility of
using the actor-critic in a wider range of scenarios.
The behavioural patterns obtained for the former case are solely learnt when the optimal
behavioural strategy in terms of reward is to react to the multiplicative combination of affor-
dances and drives. This is due to the decision making being solely based on the internal drives
and on the stimulus closest to the agent, hence disregarding a global model of the environment.
This limitation suggests that including the available affordances in the state of the actor-critic
(as part of the motivational state) is fundamental for producing more accurate decisions. Given
this architecture, the level of influence of external affordances and of internal stimuli has been
considered to analyse the coherence of this behavioural architecture from an ethological and
biological perspective. Interestingly, the results have suggested that this architecture is capa¬
ble of generating appropriate behavioural patterns to maintain the internal deficits within the
agent's viability zone. Furthermore, it has also showed that, if appetitive and consummatory
behaviours are competing in a motivation driven schema, the actor-critic will be directly in¬
volved in calculating the prediction of reward of the execution of each behaviour (appetitive
and consummatory), competing in a similar fashion for the agent's actuators.
Finally, despite the set of successful contributions, it is necessary to stress that the inte¬
gration of learning and behaviour selection in the aforementioned actor-critic is insufficient to
explain several ethological phenomena. Ethology shows examples of behaviour selection not
based on equal evaluation of each behaviour, but according to groups or habits. The architec¬
tures in this thesis are not sufficient to explain these. Furthermore, acquired knowledge relies
on the weights of the neural structures predicting reward in the actor-critic. This is a plastic
structure, which continues representing the acquired knowledge if there is a continuous expo¬
sition to the circumstances on the environment. This does not always happen in the animal
realm.
The model introduced suggests the existence of parallel learning and distributed decision
making processes distributed at the different levels of the hierarchy. The same reinforcement
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learning process used for learning can also be extended to learn policies for behaviour selec¬
tion as a process of habituation depending on the appropriateness of the stimuli and on the
behaviour's frequency of execution. Hence, under normal circumstances, the execution of one
or another behaviour will be highly dependent on the stimulus.
It is also important to remark that the level of behaviour selection addressed by the basal
ganglia does involve high-level behaviours (not low level actions, at least directly) and only
reward-directed actions (not reactive actions). This is supported by clinical evidence, since
Parkinson's patients (whose release of dopamine is fairly reduced) do not perform motivated
actions. However, they do react to stimuli in an unconditioned fashion.
Appendix A
Hypothesis of Correspondence
between Webots and the New
Simulator
The main issue addressed in chapter 5 is the learning of policies in a strategy for behaviour
selection with the requirement that physiological stability is maintained. The experimental
testbed currently consists of a Khepera robot, simulated with Webots 4.0. The use of this sim¬
ulator imposes severe restrictions from a practical viewpoint, since the performance of exper¬
iments is bounded by the availability of Webots licenses and by the length of the simulations.
Each simulation extends over 10 hours, which motivates the use of an optimised implementa¬
tion for the problems addressed in this chapter.
The most time-consuming element of the simulator is the graphics-engine, which has been
by-passed by building a simulator where the environment and the interaction have been ab¬
stracted. The interactions have been simulated on the basis of a formula that calculates the
affordance of an object as a function of the features of the object. Each object has a set of
affordances depending on its physical features. It has been assumed that the agent has this
knowledge. This simplification enables a dramatic reduction of the simulation length, while
still enabling the cognitive issues on the combination of stimuli and behaviour selection to be
addressed with a sufficient level of correspondence with the real interaction.
This section addresses the level of correspondence in a dual fashion. Firstly, it shows the
mathematical similarities between the two simulators. Secondly, it introduces a set of exper¬
iments to demonstrate that at a cognitive level, there exists an appropriate level of correspon¬
dence between the simulated and the real environment. To that aim, the affordance values used
for behaviour selection have been intentionally distorted via the addition of white noise in or¬
der to evaluate the degradation of the learning and selection process. Results obtained with the
Webots simulator and the new simulator are compared.
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A.1 Mathematical Framework
The elements of the architecture introduced in section 5.3.2 are valid for both simulation en¬
vironments. The learning is due to an actor-critic (AC) reinforcement learning architecture, a
variant of a Temporal Difference (TD) algorithm, where the assessment of decisions and the
execution of behaviour are embodied in two separate modules: the critic and the actor, respec¬
tively. The learning operation is illustrated by equations 5.5, 5.6, 5.3 and 5.4.
For the Webots simulator, the robot navigates among the objects in a random fashion.
Everytime it encounters an object, a decision is made and a behaviour executed, whose effect
reflects on the internal physiology. Unlike this, for the new simulator, there is no navigation.
The "encounter" with an object is reduced to the random selection of one of the objects to
interact with.
There is randomness for both cases. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference. The
navigation for the case of the Webots simulator is forcing some patterns of encounter of the
different objects in the environment due to their physical distribution. These patterns are absent
for the case of the abstract environment, since the selection of objects obeys a random policy.
In this respect, equation A.l expresses the general case of a transition probability.
Pr{s,+] =y,r/+i = r\st,rt,bt,st-],rt-Ub,(A.l)
In equation A.l the future state s;+] and future reward rt+1 depend on previous states (s,, s,_i
...) and on previous reward value (rt, r,_i ...) and behaviours executed (bt, b,-\ ...).
However, the structure of the environment allows us to re-formulate this dependence of
every state transition according to the Markovian property, where every state s/+i depends on
the precedent state s, only. This difference has an effect on the structure of the space of states.
In fact, the Markov property states that the probability of being in state s;+i = s' depends on
the previous state only, see equation A.l. This means that the probability of moving from one
state to the next depends on the initial state only. By learning the policies, we are adjusting the
probabilities of moving from one initial state s, to the goal, in state st+k so that the cumulative
reward is maximised. At this point it is necessary to stress that the state is divided into two parts,
the drives d, and the affordances at. The former experience an exponential decay when not
affected by an interaction, hence, their state is predictable. However, the affordances cannot be
predicted because the object to interact with in the abstract environment is chosen at random. At
this point, it becomes obvious that predicting the next state from the current state is impossible,
since only the d, part of the state is predictable, see equation A.2.
Pr{s,+\ = s',rl+] =r\d,,a,} = Pr{sl+] =s',rt+, = r\{d,. a,},b,} (A.2)
Nevertheless, it is still possible to learn on the basis of single transitions, since the reward
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does not depend on the final affordance (al+\ ), but only on the affordances available at the
moment of decision (at)\
o^+i = G^ + oc8,"#,, (A.3)
where t^/+i is the vector of weights used to estimate the policy values for each behaviour and
the prediction of future reward. et is the error vector that re-scales the scalar value of the error
in the prediction of reward d, for every weight.
The validity of these equations is guaranteed even in an environment where the encounter
of objects is not predictable. However, the use of eligibility traces (TD(A,)) is, in these environ¬
ments, excluded. Therefore, the learning is less efficient from the mathematical perspective,
than it in the case of Webots because the environment cannot be foreseen. However, the ab¬
straction of the interaction makes it possible to reduce the real time from hours to minutes,
which facilitates the performance of experiments.
Eligibility traces are an implementation of heuristics applied to the TD algorithm. It is
known that the solution is a trace of transitions from the origin to the goal state that maximise
reward. Applying elibigility traces is equivalent to extending the event of getting reward from
the current to the previous transition, see A.4 —the right term propagates the gradient of the
cumulative reward from the current to the previous states. This creates the so-called elibigibility
trace. Algorithmically, this has an effect on the update of the weights of the networks estimating
the policies and the function of the critic, cf. equations A.3 and A.4.
= (A.4)
The next section introduces a set of experiments to demonstrate that despite the differences
introduced in this section, there is nevertheless a correspondence between the results obtained
in one experimental testbed and the other. We have first performed the experiments with the
Khepera in Webots 4.0, and then replicated the simulations with the same parameters in the
new simulator.
A.2 Degrading Affordances for both Simulators: a Comparative
Study
The goal of the first set of experiments is to study the level of dependence of the learning
process on the affordances. To that aim, distortion has been gradually added to the initial
affordance values («)(?)) in the form of white additive noise (n(t),mx = 0, amplitude = a), as
shown in equation A.5. Sets of 2 simulations have been run for each value of noise, varying its
amplitude (a) between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.2. The length of each simulation has been
2 x 105 decisions (ca. 5 x 10s time steps, 7 hours per simulation).
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cij(t) = (ai(t) — 0.5) * (1 — a) + 0.5 + a*n(t) (A.5)
Equation A.5 shows the affordance value resulting from the addition of gaussian noise (n(t),mx =
0, amplitude = a) to its original value
The learning is organised in episodes. Each of them commences by setting the homeostatic
variables to random values between 0.0 and 1.0. The agent will then have to make appropriate
decisions until the norm of the vector of deficits (the drives) is smaller than 0.1 (the boundary of
the optimal zone), cf. figure 5.2. A new episode then follows. This process repeats throughout
5 x 105 simulation steps.
niiii illili kill
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Figure A.1: From left to right: Mean Number of Decisions per Episode. Number of Decisions to
Reach Stability. Physiological Balance and Overall Comfort, mean and variance values, respec¬
tively. Top graphs show results for the Khepera Robot in the Webots Simulator, bottom graphs
show results for the new simulator.
Results with Webots Figure A.l shows the mean number of decisions per episode (needed
to reach the optimal zone of the physiological space) at the end of the simulation for each
value of a. This suggests that affordances improve the performance by reducing the number
of decisions needed to reach the viability area to about 12 decisions. Also, the performance
decreases as the level of noise increases. For values of a larger than 0.6, the higher number of
decisions required suggests that the affordance values are disregarded, turning decision-making
into a process only controlled by the drives (hence disregarding the possible affordances offered
by the object faced). Figure A.l (centre graph) shows the number of episodes needed to reach
A.2. Degrading Affordances for both Simulators: a Comparative Study 183
stable policies. The time needed to reach convergence when there is no distortion is 7000
decisions, dramatically increasing for higher levels of distortion. The value for a = 1.0 signals
that in this case, the policies never get to their right values, hence in this case only, it takes few
time steps to reach a bad initial (and final) policy.
Results with the new Simulator The new experimental testbed simulates the interaction.
The environment itself consists of a vector containing the objects in the environment, each
with different affordance values. Navigation is absent in this environment, since the interaction
consists of randomly selecting an object from the vector, to which the same interaction rules
are applied as in the real scenario.
Graphs A.l (bottom set) introduce the decrease in performance in terms of the number
of decisions per episode to reach stability, tested by re-setting the internal physiology values
to random values between 0 and 1, when convergence for the policies has been reached, and
number of decisions to reach stability, left and centre, respectively. The bars are parametrised
according to the distorting value a (cf. equation A.5).
Simulations have been run with for same decay rate value X = 5x10-4 used for the simu¬
lations in the real scenario. Those to measure physiological stability have been run for both
cases with x = 5x10-3.
Figure A. 1 suggests that affordances improve the performance by reducing the number of
decisions needed to reach the viability area to approx. 12 decisions. Also, the performance
decreases as the level increases.
Conclusion
Previous sub-sections have addressed the the level of correspondence between the simulations
performed with the Webots simulator and the new simulator. Webots offers the advantage of
being a realistic simulator, using physics to model the interaction with the objects. Neverthe¬
less, in this section it has been argued that a faster simulation environment is able to provide
corresponding results with respect to the cognitive issues addressed in the rest of this chapter.
To that aim, the mathematical properties for both simulation environments have been com¬
pared, highlighting that due to the random selection of objects in the new simulator, it is only
possible to use the simplest version of the Temporal Difference algorithm (TD(0)). Further¬
more, some experiments to measure the impact of a simulated distortion of the affordance
weights on the learning process and the behaviour selection performance have been run with
both simulators. The results are introduced in figure A.l.
• By comparing the number ofdecisions to reach the goal (left graphs), it can be concluded
that with minor differences, the number of decisions experiences a similar degradation.
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The best and worst values are, for the Webots simulator 11 and 18, for the simulated
environment 13 and 17, respectively. The tendency to degrade when the level of noise
increases (a) shows the same pattern, the more noise, the more difficult it becomes to
reach the optimal zone.
• The middle graphs represent the number of decisions needed to learn the policy (that
maintain stability). A similar pattern of degradation, proportional to the level of noise,
is shown in both graphs. The best and worst values are 8800 and 12500 for Webots, and
9000 and 18500 for the simulated world. Although the pattern is similar, the numerical
difference can be explained by the fact that the update happens on the basis of single,
unpredictable transitions in the second case. This seems to be more sensitive to high
levels of distortion. An exception to the general behaviour is the values obtained for
a between 0.8 and 1.0. This is because the level of stability reached is not within the
optimal zone. Not surprisingly, reaching a bad level of stability requires a shorter time.
• Finally, the right graphs show a comparison in terms of physiological stability. Again, it
can be shown that the values obtained in both cases show a similar pattern of degradation
proportional to a.
This set of experiments has addressed the learning of policies for behaviour selection using
TD(0) with the proposed Actor-Critic architecture. The selected set of experiments demon¬
strate that although there are some differences for the interaction which affect the speed of
convergence of the learning algorithm, there is a correspondence in terms of the cognitive as¬
pects addressed in this chapter. In fact, the learning of behaviours obeys the same rules, and
the influence of the sensory perception (the affordances) has a similar effect, as shown by the
three metrics used for the comparison.
On the basis of this demonstrated correspondence, and motivated by the serious limitations
imposed by the Webots simulator, it is proposed to conduct the experiments in chapters 5 and
6.
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